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Introduction
In 2003, the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC)
implemented a revised work plan that focused
on mandate-specific activities and UNMEE
Peacekeeping Force (PKF) demining assets.
The novel and successful integration of the
Force Mine Action Centre (FMAC) with the
MACC represents a first in UN peacekeeping
history, as Force demining assets are now
coordinated by a single body and they work to
International Mine Action Standards (!MAS).
Unanticipated national events in mine action
in Eritrea in 2002 prompted an opportune
moment for the UNMEE MACC to demonstrate the key role that military demining
componems can play in humanitarian mme
action when effectively integrated.

EventR of July 2002
Unancicipated national events in
mid-2002, however, disrupted the UN mine
action operations in Eritrea. In July 2002, the
GoE enacted a new national policy for mine
action. It issued Proclamation No. 123/2002,
which dissolved the enti re national mine
action configuration and put inro place new
structures: first, the Eritrean Demining
Authority (E DA) and later the Erirrean
Demining Operations (EDO). Representing a
significant chan ge of attitude within the
national mine action programme, chis also
brought about the loss of humanitarian mine
action capacity in the TSZ. The GoE directed
a majority of international NGOs (INCOs) ro
leave the counrry. By early September 200 2,
the only non-UN mine action agencies that
were permitted ro remain in the country were
the HALO Trust and RONCO Consulting
Corporation , which is contracted to the U.S.
Department of State. The HALO Trust was
subsequently asked tO leave in June 2003.
Abruptly deprived of essen rial activities, the UNMEE MACC was forced to
reconsider the realities for carrying out its
mandated responsibilities. By removing three
major mine action international NGOs with
less than a month's notice, the original transitional concept from emergency to development mine action for Eritrea had tO be entirely revisited. Thus, immediately foll owing rhe
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Between 1998 and 2000 , a devastating two-year border con fli ct between
Ethiopia and Eritrea left behind an abundance
of mines and UXO in the countries, particularly along rhe border shared by rhe twO countries. In Eritrea, this legacy compounded an
already serious landmine problem-a result of
the nation's long struggle for independence.
After the countries' signing of the
"Agreement on Hostilities" in 2000, rhe UN
Securi ty Council promulgated Resolution
1320, which aurhorized a UN peacekeeping
mission- the UNMEE-as well as established rhe T emporary Security Zone (TSZ)
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This resolution
states that a key mandate of VNMEE is "ro
coordinate and provide technical assistance for
humanitarian mine action activities in rhe
T SZ and area adjacent ro ir." In supporr of
this mandate, the UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) of rhe UN Departmenc of

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) began
implementing a mine action assistance program me, establishing the MACC as parr of
UNMEE in mid-2000. By November 2000,
the MACC was fully established. Since then,
it has played a leading role in management
and coordination of all mine action activities
in the Mission area.

2000-2002
Between August 2000 and July
2002, the MACC responded to numerous
requests for assistance to non-governmental
o rganizatio ns (NGOs) conducting mine
action operations in the TSZ as well as
observed the PKF demining and UXO clearance programs. In addition, with the official
agreement of the government of Eritrea

(GoE), rhe MACC, during this period, concentrated much of its efforrs on rhe critical
need to coordinate all NCO mine action
activities and ro assist rhe GoE to build
national capacities for mine action. Th e
MACC worked to balance the creation of an
indigenous humanitarian mine action capacity and to coordinate rhe PKF mine action
requirements. Indeed, it expended considerable resources in the creation and d eployment
of the national mine action capacity and
ensured that these assets worked safely and
efficiently alongside the UNMEE assets. Until
mid-2002, this UN mine action srrucwre and
support functioned well and served the interest and needs of all affected parries in the
country, in particular all those working and
living in the TSZ and adjacent areas.

adoption of the new national policy for mine
action, the UNMEE MACC re-examined its
mine action role, with a view to redefining its
objectives and activities while at the same time
confirming its resource requirements.

ERtahliRhing the :Force 1\line
Action Center
In the fall of 2002, the MACC prepared a revised work plan focusing on the
restrucwring of existing mine action elemenrs
within the MACC and UNMEE, including
resources under command and control of
UNMEE PKF, the UN Military Observers
(UNMO) and the MACC, to continue to
carry out irs primary responsibilities as mandated, first and foremost, by the UN Security
Council. These are as follows:
• UN Secu rity Council Resolution
1320 (2000): "To coord inate and provide
technical assistance for hu manitarian mine
action activities within the T SZ and areas
adjacent to it."
• UN Security Council Resolution
1344 (200 I): "T o facil itate mi ne action in
coord ination wirh the United Nations Mine
Action Service, in particular through exchanging and providing existing maps and other relevant information ro rhe Un ited Nations."
• UN Security Council Resolution
1430 (2002): "Demining in key areas ro support demarcatio n."

The rapid MACC restructuring
process focused on establishing an integrated
civilian and military mine action headquarters
within UNMEE by combining the PKF's
Mine Action Cell (MACE), the Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Officer and the
UNMEE Mine Risk Education (MRE) Cell
with the structural componems of the MACC
Operations Section. This unique integrated
mine action establishment is referred ro roday
as the Force Mine Action Center (FMAC).
At the same time, the United
Nation's responsibility for assistance in
national capacity-building shifted entirely to
the UN Developmem Program (UNDP) and
the UN International Children's Emergency
Fund (UN ICEF). The MACC now only
assists UNDP and UNICEF with rheir capacity building efforts.
With the aim of implememing
UNMEE's mine action mandates, the
MACC/FMAC became fully responsible for
prioritization and issuance of all UNMEE
mine action tasks. It has both coordination
and operational functions covering all aspects
of mine action including MRE, EOD, medical coordination, mine clearance, demining
for demarcation as well as an emergency
response function, and as such is responsible
for providing support to the PKF in the TSZ
and adjacem areas. In this capacity, the
MACC/ FMAC is now able to put into effect
a consistent and well-coordinated UNMEE
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The MACC/FMAC manages and
coordinates a full set of PKF demining assets.
These assets c urren rly include a Kenyan
Engineer Company, which consists of cwo
human itarian-trained manual dem ining
t roops; I a Slovakian dem ining company,
which is made up of both a man ual and a
mechan ica l demining ca p acity; and a
Bangladeshi dcmining company, which consists of manual deminers as well as a mine
detection dog (MDD) ream. In ad dition, rhe
MACC employs MECHEM, a Sourh African
civil ian conrracror, for road clearance operations, as well as a n Emergency EOD field
ream and rwo MRE field ream s.
T he prima1y ro le and responsib ility
of rhe Force dcmin ing assets is ro support
rhe mobiliry and safery of rhe PKF as well as ro
provide specialist operational capability. Once
dem arcation commences, rhe mai n focus of
work fo r rhe Force demining assets will be rhe
clearance of roads and access routes ro pillar
sires as well as clearance of the actual p illar sires
along rhe delineated bo rder becween rhe two
counrries. Currenr preparations for dem ining
in support for demarcation inrend co deploy
rhe Force demining assets as an imegrared
operation, where all assets work alongside each
other in a murually supportive manner.
The Emergency EOD field ream is
tasked to support the Force d emining assets in
their effort to respond to immediate needs for
disposing of UXO. Most com mo nly, UXO is
discovered by members of t he local popu lation, who report these discoveries ro the
MACC MRE field teams. The MRE reams
are ch en responsible for submitting the discovery reports ro the MACC/FMAC h eadquarters, including the MACC EOD ream. In
mosr cases, rhe MACC EOD ream is subseq uently tasked ro d ispose of these UXO in rhe
field. T he EOD ream and th e MRE reams
have an excellem and effective working cooperation, wh ich enables a quick response ro
UXO d iscoveries.
The MACC MRE reams regu larly
deploy ro rhe rh ree sectors of rhe M ission area
within rhe TSZ and adjacent areas, where they
carry our community-level interventions, provid ing much-needed mine risk train ing to an
average of 2,000 men, women and children
per week.
The MACC MRE personnel also

conduct landmine safery training for mission
personnel, both mil icary and civilian, and
orher h uman itarian actors operating in
Erit rea.
In 2002, the MACC determined a
need for a road verification/clearance capacity
for locating p resumably deep-buried mines
and UXO and for increasing rhe safery of
movement and m obil ity of the PKF and
h umanitarian operations in the TSZ. The flrsc
co be contacted ro do this job was UXB Africa
(Pry.) Ltd.
During UXB's contract period until
2003, che UNMEE MACC planned the operations and tasked che rouce clearance capaciry.
In mid-2003, with the realisation char deepburied mines d id nor pose t he threat that was
initially assumed, rhe MACC recommended
ch ar the contract of UXB not be cxrcndcd.
UXB concluded operations in Eritrea in midJuly 2003.
Jn mid-2003 , rhe roure clearance/
verification conrracr was relet, this rime to
address the need co clear roads in support of
the border demarcation process of rhe
Ethiopian Ericrean Bound ary Commission
(EEBC) more rapidly as well as to address rhe
existing threat of newly laid mines (30 newly
laid m ines on roads were reported in 18
months) . This rime, the contract was awarded
co MECH EM. MECHEM has three clearance components: a m echanical ream , a manual ream and an MDD component.

MACC Management
Coordination

and

A ll mine accion tasks carried our by
rhe Force demining assets are closely planned,
coordi naced and supervised by the UNMEE
MACC/FMAC. An experienced sec of boch
civilian and military staff members of rhe
MACC/FMAC is responsible for rhe receipt
of casking requests, issuance of tasking orders,
monitoring of tasks, implem encario n of quality assuran ce as well as su pervision of activities
in completion of task orders.
The o perations section of che
MACC works alongside rhc FMAC. Three
Liaison Officers (one from each d emining
contingent) work ar the FMAC. They are in
charge of directly liaising and coordinating
tasks char are issued by t he MACC operations
section. T hese officers report to rhe civilian
Operations Officer of the MACC, who is
responsible for rhe coordination of the assets
and tasking priorities.

NGOs, cominued from page 41

In addition, chcre arc military
officers working at the MACC/FMAC. These
officers arc in fact UN Military Obse1vers
(UNMOs) seconded to the MACC for specific assignments. For example, cwo UNMOs acr
as FMAC MRE Officers; one acts as rhe
Project Officer Dcmining for Demarcation;
one aces as the Field Mine Action Liaison
Officer; and one acts as the Mine Action
Liaison Officer in Addis Ababa, Echiopia. In
coral, there are currently five UNMOs second<::d ro the MACC in rank from Major ro
Lieucenant Colonel.
The civilian international staff of
the MACC are predominantly ex-military
staff from a variery of countries. The majority
of chem have considerable demining and operational m anagement experience. At the
MACC, they fi ll positions such as Programme
Manager, C hief of Operations, O perations
Officer, Regional Liaison Officers, EOD
Officer, Chief of Informacion , Logistics
Officer and Programme/Tra ining Officer. As
a ream, they are responsible for the smooth
functioning of t he UNM EE MACC.

Demining Statistics
Since its inception, the MACC has coordinated,
managed or supervised the following clearance operations:
• Clearance of 51,058,794 sq m o f land
• C learance of 9,2"'7 km of roads
• D isposal of 3,739 AP mtncs
• D isp osal of2,514 AT m ines and 48,256 items o f UXO
These figures are the results of a combined military
and civilian composite of demining operations since the
beginning of the MACC through January 2004. They
are a reflection of the commitment and cooperation to
demining operations across the Mission area-an
achievement that has been realised through joint efforts
among contributing local authorities, NGOs and Force
demining assets.

Conclusion
The integration of a MACC into a peacekeeping o peration
has w itnessed a successful management of assets coupled with a unique
skills base. This is rhe first rime in UN peacekeeping history that a
peacekeepi ng mission has effectively incorporated into the establishment of rhe mission structure an integrated civilian and m il itary mine
action headquarters. This unprecedenced achievement has been
accomplished in addicion co mine clearance of large areas of land in
Eritrea and a significant reduction of the land mine and UXO threat
for rhe local population. Being the first UN mine action establishment
to effectively integrate all civilian and military mine action components of a UN peacekeeping mission within a single headquarters
structure, t he UNMEE MACC has che potencial to se1ve as a template
for che creation of fut u re mine action centers that are parr of UN
peacekeeping operations where a mine action element is required.

The }'uture
T he largest cask yet awamng rhe
MACC/FMAC is the continuation of coordinating clearance task~ of roads, access routes to
pillar sires as well as pillar sites in Sectors
Cemer and Wcsr to support rhe demarcation
project of the EEBC. O riginally, it was intended that chis p roject would commence in 2003.
However, due to rhe poli tical sralemare
bccween the cwo countries concerning the
delineation of their border, the EEBC has been
unable to proceed with demarcatio n. As a
result, the sires for pillars in Sectors Center and
West of che TSZ remain undecided, holding
back the Force assets to demine rhe necessary
areas in preparation for marking rhe border.
Pillar sites in Sector East have already been
idencified and cleared in prepa ration fo r
demarcation as chis was underway prior to che
disagreement becween che two countries concerning the way ahead of the EEBC. In the
interim, while che international communiry
anticipates an agreement becween Ethiopia
and Eritrea concerning demarcation, rhe Force
demining assets will continue to effectively
conduct UNMEE and humanitarian clearance
tasks in areas where populations are most
affected by the chreat of mines and UXO.
Currently, chis require ment is grearesr in the
minefields of rhe Shilalo region in Sector Wesr.

"'Photos c/o the authors.
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rhe needs and goals of rhe ocher. As John W ilkinson points o ut, " ...
ic's che same rh ing, but d ifferent sides of rhe same coin,"3 and gening
those rwo sides ro work in concert wirh one another is key to the
progress of humanitarian demining and will undoubtedly benefit both
as rhey work towards the murual objeccive of a world safe from mines
and UXO.
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piles of mines requires logistic support, such as inventory control, transincluding communication and medical back-up, and are organized to
port and unpacking prior to destruction. The local military can underoperate as a ream. Local military forces may have rhc necessary equ iptake these labour-intensive tasks.
me nt for demin ing, bur if not, this can be provided by visiting forces
bilaterally or multilaterally.
Thus, in many contexts, military forces have been widely
Visiting Military Forces
used in mine action, including humanitarian demining, although with
M any armed forces possess considerable expertise m mine
varying degrees of success. In Nicaragua, for instance, all demining has
action, including managing a nd overseeing demining and explosive ordbeen carried ou t by the Nicaraguan army and its effectiveness has been
n ance disposal (EOD) programmes, especially in emergency siruarions.
greatly enhanced by support from visiting milirary forces operating
T he positive elements they may bring are experience, knowledge of techunder rhe a uspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). On
niques and advanced EOD skills, and in a number of cases, some knowlthe other hand, in Bosnia Herzegovina, the usc of entity armed forces
edge of the International Mine Action Standards (!MAS). A number of
(EAF) in demining has been expensive and demining accidems have
the case studies in the GICHD report, notably Bosnia-Herzegovina and
been unacceptably high in rhe initial phases when compared to comN icaragua , show that dem ining accidents have been reduced due ro
mercial companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) . In
training and oversight from visiting m ilitary forces.
Cambodia, the armed forces have made a relatively limired contribuHowever, in mine-affected countries where rherc is both local
tion to huma ni tarian demining ro dare, rhough rhe srudy recomme nds
miliraty and civilian involvement in the mine action processes, visiting
that their role and contribution be reviewed. This is due to the recenr
mil itary forces te nd ro view their mission as fulfilling a rather narrow
improvements in organization, training and equi pment of the Royal
service. Cooperation and coordination with civilian structures are nor
Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), as well as rhc declining donor
always accorded adequate priority, which can lead to compa rtmentalizafunds for rhc civilian mine action structures in-country.
tion of rhe assets being delivered. Certain missions may even be underM ilitaty forces often operate in environments where info rtaken withour any direct knowledge of rhe civili an organ izations operatmation is restricted and con trolled, and rhey may be reluctant ro proing in the same tl1eatre.
vide data and information to others. T his makes coordination diffiBilateral arrangements between militaries can be appropriate
cult, if nor impossible, and duplication and gaps likely. In many conwhen the local military is largely or entirely in charge of a country's mine
texts, local military forces are reluctant to accept coord ination or
action programme. Such agreem ents, however, may not provide an adeinstruction from a civilian aurhoriry. For example, this appears to be
quate planning and programming framework when there arc multiple
the case in C ambodia. In Lebanon, the militaty has seemed reluctant
local and international actors involved, as programm ing complexity
to take external advice on mine action, although in fo rmation sharing
inc reases geometrically as the number of actors increases. As a n exa mple,
has reportedly improved. Similarly, in N icaragua, after early difficulit is possible that a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) or a UN
ties, coordinarion with rhe National Dem ining Commission and visMine Action Centre (MAC) may be working in conformity with localiting military forces seems ro
ly adapted standard s, bur a
have sign ificantly improved.
Clearing mines for humanitarian purposes demands visiting military fo rce may be
The srudy did not
training on a different interfind much evidence of the usc specific expertise, which may not necessarily be gained as a pretation. The !MAS repreof the military in the other result ofordinary military training or experience. Also, morale sent a n international set of
areas of mine action. While among deminers serving in local military forces may be low, sta ndards char may be adaptthe military may be able to
ed and interpreted differc nrly
provide warnings about the depending on salary and conditions, and conscripts do not by each h ost country, making
technical dangers of land- make the best deminers. It should not be forgotten that mili- no two countries' technical
mines and UXO, they are not
tary deminers are first and foremost soldiers and as such will procedures or standard opersuited to undertake commuating procedures (SOPs)
nity-based
MRE
pro- be used as combat engineers if hostilities re-emerge. In the exactly ali ke. Often , such disgrammes, where social issues aftennath of an internal anned conflict, the national anny parities will become evident
and helping to develop altermay not be perceived as neutral and may not be only !are in rhe programme
native coping mechanisms are
cycle as an increasing amount
important. In a few cases, the welcomed by affected communities. In these situations, it is of operatio nal respo nsibility
local military may have pro- better not to use the military or assign them tasks that do not is assumed by the national
vided immediate medical care
authority. The implications
to a civilian mine victim, bring them into contact with a community, such as the clear- of this may involve duplicathough they d o nor become ance of military barracks or airfields.
tion, unnecessary cost or the
involved in the provision of
need to re-clear land. Again,
prosthetics or rehab ilitation activities. Very few militaries anywhere in
rhe need for a strong, central national coordination body establ ished
the world have played an active role in calli ng for a b an on AP landearly in the life of a programme is seen as impon ant in avoiding these
mines. T he one other area where the local military has been seen to
situations.
play a significant role is in stockpile destruction in those countries that
UN peacekeepe rs have rarely engaged in large-scale humanihave signed the AP Mine Ban Convention (MBC). Destroying stocktarian demining or EOD tasks (Kosovo being a notable exception).
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Thus, although UN peacekeepers have been present in Lebanon for
more than rwo decades, they have rypically conducted only mine clearance co support their own operations, and according co their own
national military procedures. Though this may be consistenr wirh the
obligations of parties ro a conflict under international law ro be
responsible for mines, booby-uaps and other explosive devices laid by
those parties, it docs not necessarily lead to substantial remediation of
the problem in humanitarian terms. In fact, throughout the more than
20-year experience in Lebanon of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL), as seemingly simple a task as the handover of records, concerning the mine clearance work between incoming and outgoing contingents, appears not co have been accomplished.

Use ofMilitary TAs
Visiting militaries have often assigned military personnel ro
serve as TAs to the various MACs and project implementation units.
Many of these have performed admirably, and the secondmenr of
active military personnel appears to have been a successful strategy for
getting a mine action programme up and running in an emergency
phase and in highly specialized roles, such as EOD.
However, the GICHD smdy has concluded that the overall
contribution of these secondmenr programmes has proven modest in
the long term. There have also been criticisms of the role played by
some TAs, on the basis of unclear chains of command and reporting
lines and confused terms of reference. It has also been claimed that
coordinating authorities have sometimes failed to exploit fully their
skills and potential contributions ro the programme. Thus, a number
of rhc case studies in the G IC HD report, while acknowledging an
important role for in-kind military advisers at the o utset of a mine
action programme, express concern about their conrriburion over rhe
longrerm in a development context. This is the case in BosniaHerzegovina and Cambodia in particular, where TAs may not necessarily have been equipped with the skills needed to sustain mine
action. Nor are TAs necessarily experienced in building local capacities through advising their local counterparts.
In 1999, in Cambodia, for instance, the Cambodian Mine
Action Centre (CMAC) hosred 76 TAs, both military and civilian. A
review by UN Development Program (UNDP) concluded that, "while

the military has made an impressive contribution in developing capacity
within the CMAC, partimlarly technical capacity, in gmeral milif<lry advisers
are less suited to meet the training needs and capr1ciry demands CMAC now
foces. " Indeed, TAs may end up learning more abom mine action than

.,
0

n

c:

VI

do their national counterparts. These difficulties are compounded by
tours of dury-rypically six months-that are often roo short for the
individuals to make an effective contribution to the programme.
TAs can represent a significantly high cost for a mine action
programme. The incremental costs associated with any foreign dury
assignment of personnel from visiting military forces may be at least as
high as the full cost of engaging equally well-qualified civilian personnel for the same assignment. In addition, a different framework for
employment would allow for the termination of the assignment of an
employee whose performance proved to be unsatisfactory-something
that cannot readily be done with personnel seconded on a temporary
basis from a visiting military force.

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol8/iss1/1

developed in a consultative manner with the full range of actors.

Enhancing Combat Capacity
The provision of assistance to local miliraty forces for mine
action purposes, in the form of training and/or equipment, has sometimes been controversial as these can also enhance combat capaciry.
The nation providing military assistance must carefully consider the
potential ramifications of supplying training or equipment ro a miliraty force. The historical evolution of the conflict, rhe current peace
and reconciliation developments as well as the nature of the militaty
structure and deployment must all be weighed against the potential
benefits of military support for mine action prior to rhe provision of
assistance. There is no real mechanism ro decide this, as most militaryto-military assistance is provided on a bilateral basis.

* Copies of the study, The Role of the Military in Mine
Action, are available in hardcopy from the GlCHD or can be down-

loaded form the GICHD website at www.gichd.ch.

Final Comments
* Photo c/o AP.
E NDNOTES
1. See www.gichd.ch.

Contact Information:
Ian Mansfield
Operations Director, GICHD
7bis Avenue de Ia Paix
PO Box 1300
CH-121l Geneva 1
Switzerland
Tel: +41-22-906-1674
Fax: +41-22-906-1690
E-mail: i.mansfield@gichd.ch

CONCLUSION
The GICHD study on the role of the military in mine
acrion found rhat the military has played a significant role in a number of national mine action programmes. This can be either through
involvement by the local military forces or wirh support from a visiting milirary force. Invariably, at rhe end of a conAicr, local militaries
will need training and equipment to enable them to undertake
humanitarian demining tasks according to international standards.
T he decision to provide such support will need to be carefully weighed
against the risk of enhancing their war-fighting capabili ties, and what
phase of the post-conflict period it is. The study was unable to determine if it was cheaper to use the militaty for demining tasks, as productivity and cost effectiveness are areas that require further study in
the whole mine action sector. The use of visiting military forces on the
oth er hand, has been found to be most effective in the emergency or
starr-up phase of a national mine action programme.
Wherever there is a mine or UXO problem, humanitarian
and developmental ini tiatives necessarily involve a high degree of contact and interaction among military personnel, non-military m ine
action personnel and local communities. Militaty capabilities, if properly directed and controlled, can bring important skills and organizational assets to complement many mine action activities, particularly
in the emergency or srarr-up phase of a programme. Military organizations are normally trained to be mission-oriented and to complete
these missions as quickly and efficiently as possible. This works well
for almost all military problems, and indeed for many humanitarian
problems like infrastructure repair, bm establishing national mine
acrion programmes under post-conAict conditions normally requires a
longer-term approach than a militaty "task-oriented" one. Military
actors are unlikely to have the best idea how mine clearance firs into
the larger mine action picture.
The component activities of mine action have to be closely
coordinated if they are to work at all and military staff are well-versed
in the concept of how many interlocking compo nents make up a plan .
Mine action plans require a similar degree of integration, bm this
planning has to take place with a number of different agencies, both
military and non-military, which often have different perspectives and
agendas. All the actors must be prepared to submit to overall coordination and direction. T his does nor mean interfering in the established
military "chain of command," but that rhe broader issues like national strategies and prioriry setti ng for all the aspects of mine action are

already uses a version of 1M SMA that incorporates digitized maps of
the local training area at Fort Leonard Wood. This allows srudenrs to
work with actual survey data collected from simulated hazard areas and
incorporate them into IMSMA.

Eric M. Filippino
Head, Socio-Economic Unit, GICHD
7bis Avenue de Ia Paix
PO Box 1300
CH-121l Geneva 1
Switzerland
Tel: +41-22-906-1668
Fax: +41-22-906-1690
E-mail: e.filippino@gichd.ch

HDTC, continued from page II

of epidemiology and public health methods of assessment to analyze
and present clara used for planning and monitoring. Additionally, the
HDTC hosted representatives from the Psychological Operations unit
to discuss specific needs and recommendations. This interactive
course developmenr process allowed the center to update and implement changes for subsequent classes.

Landmine clearance is a deadly serious business. With rhis
ever in mind, rhe HDTC staff works diligently to conduct all training
in accordance with I MAS and to find and teach safer ways to perform
HMA operations, thereby fully supporting rhe U.S. government's
Mine Action Program.

*Graphics c/o the author.

Contact Information:
Rodney A. Robideau
Technical Director
U.S. Department of Defense
Humanitarian Demining Training Center
ATTN: ATSE-DOT-HD
Bldg 5415, FLW Hwy 38
Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473
USA

Comm: (573) 563-6199
DSN: 676-6199
Fax: (573) 563-5051
E-mail: robideaur@wood.army.mil
Website: www.wood.army.mil/HDTC
Paul Arcangeli
Director, HDTC
Comm.: (573) 596-0131 ext: 6-3869
E-mail: arcangelip@wood.army.mil
Lloyd Carpenter
HDTC Course Manager
Comm.: (573) 596-0131 ext: 6-5415
E-mail: carpenterl@wood.army.mil

New Plans for Training

-

The HDTC is planning to add rwo additional trammg
modules ro its curriculum. The first is a Level I UXO C learance
course that will enhance training of technicians ro perform barrie area
clearance (BAC) in contaminated areas. Students attending this course
will graduate with specialized knowledge gained from hands-on training and mission-specific lesson material in-hand for use in teaching
students in the specific host nation.
The second new training module pertains to an
information database manager's course on the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), the Geneva
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (G ICHD)
standardized mine action database. The HDTC responded ro requests
from its "cusromers" to add this module to our curriculum and
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THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

TRAINING CENTER
A CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

Introduction
Humanitarian mine action (HMA)
is a field known for irs paradigm shifrs. Just as
technological advances create more efficient
a nd less expensive alternatives to old products
a nd methodologies, em erging technologies
offer newer and safe r ways to derecr landmines. I nregrari ng rhese advances into rhe
HMA community and thereby rhe training
curriculum, is o ne challenge faced by rhe staff
of rhe U .S. Department of Defens e
Humani ta rian Demining T raining Cenrer
(HDTC).

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Background
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Established 111 1996, HDTC is
located ar Fort Leonard Wood, M issouri, and
is rhe U.S. Deparrmcnr of D efense training
facil ity for HMA. T he cem er is in a modern
15,000 sq ft. building set amid the rolling hills
of the Ozarks. In December 2003, rhe Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) directed
HDTC be transferred to rhe Defense Security
Cooperation Agency for oversight and direct
superviSIOn.
The typical studenr attending rhe
rwo-week HMA course comes primarily from
the Army's Special Operations Fo rces (SOF) .
T he stude nts come to rhe HDTC ro prepare
rhem to deploy on HMA training missions in
one of the 43 mine-affected nations presently
su pported by the U nited Stares. These missions range from establishing a new program
ro maintaining on-going mine action initiatives. SOF soldiers are well-suited to perform
HMA missions due to their experience working overseas in small units, their ability ro
work independently and an in nate cultural
awareness. T he last trait is extremely imporranr, since these "unofficial ambassadors" represent rhe Uni ted States-its people, government a nd military-to rhe citizens of rhe host

natio n. The contact these soldiers have with
their counterparts and students may be far
more personal and inrense in nature than rhar
which many diplomats experience.

Training Curri culum
The basic HDTC curriculum is rhe
same for all students during the first week.
This common-core training foc uses on the
basic prem ises of mission planning, U.S .
Policy, and the International Mine Action
Standards (!MAS). All students are exposed to
rhe rigors of demining during an introduction
to the use of mine detectors and basic mine
clearance proced ures. lr is d uring th is training
rhar all studenrs d on protective equipment
and locate and expose a m ine in a one-meter
training la ne while ar rhe same rime practicing
safe and proper techn iques and procedures.
W h ile rhe novelty of the task first amuses rhc
soldiers, rhis training q uickly demonstrates
the d ifficulties and ted ium of clearing vegetation, avoiding trip wires and finally, of preparing rhe mine for destruction in place.

D uring rhe second week, students
arc trained according ro their specific responsibilities for the upcom ing mission. Generally
speaking, Special Forces soldiers focus on
dem in ing skills throughout the second week
of training, as ir will be their responsibili ty ro
train deminers in rhe host nation. These particular soldiers a rrive ar rhe HDTC with ma ny
of rhe skills necessary to reach d emin ing; rhey
are experienced trainers, possess advanced language skills and have extensive training wirh
explosives.
C ivil Affairs soldiers arrive already
trained and experienced in working with m inister ial levels of government. T his background
lends itself well to the program ma nagement
a nd infrastruc ture d evelopment aspect of
HMA These students are given additional
training on general management, the U.S.
Department o f Stare's Country Plan
Assessment, rhe host nation 's curren t work
plan, and a n overview of other organ izations
involved within the counrry. Armed with this
knowledge, rhese soldiers are called upon ro
reach or assist in srraregic p lanning, coordi-

narc efforrs with other HMA activities, a nd
advise in logistical planning.

Additional Components of HMA
Mine risk education (MRE) is a
viral aspect of H MA, allowi ng rhc grearesr
reach a nd influence ar rhe lowest program
cost. To achieve this goal, soldiers fro m rhe
U.S. Army's Psychological Operations orga nizations bring product development skills ro
rhe table. These skilled warriors receive m uch
of the sam e training as C ivil Affairs soldiers
regarding the H MA situation in a host nation.
Additionally, they receive mission-fo cused
train ing on MRE methodology, idenrificarion
of at-risk groups, and integration of communi ty-based MRE efforts inro the larger country-wide p rogram.
Another group of soldiers supporring the U.S. governmenr's H MA efforr come
from rhe U.S. M il itary's Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) specialty. These highly
trained technicians hail from all branc hes of
rhe Armed Forces. A typical class may include
soldiers, sa ilors and Marines. Iris rhis specific
diversity rhar ofren strengthens the group's
skill sets and experience leveL EOD students
receive the same basic HMA instruction as all
students attending trai ning at rhe HDTC.
Since they already possess a strong background in rhe UXO disposal, their m ission
preparation concentrates primarily on rhe type
of tlueat and the type of traini ng rhey will
have ro plan for rhe host nation. EOD technicians leave HDTC wich a perspective of how
ro address explosive conraminarion from an
HMA perspective.

HDTC Museum
Students and visirors are often surprised at the level of sophistication awaiting
rhem ar rhe HDTC. T he H DTC Museum is
ar the recep tion area, where all manner of
mines, o rdna nce and interactive displays are
available for evaluation. The inerr mines are
displayed on shelves, intact or as cur-away
models, or even in an underground sid e-view
of emplacement. The museum includes an
ever-expanding variety of fu ses, ami-ha ndling
devices, bombs, rockets, sub-muni t io ns,
detectors, protective equipment and ammunition.
Given the cenrer's va ried contacts
throughout rhe HMA community, ma ny diffe rent people, organizations and agencies have
come together ro provide inerr samples of rhe

many items fo und in counrries where rhe U.S.
governme nt HMA program is involved. More
tha n just an inreresting place to visit, the
museum allows stude nts and visitors an
opporruni ry ro safely see and touch "rhe rea l
thing. " This enhances the learning experience, a nd gives all a keener understanding of
rhe rhrear from these indiscrim inate killers.

Teaching at the HDTC
Cou rse Managers ar rhc HDTC all
have a primary area of expertise. In addition ,
they each fill alre rnare or assistant instructor
positions in one or more orher courses. At first
glance, this broad-reach ing collaboration may
appear less difficult than it is in application.
T he expectation is rhar all staff members reach
beyond the Cenrer's currenr activities and
scope ro become subject matter experts in o ne
or more HMA-relared areas. This directly supports rhe Deparrmenr of Defense's visio n for a
"Cenrcr of Excellence" in HMA tra ining.
With over I 00 acres of land available for training, rhe HDTC provides studenrs with full-scale layouts of mine clearance
operations, ro include associated supporr areas.
Each area is constructed in accordance wirh provisions of rhe !SMA. Orher lanes show examples of indigenous marking systems used in
clearance operations throughout the world .
O ne partic ularly inreresring display depicts
landmi nes rhar were emplaced several years
ago, wirh vegetation and terrain allowed ro
"age" naturally. Purposely, rhe area is nor
mainrained or changed in a ny way so stude nts
are able ro observe m ines
thar have become more
or less visible, changed
colo r, becom e rotted or
migrated due ro rhe
effects of wea the ring.
What srudenrs leave wirh
is an innate understanding of the effects nature
m ay have o n actual
mined areas. Fallen limbs
and heavy undergrowth
underscore the difficulties faced by demi ners in
many parts of the world.
T he HDTC
staff is com prised of
experienced professionals-most wirh prior military experience. T hese
sraff members
have
extensive backgrounds in

a reas such as EOD, engineering, Informacion
Technology and Special Operations. Along
wirh U.S. person nel, a m il itary representative
of rhe Royal New Zealand Army also augments rhe staff. While the bulk of rhe H DTC
sraff is U.S. governme nt employees, rhe New
Zealand Army representative is the only currem active-duty military member of the staff,
and brings in-depth experie nce gained
throughout his engineering career.
The H DTC has d eployed irs sraff
me mbers on military training missions and
assessme nts ro numerous countries ro augment and advise military H MA ream trainers.
T hese deployments provide several direct benefits: they provide a ready source of information to the military training team and they
allow staff members to gain fi rsthand observations of HMA operations rhrougho ur the
world. This in turn ensures rhar rhe H DTC is
up-to-d ate on the latest techn iques a nd technology in use by the H MA communi ty.
Another way rhe HDTC conrinues
ro evolve is through feed back from rhe "customer," na mely, the students or rheir units.
Recently, Psychological Operations students
indicated additional areas they felt would be
be nefi cial ro their trai ning and understand ing
of HMA. In response, the H DTC senr a representative ro attend trai ning with rhe United
Nations C h ildren's Fund (UNICEF) and rhe
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in Arlanra, GA. T his training focused
on rhe laresr find ings and associative relevance
continued on page 9, HDTC

(II

:I
()

...

0

1-- - -- -- - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - tlv Lloyd D. Carpenter, Course M anager, Paul Arcangeli,
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CANADIAN MILITARY
Support to Humanitarian Mine Action

Introduction
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Humanitarian mine action tasks fo r
rhe military are almost exclusively assigned ro
rhe Canadian Military Engineers (CME).
During rhe Cold War, the CME spent a great
deal of rime training for mine warfare, while
maintaining a keen eye on rhe North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's (NATO's) Central
Front. Fortunately, the CME did nor have ro
exercise their full capabilities. However, some
of the skills the CME had acquired proved
useful in unexpected ways as the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
began to fade.
Between 1989 and 2003, Canadian
sold iers participated in rhree significant
humanitarian m ine action programs in
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Bosnia-

Herzegovina (BiH). In addition, smaller numbers supported survey programs tn
Mozambique and Angola. Canadian troops
deployed to Kuwait, Iraq, C roatia, BiH,
Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Erhiopia/Erirrea and Afghanistan
conducted mine and UXO clearance, which
contributed to rhe overall demining effort.

>akistanl Aie:hruustan
The
Soviet
occupation
of
Afghanistan in 1979 created a severe mine
rhreat in Afghanistan and a large Afghan
refugee population migrated to neighboring
Pakistan and Iran. The 1988 Geneva Accords
set rhe rerms for Sovier withdrawal, bur the
way home for rhe Afghan refugees was-all
roo literally- far from clear. The first human-

itarian mine action programs and rhe first
general usage of the term "humanitarian demining" developed in response ro rhis situation.
The United Nations, which had
established an office in Islamabad to coordinate rhe humanitarian demining effort, proposed to address the mine threat there by
training select refugees in basic mine cleara nce
and mine awareness. Whe n rhe projected largescale repatriation of refugees began following d1e
withdrawal of Soviet troops early in 1989, ir was
anticipated mat rhis selection program would
provide refugees wirh needed skills and capabilities. In preparation for humanitarian demining effort s, rhe Mine Awareness and
Clearance Training Program (MACTP) was
established in August 1988. The Unired
Nations appealed to member stares to support
rhe new program. Nine countries, including

Canada, agreed to provide military personnel, the first of which began
concept of civilians clearing mines around their villages proved ro be
ro arrive in February 1989. Canada also provided a Colonel to rhe
invalid. This was not a reAecrion on rhe trainees or on rhose who had
MACTP Headquarters to acr as the Assistant Controller and Senior
provided the training; rather, this was a reflection of the narure of demTechnical Advisor. Between March 1989 and July 1990, four 12ining, rhe requirement for reasonable salaries and me availability of
m ember CME teams rorared through the MACTP.
appropriate support.
Initially, the MACTP had two goals. The first was to train
15,000 Afghan men who were then distributed according to place of
Cambod1a
origin so as to ensure their knowledge concerning rhe basics of locating, neutralizing, and destroying mines and booby rraps. The second
In October 1991 , after decades of aggression, rhe government
goal was to provide mine awareness, which consisted of recognition of
of Cambodia and irs opponents agreed to end rhe conAicr by permi tting
mines and potential mine locations, self-extraction from a mined area,
rhe United Nations ro run the country for 18 months. The United
and marking techn iques. Subsequently, when rhe pace of refugee
Nations was also responsible for conducting elections and supervising
return proved slower rhan expected and more training rime became
demobilization. United Nations troops began to arrive at the close of
available, rhe following positions and additional courses were added:
1991 a nd began ro withdraw in mid-1993, having shepherded rhe
basic mine clearance instructor, unit leader, small unir operations and
counny
th rough a reasonably successful set of elections, despite rhe fact
survey.
rhar
the
Khmer Rouge had nor cooperated. Ir was clear from the beginDuring rhe developmental stages of humanitarian min e
ning
of
rhe
United Nations mission rhat Cambodia faced an extre me
action, issues such as the broader management of clearance operations
mine rhrear; one that continued ro increase until rhe final round of
and quality assurance were nor addressed. Training was conducted in
figh ring weakened at the end of rhe 1990s.
two camps near Peshawar and Quetra, each with a capacity for an
U nired Nations forces conducted mine clearance efforts in
average of 250 students. Pakistani army engineers, who also served as
Cambodia,
which included limired survey, marking and mine awareness
additional camp support and administration , established both camps.
activities in order ro support their own operations. During 1992,
Working our of these facilities, MACTP personnel trained some
United Narions personnel contingents began to rrain Cambodians
11 ,000 Afghans in 15 months. Canadian personnel conducted trainunder
rhe auspices of rhe Mine Clearance and Training Unit (MCTU).
ing, updated curricula a nd verified the technical content of rhe demiIn
1993,
with United Nations withdrawal nearing, rhe MCTU evolved
ning courses.
into rhe Cambodian Mine Acrion Centre (CMAC) . The CMAC is a
Mine awareness training was conducted under rhe auspices
government agency with foreign civil ian and military Technical
of the Inrernational Rescue Committee (IRC) on behalf of rhe United
Advisors, financed through a U nited Nations Development Program
Nations. IRC mine awareness training presented a particular challenge
(UNDP) trust fu nd , with rhe Unired Nations Office of Project Services
to female refugees, as Afghan culture restricts the use of male trainers
(UNOPS) as the executing agency. CME members were heavily
for the refugee wome n a nd girls. This difficulty was resolved through
involved in this process. The Canadian govern ment agreed to provide
a peculiarity inherent in the Canadian training system. All CME officontinual military support to CMAC. Incidentally, the term "mine
cers are required to train for both combat engineer and garrison infraacrion" appears ro have been coi ned in the process of naming CMAC.
structure support tasks. Female officers, who were at that time prohibInitially, the 12-member Canadian group was the largest
ited from serving in combat units, nevertheless had ro undergo rhe relnational demining conringcnr, comprising more than one-rhird of rhe
evant training. This inequity e nded the following year when the
restriction was lifted.
first group of military Technical Advisors. However, rhe Canadian
group was gradually reduced to seven, until finally me Canadian comCanada was thus in a position to provide qualified demimitment was terminated in 2000. Members of the Canadian contingent
ning instructors who could go into the camps to train female refugees.
Three members of each 12-member ream were women. These officers
occupied a range of positions includ in g rhar of C hief Technical Advisor,
assisted IRC with curriculum development, raugh r different aspects of
which would remain a Canadian post until mid-2000. Other Canadians
mine awareness to Afghans of borh sexes and monitored rhe insrrucserved as Technical Advisers in the field and as operations and technical
rors once they began to reach rheir own courses. By July 1990, an
dcvelopmenr sraff ar the CMAC headquarters. The Canadians and
average of 40,000 refugees per month were receiving mine awareness
other technical advisers assisted wirh mine clearance operations, plantraining. However, access to female refugees continued to remain
ning, procedures, equipment testing, acquisition, mine awareness and
problemaric due to con tinued cui rural obstacles and a limited number
information management. In 1999, seven Canadians occupied four
of female instructors .
positions at CMAC headquarters, including that of Chief Technical
The last of rhe 50 Canadians to serve with rhe MACTP lefr
Advisor, and three positions in two of CMAC's fou r demining units.
Afghanistan and Pakistan in July 1990. The program had begun to
International support helped CMAC establish irself rather
d iversify some time earlier wirh the srarr of clearance operations withquickly. By rhe middle of the decade, the organization could field 42
in Afghanistan and continued to evolve as rhe number of qualified
plaroons of deminers wirh the requisite adminisrrarive and logistics supAfghans increased. The number of foreign instructors decreased as the
port, as well as survey, mine awareness and traini ng eleme nts. By 1997,
scope of clearance operations expanded. In the long run, however, rhe
there were approximately 2,500 national staff and 50 expatriate techniuse of unpaid civilian deminers who lacked logistic and medical supcal advisers employed by CMAC; in 1999, there were some 60 platoons
port was not viable, and focus shifted to non-governmental organizawirh nearly 2,800 national sra.ff and 50 expatriate technical advisers.
tion (NCO) and commercial operations. In this respect, the MACTP
The CMAC provided approximately three-quarters of Cambodia's
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demining resources.
Unfortunately, this success was marred by increasing concerns about mismanagemenr and corruption, and funding eventually
ceased. Lack of funding led to a halt in ope rations in late 2000, when
the organization could no longer sustain itself. The simarion was evenmally resolved by implemenring a national mine action authority, rhus
separating responsibility for clearance operations from rhe strategic
planning, quality assurance and oversight of those operations .
Following previous setbacks, a chastened and reorganized CMAC
resumed ope rations, focusing on clearance. Wider demining responsibilities had been transferred to the newly created Cambodian Mine
Action Authority. The success of the changes helped to significantly
restore donor confidence.

Bosn1a-Hcrzep;ovnta
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The fighting that swept across the western Balkans during
the 1990s left BiH with a signifi canr mine and UXO problem. After
rhe signing of the Dayton Accords in late 1995 and the subsequent
deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR, later rhe
Stabilization Force or SFOR) in conjuncrion with a variety of organizations ranging from NGOs to indigenous armed forces, the collaborating organizations began to conduct mine action operations. In May
1996, rhe United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs established a mine action center (MAC) in BiH. T he MAC operated under
a mandate from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs to act as the
lead agency fo r all mine action activities in the counrry. These responsibilities were turned over to the newly created Bosnia-Herzegovina
Mine Action Center (BH MAC) in J uly 1998.
The situation in post-war BiH was further complicated
because the country was divided int o two Enriries. Each had substantial powers rhar, by design, left the State governmenr with limited
spheres of authority and responsibility . For example, each Entity
maintained its own armed forces and civil protection forces. T he division between State and Entity levels meant that BHMAC's authority
was limited, even though irs responsibilities included the accredirarion
of demining companies, the promulgation of national standards
(including technical standard operating procedures and accident investigation), and the coordination of information management and centralized financial management (including donor funds). Furthermore,
the coordina tion of daily operations was the responsibility of rwo
Entity Mine Action Cenrers (EMACs), reponing to their respective
Entity governments and acting through a number of regional offices.
The EMACs enjoyed significant latitude in planning and conducting
operations, which would eventually lead to severe difficulties.
Canada's involvement in humanitarian mine action in BiH
began in 1997 when six military personnel were d ispatched ro support
the United Nations MAC. The initial six Canadians would be the
beginning of a five-year commitrnenr that would involve some 60
Canadians serving in six-mo nth rotations. In the beginn ing, rhc
Canadians made up approximately one-fifth of the BiH military
Technical Advisers, although this proportion d im inish ed over the years.
At various times, Canadians worked at the regional, enrity and stare levels and were involved in training, operations, information management, supply and finance. For example, in 1999, the four-member
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humanitarian mine action and the several organizations a nd individuals which they worked alongside. It is undeniable many valuable lessons were learned during rhe period covered by this overview, and it
is equally obvious that many issues remain the subject of debate. I am
certain char rhe people whose efforrs form the basis of this article
would join me in welcoming that debate, as it is essential to the continued improvement of humanitarian mine action.

Canadian contingent occupied several posts including rhe following:
• Quality Assurance Adviser (BHMAC)
• Finance Adviser (EMAC)
• Two field-level Technical Advisors at regional offices
Demining operations in BiH were conducted by a wide variety
of agencies including NGOs, commercial companies, teams equipped
and managed directly by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), C ivil Protection forces in the Entities and demining units of the Entity arm ies. Although nor part of BHMAC, some
members of rhe Canadian IFORJSFOR contingenr in BiH had acted
and conrinued to act as mine monitors, ensuring that indigenous
armed forces conducted mine clearance operations in accordance with
their obligations under the peace accords.
Over the years, mine action in BiH was accompanied by frequent allegations of corruption, mismanagement and misuse of influence. Not surprisingly, donors lost confidence and began pulling funding from the operation as the 1990s progressed . Activities slowed and
in late 2000 operations were sharply curtailed due ro lack of funds. The
development of legislation ro centralize mine action under BHMAC
and ro clearly subordinate rhe Entiry offices to the central agency eventually resulted from international pressure. This legislation was enacted
in early 2002, rhus beginn ing the process of restoring donor confidence.
T he siwarion has been gradually improving since then.
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the clearing and mapping of mines. The agreement also gave the internationally led Joint
Military Commission QMC)- in which the
United States played a leading role- specific
responsibility for supervising the mapping and
cleari ng of mines. Immediate demining action
was required in this region as it was critical to
the success of the first phase of the cease-fire
and the operations of the JMC. In addition ,
heavy rains in Sudan begin in June, which
would have made ground movement and
mine-related activities impossible or extremely
difficult. The QRDF was deployed to Sudan
during April-June 2002 to
conduct mine clearance operations . The QRDF's mine
clearance operations lessened
the likelihood of casualties in
this area as refugees and internally displaced persons (lOPs)
began relocation into areas
where mines were known ro
exist and into other areas suspected of being mined. In
doing so, the mine clearance
operations conrribmed to the
success of the fi rst phase of the
concluded cease-fire between
the government of Sudan and
rhe SPLM/A as well as the
operations of the internationally led JMC. This initial operation was so successful that a second "ad hoc"
QRDF deployment was conducted during the
period of March 2003 through January 2004.

The Quick Reaction Demining Force:
The United States' Response to Humanitarian Demining Crises
the Republic of Mozambique. The United
States has also established an independent
management unit in Maputo to manage
QRDF operations in coordinat ion with
Mozambican authorities. In between deployments o utside Mozambique, the QRDF
engages in humanitarian demining in support
of Mozambique's National Demining
Institute, which allows the QRDF to both
perform valuabk service in mat mine-affected
nation as well as keep its professional skills
finely honed.

Demining Assistance to Sudan

Introduction
H umanirarian crises, particular! y
crises in which landmines are involved, may
occur without warning and require an immediate response. Examples of such crises include
Hurricane Mitch, which struck Central
America in 1998, the rapid, post-air war
return of refugees ro mine-infested Kosovo in
1999, and tropical cyclones Hudah and Eline
that ravaged Mozambique in 2000, displacing
thousands of landmines. T o respond to such
emergency situations quickly and effi ciently,
the United States developed a Quick Reaction
Demining Force (QRDF).

Overview of the QRDF
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In
April
2001,
the
U.S.
Department of State's Office of Humanitarian
Demining Programs (now the Office of
Weapons Removal and Abatement), in cooperation with the Republic of Mozambique,
established the QRDF as a result of lessons

learned from rhe immediate post-conflict situation in Kosovo, where threats to returning
refugees existed. The QRDF is a permanent,
professional humanitarian dem ining group
composed primarily of four 10-man reams of
Mozambican mine clearance specialists augmented by eight mine detection dog (MOD)
reams of one dog and handler each. The teams
can be deployed worldwide within 14 days of
activation to provide immediate demining
assistance in emergency humanitarian situations. The QRDF is d eployed to demining
crisis situations as directed by me
government. The force incorporates proven demining procedures, including rhe use of MODs
and specially designed mechanical equipment,
and is outfitted with demining-specific rools
and materials. Once deployed, the reams
locate, identifY, map, record and destroy landmines, U:XO and improvised explosive devices
(lEOs) found in the areas designated for clearance. The United Stares oversees recruitment,
provision of equipment, training and supervision of QRDF personnel within and outside

u.s.

On January 19, 2002, the governm ent of Sudan and the Sudan People's
Liberation M ovement/ Army (SP LM/A)
accepted a formal cease-fire agreemenr following the mediation of the United States and
Switzerland for a war that had lasted 17 years
in the Nuba Mountains. This war had resulted in massive population displacement within
the region, and landmines had consistently
been cited as a major threat to the civil population and a barrier to freedom of movement
and generation of income. The government of
Sudan believed that between 1989 and
February 2002, I , 160 persons became mine
victims in the Nuba Mountain region.
Following the cease-fi re, the displaced population from both within and outside the region
had begun spontaneous relocation and movement despite advice from authorities to wait
until their sec urity and safe ty could be
assured. The actual presence of landmines in
some areas, their suspected presence in others
and the inability to differentiate between the
two situations all posed real threats ro the
Nuba Mountains community. The landmines
also threatened rhe implementation of the
cease-fire and the sustainability of peace in the
Nuba Mountains.
The cease-fire agreement specifically referred ro the cessation of mine laying and

Demining Assistance to Sri Lanka
In March 2002, the government of
Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam signed a cease-fire agreement and began
planning for peace talks to take place in a neutral country. The 18-year civil war left many
landmines and UXO scarrered across Sri
Lanka . Because no accurate countrywide survey of the mine/UXO threat has been conducted, an accurate estimate of thei r numbers
and the areas they affect is impossible to calculate. The most heavily mine and U:XO-Iirrered
areas are J affna in the north and the areas
directly to rhe south of Jaffna. The deployment of the QRDF to Sri Lanka was in
response to the government of Sri Lanka's
request for assistance to resettle some 200,000
IDPs who had to travel through heavily mined
areas in the Vanni and Killinochchi regions

and in the Jaffna Peninsula. The QRDF
deployment provided an on-sire demining
capability until the United Nations could
begin irs program of assistance, which demonstrated the U.S. government's continuing support for efforts to bring peace to Sri Lanka. In
early May 2002, QRDF operations began in
the key village of Sarasalai about 15 km from
Jaffna where Tamil civilians, taking advantage
of the cease-fire, were returning to their homes
and fields. The QRDF team completed its
work on October 25, 2002, by releasing nearly 123,000 sq m of land in this area to Sri

Lankan authorities. The team cleared 980
anti-personnel mines and 42 pieces of UXO
and additionally collected and destroyed
numerous other pieces of UXO that had been
brought to irs attention by local residents. In
early 2003, the United States demonstrated irs
continued commitment to humanitarian
mine clearance in Sri Lanka by returning the
QRDF to render anomer six months of demining assistance. This provided a bridge of
assistance while rhe United States geared up to
support rhe next srep in the dcmining effort:
establishing a humanitarian mine clearance
training program for Sri Lankan civilian and
military personnel so that Sri Lankans could
continue rhe work in their own country.

Demining Assistance to Iraq
Under the direction of the
Department of State, demining contractor
RONCO deployed four QRDF teams to Iraq
on May 3, 2003, ro provide demining and
battle area clearance (BAC) assistance to the

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (O RHA). ORHA served as the initial governing body in Iraq and was eventually redesignated as the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA). As the governing body, the
ORHA/CPA was able to immediately begin
rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq and also
quickly remove serious threats of mines and
U:XO- a task char fell to the QRDF.
Under the direct supervision of a
RONCO Task Leader, EOD/Demining
Supervisor and MOD Supervisor, the four
eight-man demining reams and
eight dog handler/MOD team s
conducted operations with
respect ro the reconstruction
and threat removal effort being
coordinated by the ORHA/
CPA along with Coalition
Forces (CF). By incorporating
proven barrie area and mine
clearance procedures, with the
added asset of MOD reams,
the QRDF safely cleared nearly
1.2 million sq m of land , which
yielded over 2,000 mines and
U:XO from BAC and demining
tasks in and around farms,
wheat fields, power lines, government buildings, and houses
and along major highways in
the Baghdad area. On August
27, 2003, fou r months after the deployment
to Iraq, the QRDF reams returned to their
home base in Mozambique after they responded successfully once again to an imminent
humanitarian crisis. Today, rhe QRDF
remains "on call" to alleviate human suffering
anywhere in the world while ir contributes to
rhe
establishment
of
a
mine-safe
Mozambique.

*Photos c/o Office of Weapons Removal and
Abatement, US Department ofState.
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Demining (G ICHD).

2004 Seminars

Mine Action Training

During the Updating Seminar VII
scheduled for June 7- 11 , 2004, rhe main
topic will be based on rhe "Guide ro Mine
Action." This guide was recently published by
the GICHD and includes issues that are essenrial for understanding the current e nforced
doctrine. The second Updating Seminar VII
being held in October or November will focus
on the analysis of !MAS and other publications issued by GICHD.

,

enttna

Future Plans

Argentina has always relied on irs
military with respect ro demining. At the same
rime, the governme nt has con tinually taken an
active role in promoting rhe use of military
mine clearance throughout the international
co mmunity. For instance, in 1993, three officers and one no n-commissioned officer
(NCO) were sent as a ream, supervised by rhe
Organization of American Stares (OAS), ro
Nicaragua. There they took the role of training the Nicaraguan army in different mine
clearance techniques.
A few years later in June 1997, a
senior officer was appointed United Nations
Program Manager of rhe Department of
Hum ani tarian Affairs (DHA) Support
Program for M ine Action in Angola. In coord ination with rhe White Helmers, 1 eight officers and three NCOs were later appointed to

various Angolan provincial demining brigades
unci! 1998. In January 1999, in coordination
wirh rhe White Helmers, rwo senior officers
along with one junior officer and one NCO
were appointed ro be parr of a demining ream
in Central America. Later in July, three officers and one NCO relieved them. Ar the completion of the year, all ream members returned
to Argentina.

Conside ring the increasing participation of Argentinean miliraty personnel in
international demining activities, the army
began training irs personnel on mine clearance
techniques and procedures. T hese became
known as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
courses, which focused mainly on the safety of
operators. T his change in direction made a

substantial difference from former militaJy
procedures related to mine breaching.
On April 12, 2000, the C hief of rhe
General Staff of the army orde red the
Humanitarian De mining Training Center
(H DTC) to be created in the Engineer
Battalion 601 in Campo de Mayo, Buenos
Aires. Larer in September of 2000, the first
course on humanitarian d emining was held,
continuing on through 2001. Military units
throughout the counny sent their engineer
personnel to attend.
Since its creation, th e HDTC has
assumed rhe responsibility of training irs own
and foreign personnel in coordination with
J oint Peacekeeping Operations Training
Center in
Arge ntina
(CAECOPAZ).
However, rhe financial difficulties faced by rhe
country during 2002 and 2003 made training
of foreigners impossible; thus, the courses
we re limi ted to Argentinean personnel.

Tl

The U.S. So uthern Com ma nd ,
between April and June 2002, o rgan ized a
course for instructors about mine clearance
program manageme nt in accordance with rhe
U.S. Department o f Defense (DoD) mu!ti!are ral agreement. They also contributed invaluable equipment for use at CAECOPAZ.

water demining. M ost notable is their
amphibious e ngineer course, which takes
pride in training rhe army specifically in
amphibian demining operations. Currenrly, ir
also includes humanitarian demining training,
bur in rhe future this training will be carried
our by rhe HDTC.

Current Situation
In 2004, there will be the following
rwo courses on Humanitarian Demining:
I. Humanitaria n D emining Basic
Course: The aim o f this co urse is to train personnel on the necessary techniques to carry on
humanitarian demining operations.
2. Human itarian Demining Advanced Course: The aim of this course is to
train officers in the preparation needed for
planning humanitarian demining operations.
T h e HDTC plans ro continue
exchanging instructors with U.S. training centers in Fort Leonard Wood and especially in
Fort Belvoir, which holds a wealth of information penaining to mine detection d ogs. The
HDTC has also requested personnel to be
assigned to the Engineer Brigade in order to
conduct speci fic research.

0

n

c:
(I)

The Argentine Marine Corps has
engineer personnel that parricipare in under-

On October
I, 2000, the
Humanitarian De mining Office was c reated
as parr of the J oin t Staff: O ne of the main
duties of rhe office is to ensure rhe application
of internationally agreed procedures on mine
clearance. Since 200 I , it has organized rwo
seminars a year, in which offi cers designa ted
by each force are instructed on current UN
demining guidel ines.
The first seminar is normally held
in May or June and focuses on rhe latest
reports issued by the Meeting of Stares Parries
of rhe Landmine Ban Convention, rhe
Secretary General of the United Nations, rhe
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), rhe
International Ca mpaign ro Ban Landmines
(ICBL) and rhe Landmine Monitor Report
(LMR) . H owever, the second seminar, wh ich
is normally held in October or November,
focuses on the International Mine Acrion
Standards (!MAS) and the different ad vances
on rhe issue stipulated by rhe Geneva
Internatio nal Center fo r Humanitarian

In the future, the activities c urrently planned for the 2004 seminars w ill most
likely be included in regular courses organized
by the HDTC for the three military forces.
The HDTC will be closely related to the
G JC HD. The HDTC will train irs own personnel, a nd any foreign personnel , to take parr
in ongoing activities related to mine activities.
T he ultimate goal of rhe HDTC is conrriburing ro the elimination of landmines all over
the world.
The J oinr Sraff of the Armed Forces
also plans to reorganize its activities to comply
with the foll owing aims: gathering demining
information, coord inating and monitoring the
application of topics agreed on by the member
stares' meetings, and implementing actions
issued by the UNMAS and ICBL/LMR.
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Humanitarian Assistance.

Photos c/o the author.

Contact Information:
Carlos Nielsen
Adviser of Humanitarian Demining
Office of the Argentinean Joint Staff
Azopardo 250 Piso 12 Buenos Aires
(cll07 ADB) Republica Argentina
E-mail: DesminHuman@fuerzas
armadas.mil.ar
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The Israeli Defense Force's
Humanitarian Demining Efforts
uarion. In addi tion, IDF continues ro prioritize mine action internally.3

mern01 Humannanan
emlnina Efforts
All minefields and areas contaminated by UXO a re defined as military closed
areas; therefore, the IDF Engineering Corps is
responsible for any activities on mined rerritory.4 The lDF policy is based on rhe removal of
outdated m ines and other mun itions. IDF
continues to verifY the marking and fenc ing of
minefields and suspected areas in acco rdance
with the provisions of rhe Conventio n on
Conventional W eapons (CCW) Amended
Protocol II , whic h restrict rhe use of mines,
booby traps and o r her devices. T he re newal of
fences and markings, where necessary, is carried our within the context of rhe !OF's verifi cation activities)
T he 2003 Landmine M onitor
Report, produced by the I nternational
Campaign to Ban Land mines (IC BL), reports
that in N ovember 2002, Israel disclosed its
annual program to destroy o urdared m ines
and stared thar no new minefields were pur in
place within the year. As a follow-up on rhis
srarement, in February of 2003, Israel reported thar 12 tons of mines were destroyed in
2002.4

Introduction

...,
0
0

c:

(II

N
0

The Israel Defense Force (IDF)
Engineering Corps is the mine action cenrer
of lsrael. 1 Currently, IDF is engaged in various activities in response to the Palestinian te rror campaign and d ocs not have the resources
ro participate in international demining programs.2 Howeve r, rhe Israe li government
views rhe issue of inrernarional cooperatio n in
rhe areas o f mine clearance, m ine awareness
and mine victi m rehabilitation ro be of major
importance, despite rhe d ifficult budgetary sir-

\
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D uring 2003 , rhe IDF began working to improve rhe recording measures of several m inefields a nd suspected areas via the use
of specific global positioning sysrems (GPS)
and orher equipment. This equipment will
assist in rhe managem ent and control of m inefields and will enable the Israeli Mapping
Center (IM C) ro update maps with more
accurate locations of minefields.5

l
Israel has nor enacted any ad dirional domesric legislation to implem ent the provisions of Amended Protocol JJ.4 Israel mainrains that rhe existing Israel i legislarion enables
the government to implem ent the provisions
of Amended Prorocol !I wirho ur the need for
additional legislation. This legislation
includes, inter alia, exporr conrrol legislarion
covering all d efense equipment, know-how
a nd rechnology. There are also ID F regulations and ord ers concern ing marking, fen cing
and moni toring as well as d em ining a nd disposing of m ines, booby-rra ps and other
devices.6
Subseq uent ro Israel's ratificat ion of
Ame nded Prorocol II . m easures were taken ro
ensure that the relevant authorities in rhe !OF
were cognizanr of the provisions of the
Protocol and their implications. In addition ,
IDF instrucrions and operating procedures are
regularly reviewed to verifY rheir comparibil iry with the provisions of Amended Protocol

IJ.3
The IDF Engineering Corps mainrai ns a set of dera iled regulations and instrucrions regarding rhe management of archives
and rhe recording of minefields and m ined
areas. Moreover, rhe ID F School of M ili tary
Law (responsib le for rhe dissemi narion of rhe
laws of war with in rhe IDF) includes the provisions of the CCW and Amended Protocol II
as parr o f rheir c urriculum . In add ition , lectures concerning the conventions and prorocol are provid ed o n a regular basis to commanders of the IDF Engi neering Corps.3

Information provided fo r rhe general population regarding Israel's sta tus vis-a-vis
Amended Prorocol II was disseminared upon

Israel's ratification of rhe Protocol. To prevenr
any accid ental cnny into pon:nrially dangerous areas, warni ng signs in rhrec languages
(Hebrew, Arabic and Engl ish) are clearly positioned o n the perimeter of the minefields.3
Organizers of field trips (conducted
by schools, youth movements, workplaces and
privarc citizens) are obligated ro coordinare
their route with the relevant IDF Area
Command. In this conrexr, field trip organizers are briefed as ro the location of minefields
siruared in the area (or suspected areas that arc
treated as mined until cleared and verified)
and are given the appropriate mine awareness
insrructions.7
Com mercially available land maps,
issued by the IMC, contain clear markings
regarding rhe location of mineficlds. The maps
are periodically updated by the IMC based on
information available to rhe IDF.7

Israel has been criricized for
abstai ning from voring on every annual prola ndm ine ban UN Genera l Assembly
(UNGA) resolution since 1996, including
UN GA R esolu rion 57/74 in Novembe r
2002.4 Israel responded by staring that it
views la ndmi nes as weapons thar should be
carefully restricted, bur not totally banned, as
they are ofren necessary to prevent aggression
a nd arrack, particularly given rhe threarening
envi ron ment in the region.2
The Landmine Monitor Report cites
the U nited Natio ns Children's Fun d 's
(UNI C EF's) assessmenr of rhe situation in rhe
Occupied Palestinian T erritories (OPT) . In irs
report UN ICEF srates:
"Minefields dating from rhe !967
Middle Easr war, locared in the fim defense
line berween Jordan and the Wesr Bank, are
mosrly nor properly fenced or marked. Israeli
milirary training zones either are not properly
fenced or nor fenced at all and U:XO is nor
collected afte r the end of training. Many of
rhese rraining zo nes are siruarcd near populated areas; as a result, civilians come into conrace with VXO easily. In addirion ro rhar, in
most areas of confrontation Israeli and
Palesrin ian UXO and l ED are left behind.4"
Israel maintains rhar with in its borders all m i neficlds are fenced and registered
and a re updated on a timely basis by rhe IDF
and rhe National Mapping Aurhority.4

M aavarim: An Israeli D emining Company
Companies like Maavarim complete mine clearance projects within Israel for civilian purposes. However, the IDF Engineering Corps
is required to be involved in any contract to remove landmines/ UXO
within Israel. Like every mine action center (MAC) , IDF Engineering
Corps has its specific procedures beyond the International Mine
Action Standards (IMAS). IOF requires any organizations that complete demining in Israel to adhere to their procedures. For example, a
different type of minefield marking, different lane width and much
stricter safety procedures are required. They check the organizations'
plans and approve them. They are responsible for external quality
assurance. They also mon itor handover procedures. I
At present, Maavarim is involved in a 2-3 month project in Ramat
Hovav for the Industrial Council of Ramat Hovav. The project aims
to clear an area that was a fire zone in southern Israel, near BeerSheva. The area, contaminated with UXO, will be cleared for development. !
Maavarim, in conjunction with the Turkish company ARMADA
and others, is also in the process of planning to clear mines along the
border to allow the area to be used for agriculture. During 2003,
Maavarim checked suspected areas for the Jordan Gates Project. The
project will establish a free trade area.3
In addition, Maavarim has contributed to international mine
clearing efforts: Maavarim experts conducted mine awareness workshops for Kosovo refugees in Albania prior to their return home.3 In
2002, Maavarim cleared 700,000 sq m , including a rai lway station in
Sunja and a main road in Sibenik, in a World Bank-fu nded project in
Croatia. 4

nternatlonal Humanitarian
eminina Efforts
During I 995- 200 I, Israel, in conjunction with UNICEF, participated in a
mine awareness project conducred in Angola .
The project was established to educare rhe
local popularion in various regions of rhe
country abour the hazards of mines. Israeli
involvemenr in this projecr increased during
2002 when four Israeli volunteers, financially
sponsored by rhc GO! (government of Israel),
opera red in rhe area.3
In 1997, Israel conducted a joint
mine clearance projecr wirh Jorda n in the
Arava Valley ro allow for agricultural use of

rhe area.3 In 1998, Israel, Jordan, Canada and
Norway participated in a quadrilateral project
aimed ar mine clearance in the Jordan Valley
and medical rehabilitation for Jordanian mine
victims. As parr of rhe quadrilateral effort,
Israel organized and hosted a workshop on rhe
rehabilirarion of mine vicrims in April 1998.3

Israel offers
treatment
and
rehabilirarion ro Israeli citizens and to
residenrs of rhe Mcdirerranean region.3 The
Israel i medical esrablishment rrears and rehabilitates ind ividuals who have lost rheir limbs
or have suffered multi-system injuries as a
continut:d on page 23. Israeli D efense Force's
Humani tarian Dcmining Efforts
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humanitarian demining efforts

In The Occupied
Palestinian Territories
Introduction
In an August 2002 assessment of the Occupied Palestinia n
Terrirories (OPD . the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
reponed that the fo llowing areas in the OPT are not properly fenced,
marked or cleared:
• Minefields from the 1967 Middle East war- unmarked
minefields were reportedly found between Jordan a nd the West Bank,
in the Jordan Valley and in other strategic areas in the West Bank.
• Israeli military training zones.
• Areas of confron tation between Israel is and Palesrinians. 1
Though no minefields have been offi cially declared in rhe
Gaza Strip, Ayid Abu Qtaish, mine awareness coordinator of Defence
for Children International (DCI), Palestine Section, has no doubt the
area is contaminated. 2
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA) have drawn criticism for their huma nitarian dem ining (HD) efforts, or lack thereof. However, a N ational Mine Action
Committee, composed of both Palestinian and inte rnational organizations, has taken the lead in mine awareness efforts in the OPT.

HD Efforts by the National MinE
Action Committee
In response ro the lack of mme
action 111 the OPT, a National M ine Action
Comm ittee was established
by the
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), UN ICEF, the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the
Palestinian government. 1 The Palestinian Red
Crescent Society, DC! in Palestine, and the
Palestinian Ministries of Education, Youth
and Sports, Interior, and Health are also
members.3 The committee, which was established in August 2002, coordinates mine
action activities in the OPT. Activities
include:
• Teaching MRE
• Developing a national mme
action plan
• Ensuring UXO awareness messages are consistent and coherent
• Carrying our surveys to assist 111
the appropriate design and prioritization of
activities 1
Abu Qraish told Aijazeera that the
emphasis on MRE and awareness activities
versus landmine rem oval activities is due ro
Israeli restrictions on removal of landmines.
A Canadia n iniriarivc tO demine the village of
Husan near Bethlehem was stopped
short due to an Israeli ban on the import of
mine-cleaning materials and restrictions on
the method of cleari ng.3
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In February 2003, Israel outlined its stockpile destructions
efforts, stating rhar I 2 tons of mines were destroyed by the military in
2002. However, Abu Qtaish of DC! told Aijazeera that Israel's efforts
were not enough. Qraish rold Aijazeera, "Practically speaking, there
has been no mine clearing. T here is a big diffe rence between clearing
minefields for military purposes and clearing them for huma ni tarian
purposes. In the latter case, the number of mines must be zero."3
Israeli HD efforts have also been cri ticized. Last year, IDF
declared the village of Husan, in the West Bank, a mine-free zone.
Aijazeera reports that, fo llowing the announcement, three people from
the village died when a mine exploded.3
Conve rsely, the PNA has made no recent official statement
about ba nning anti-personnel mines. Palestinian groups have access ro
both a nti-personnel a nd ami-vehicle mines. Media reporrs indicate
that these groups are using landmines and explosive devices, made
from the explosives taken from landmines, in attacks against Israeli
soldiers and civilians. l

ger that comes with the possible re-deployment of the Israeli army and the hand-over of
those areas ro the PNA. T he tear is that, with

Israeli Defense Force's Humanitarian Demining
Efforts, concinued from page 2 1

result of landmines, UXO, lED and ocher
devices. 8
T he Landmine Monitor reports
that, in recent years, Israeli rehabilitation specialists were sent, under the auspices of the
United Nations and Israeli Foreign Ministry,
to Sri Lanka, Viemam, El Salvador, C roatia
a nd Slovenia. Israel also has a rehabilitation
exchange agreement with Armenia, Cyprus,
G reece, Turkey and several stares of th e former Soviet Union.4 T he Landmine Monitor

rhe increased mobility of Palestinians in the
areas, the number of landmine/UXO accidents will increase. ocr has made it a part of
irs agenda to address this issue in hopes of
avoiding the high number of casualties that
occurred follow ing the Israeli withdrawal
from southern Lebanon. 2
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lnttoduclion
When you first arnve as a member of the
Multinational Brigade North (MNB(N)), you
are fu ll of promise. You know your team of
highly trained professional soldiers will make a
difference in the lives of those that live in BiH.
Then it sets in. Your six-month tour of duty
doesn't allow you ti me to finish what you
starr. So what is ir you can do to make a diffe rence in only six months? T his is the exact
question rhar starred rhe process of developing
rhe U.S. Army National Guard Demining
Initiative in BiH. This initiative was undertaken by the U.S. Army's National Guard, an
adjunct to rhe U.S. Armed Forces. There are
multitudes of issues you can work ro resolve in
Bozn ia-Herzegovina (BiH). MNB(N) plays a
supporting role in most of these, bur we wanted ro do something more. We wanted to bring
a fresh idea to the area of operation (AO ) rhar
would make a significant impact on one of the
many critical issues facing BiH. To make our
choice, we focused on two key concerns:
"What will have the biggest impact on rhe
daily lives of rhe people?" and "What will
instill confidence in the international community ro speed up economic recovery?" We
chose the issue of demining.

Relhinkinu How We Do Demining
II
So why choose demining? As a military officer, I have always been told to stare
rhe bottom li ne up front no matter how bad
the situation. So here it is: seven years after
Dayton, progress in clearing mines in BiH is
far from what is required to create a safe and
secure environment. Containment (marking/
fencing) efforts are almost non-existent.

The mine threat in BiH is widespread, of low density and dispersed.The
IEBL is rhe dividing line between the entity
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rhe technological advantages of a modern,
well-equipped humanitarian demining ream.
Such military organizations are something the
U.S. Army National Guard is uniquely suired
for. The U.S. Army National Guard in itself is
an exceptional organization known worldwide
for irs ability to quickly adapt to the everchanging req uirements of international security environs. Our success in managing dynamic peacekeeping operations is well-known.
T he U.S. Army National Guard is
currently involved in the New Horizons exercises that focus on developing emerging doctri ne and operational skills for humanitarian
and civil assistance missions. These mandates,
combined with our operational experience in
peacekeeping operations, will rhrusr the U.S.
Army National Guard into rhe forefront of
modern humanitarian doctrinal development.
This is why I say we must perform this mission of thinking outside the military norms of
yesterday.

When you ftrst arrive as a member of the Multinational Brigade
North (MNB(N)), you are full of promise. You know your team of highly
trained professional soldiers will make a difference in the lives of those who
live in BiH. Then it sets in. Your six-month tour of duty doesn't allow you
time to finish what you started. So what is it you can do to make a difference in only six months? This exact question started the process of developing the National Guard Demining Initiative in BiH. There are multitudes of issues you can work to resolve in BiH. MNB(N) plays a supporting role in most of these, but we wanted to do something more. We wanted to bring a fresh idea to the area of operation (AO) that would make a
significant impact on one of the many critical issues facing BiH. To make
our choice, we focused on two key concerns: "W'hat will have the biggest
impact on the daily lives of the people?" and "What will instill confidence
in the international community to speed up economic recovery?" We chose
the issue of demining.
armed forces at the end of hostilities as d efined
by the Dayton Peace Accord (GFAP) . This
heavily mined area is probably the single most
important factor affecting our continued support of two key military tasks.
I
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The first key military task affected
is our ability to "provide a safe and secure
environment" in Bi H. So far in 2003, mine
strikes have caused 13 deaths and five serious
injuries 1 1n th e MNB(N) Area of
Responsibility (AOR) alone. More than 2, 100
sq km ofBiH requires a "Technical Survey" to
determine if rhe area is mined.2 Technical
evaluations have estimated rhar 400 sq km to
1,000 sq km of this suspect area will require
"Clearance Operations" of some sorr3 that
include mechanical and manual clearing techniques. The key pro perry of these operations is
they must meer humanitarian demining standards if we are to provide a permanent solution for a safe and secure environment.
H old on a minute. Military reams
don't perform humanitarian demining. So
why are we focusing on this issue? Mainly

because we have to. In the modern world of
the coalition forces, rhe military is nor always
provided with defined limits for tasks that
their forces m ust effectively perfo rm to meet
coalition objectives. This is especially true in
rhe world of Stabilization and Securi ty
Operations (SASO) like the tasks we are currently performing in BiH and will soon perfo rm in Iraq .
As we have seen in recent headlines,
our military leaders are also realizing this
truth. As you read this article, military leaders
are working to implement these new prio rities
before they become roadblocks to security
around the world. If we are to be successful in
rhis transitional process, we must be active ar
all levels of expertise. While mili tary leaders
are focused on changing policies that address
our demining limits, we ar the tactical level
must be ready to respond with a well-developed plan o f action to meet these new SASO
priorities. T he plan we are proposing is the
first step in meeting o ne of rhese new priorities. Our pro posal combines the cri tical
strengths of solid leadership and unified command rhat military organizatio ns possess with
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The second key military rask affected by the BiH mine risk is our abili ty to
"maimain free dom of movement." Freedom
of movement is a key ingredient in eliminating threats to economic development and to
allow displaced persons and refugees (DPRE)
to return. Bur today's slow and inconsistent
demining processes are unable to meer the
demands of rhese humanitarian missions.
Over the past few years, the average clearance
rate of all demining operations in BiH is six sq
km per year. That's about 1.5 percent of rhe
suspecred area of risk. The cost to dare for all
demining in BiH is $100 million (U.S .) or an
average of $ 16.6 millio n per year. To accomplish even this minimal level of success
involves the work of the Armed Forces in Bi H
(AF BiH) demining teams and the efforts of
42 non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/
commercial activities that arc accredited to
demine by rhe Bosnia-Herzegovina M ine
Action Center (BHMAC) . These NGOs and
commercial activities provide most of the
mechanical supporr (fl ails and vegetation cutters) required bur ar a premium cost. The AF
BiH demining reams have far less equipment
bur they have the most experienced and welltrai ned deminers available; plus their hearts
are in it. Of this six sq km total per year, the
International T rust Fund for Demining (ITF)
srated that NGOs and commercial acriviries
completed 2.3 sq km in 2002.4 Based on this

< rethinking

Humanitarian Demining

tor coalition forces >

build ing mili tary and diplomatic support for
rhe initiative

Time to Take It Up a Nolch
Let us nor forger the International
Community (IC) is also watching. Based on
various inputs from gro ups such as rhe
Organization for Security Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and other key diplomatic
agencies, the IC goal for demining success in
BiH was derermined to be 12 sq km per yea r.5
The IC feels this level of reduction is a key
indicator for the economic growth of BiH and
is one of the "confidence" barometers they use
to judge rhe ability ofBiH to create rhe secure
and stable environment that is paramount for
joining the Eu ropean Un ion (EU) . This confidence level equates to investment opportunity and faster economic recove1y for BiH. So
here's some more bad news. Based on the success of the current demining approacl1 in Bi H ,
it will rake 60 to 200 years to demine BiH.
The United Narions D evelopment Program
(UNDP) esrimares the funding required to
accomplish this demining at $26 million per
year.6 It is easy to see we lack the funds, we
lack rhe rime and we lack the patien ce to sacrifice the life of another innocent human due
to our inability to ch ange an outdated military
paradigm.
\\,.,

The question for our team now is
"What do we change?" I LT Richard Weber,
Officer in C harge (OIC) of the SFOR 12
Mine Cell , completed the initial concept for a
Demining Brigade in early 2003. The original
concept was to develop a Demining Brigade
that could meet BiH domestic mandates as
well as other international mandates. I LT
Weber's unique design integrated rhe
strengths of a military organization with the
technological advantages of a modern humanitarian demini ng team. T here have been various equivalents of lesser size (i.e., Berlin Wall
ream, ere.) bur never before has there been
such a forceful effort to make humanitarian
dcmining a permanent milirary mission.
Before handing over the reins to SFOR 13,
1LT Weber developed a well-tho ught-our
technical design fo r the brigade that became
rhe basis fo r rhe T able of Organization and
Equipment (TOE) used in our current d esign.
Based on this in itial design, SFOR 13 was
ready to move the concept to rhe next level by

J ll
To build this support, we needed to
show why this humanitarian demining ream
would be successful where others fa iled . So
what are the failings the initiative needed ro
answer' While some of rhe lack of success may
be attributed to rhc nature of rhe mine threat,
much is due to inefficiency, mismanagement
and the appearance of corruption in rhe
bureaucracy. To answer rhese concerns, we
concentrated on four critical areas of foc us.
1. An integrated demining effort
is required: First was the need for a demining operation that is integrated from the
state level down to the individual deminer.
The current method of demining does not
adequately integrate demining operations
and wastes valuable time and resources.
Military clearance procedures, although
weH integrated and fast in nature, do not
provide the 99.6 percent clearance level
mandated by International Humanitarian
standards in SASO environments. Our initiative must integrate mechanical means,
manual demining efforts, Explosive
Detecting Dog Teams (EDDTs) and containment practices. Although we use these
four methods today, they are not integrated
at the level required to be consistently effective. NGOs, commercial activities, and AF
BiH are all used to perform these tasks in a
fractional manner due to competing agendas and interests.
2. The BHMAC and government
control: The BiH Demining Law of
February 2002 set standards for BiH demining in line with international protocols.
This law is crucial leverage for the success
of demining in BiH and must be fully supported by our proposal. This law allows the
BiH government to endorse the BHMAC
by providing two key mandates:
• T he BH MAC is rhe sole national
authority for rhc coordinatio n of mine clearance.
• The BHMAC is the o nly
inst itution
responsible
fo r
nationa l
standards and quality assurance.
Since the formation of the
BHMAC and the reorganization of its

Ill
N

Ill

::I

<.>
0

u.

In his book l'rog>Yss in 1/mnmull/rt•W /Jemmmg: I ulmiml 1111d Polu I' Clutflntgo,
Richard Garwin ha' csumatcd '' ,.;[ ta1,e 1,000 )can 10 d<·mtne the world ba~cd on roda• ~
tcchnolnl,'"\ an<l pr.lcllce,. A rhou•aml \<~n is roo long 10 "all for a mrm free \\orld. We
mu.1 act nnw 1<1 ch~ngc th< \\urld \\£ an: handing In our thildr~n and rh~rr ~hrldr<,.
A' loti.\\ mohtdl"\ leaden 01 u our dun .md our n:spoo\lhllott.

1-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - h - u y MAJ Tom Barnett and CPT Kyle Shaffer,
MNB(N), SFOR 13, 35/D(M), ARNG
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fi nding, the AF BiH dcminers appear ro perform rhe bulk of rhe demining efforts with the
least amount of equipment and personnel.
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regional offices, some institutional coherence has been achieved. However, many
national interests continue to prevail in the
decision cycle for prioritization and
resources allocation. By providing the
BHMAC with the operational tools necessary to double its success rate, its ability to
manage relevant national interests will be
substantially reinforced.
3. Donor Fatigue: The general
decline of world economies has caused
international charitable aid and donor government funds to decline from previous
years' contributions. One such example is a
substantial donor to BiH demining efforts,
the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA). For 2003-2008, their
funding is reduced to $750 miJiion as compared to $1.0 billion over the previous fiveyear period. Aggravating this lack of funds
is the lack of progress toward BiH unification. This is affecting donor focus on BiH
and is allowing other more successful countries to take funding precedence. These IC
donations are usually funneled through
two main support areas: NGOs and the

ITF.

..,
0
(")

c

1/)

N
Cll

• NGO Aspects: NGOs provide
exposure and fi nancial conduits fo r international inslitlltions and donors. Some NGOs
provide only management services and some
only provide mine-clearing resources, wh ile
ochers even undertake demining o peration; as
quasi-commercial activities. However, commercial activities rend to bid on rhe "easier"
jobs as profit and risk factors limit their investment in the fu ll range of equipment available.
NGOs arc also usually the first ro attract international donors, as donors don't pay directly
ro governments due to suspicion of corruption. Bear in mind that with the exception of
canine counrermining , NGOs arc nor critical
to BiH d emining based on activities to dare.
• Th e lTF and Commercial
Aspects: Commercial dcmining is paid for by
inrcrnario nal donors and rh us comperes with
NCO and AF BiH dcmining dforrs for fund ing. Commercial dcmining reams also suffer
from rhe stigma of corruption th roughout
BiH. This corruption mani fests itself in many
w,1ys and casts suspicion on rhc BHMAC and
the ITF. The ITF is rhe major funding tool for
commncial demining in BiH. Bur these funds
arc waning also. In an arridc on the !Tf websire, Mr. Ccm persek, ITF Director, scared,
"There arc a lot of changes in rhc donors' deci-
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sions as ro where they want to place their
money, we are afraid thar rhe donations will
go down and nor up."7 We wish to main tain
our relationship with the ITF but reduce our
dependence on NGOs and commercial operanons.

4. AF BiH Aspects: Here's the
bottom line for the AF BiH: The
Instructions to Parties (ITP) obligates the
AF BiH to demine and they are also obligated to sustain this capability. AF BiH
deminers are capable manual deminers but
lack consistent funding. The BiH government is providing most of the administrative costs, but this support may not survive
the AF BiH restructuring now underway.
The reality is that since Dayton, AF BiH
demining has been largely sustained by
donated capital and equipment. Donations
have also maintained this equipment,
bought consumables, and purchased accident insurance that is required on the demining laws. While factional interests sometimes still prevail, at the grassroots level, AF
BiH soldiers wish to maintain their demining momentum. A commitment to demining is not so obvious at the senior level of
the AF BiH command. AF BiH commanders view demining as a drain on the already
austere defense budget and do not support
incorporating the current 470 deminers
into the new force structure. If we are to be
successful, we must integrate demining
units into the proposed 12,000 soldierrestructuring plan and maintain a minimal
force for combat engineers (mobility/countermobility) .
What
the AF
BiH
Commanders fail to understand is that the
IC sees their current demining components
as the only element of the AF BiH producing a positive contribution to BiH unification. As the AF BiH restructure to join
Partnership for Peace (PfP), BiH demining
expertise is seen as the specialized contribution the AF BiH can make as a potential
member of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). In this sense, our
demining initiative has global implications.

Although it was a bold d esign, the
im plications of funding challenges, the changing nature of rhe AF BiH restructuring, and
rhe IC's red uced commitment to BiH demining demanded char we make changes ro 1LT
Weber's initial design. After review of th e

design by the MNB(N) Commander, rhe
Stabilization Force (SFOR) Comm-ander and
staff, the U.S. Ambassador to BiH, the OSCE,
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) ,
and other members of the IC, we modified the
in itiative ro m eet rhc new sociopolitical
dynamics. CPT Kyle Shaffe r, OIC of the
SFOR 13 M ine Cell, assisted by MAJ Tom
Barnett, SFOR 13 J oint Military Affai rs
Liaison Officer to SFOR and IC, answered
the challenges posed by these forward looking
diplomatic and military leaders. The design
now focused on creating a more flexible miliraty demining unit with a humanitarian mission at the state level of BiH char can be
phased in based on national and international
mandates. The design focused on several key
objectives thar musr
be supported.
Specifically, rhe design must:
• Provide significant performance
improvements for AF BiH demining rates
• Be supported by a sustained, adequate and regular fu nding arrangemen t
• Be integra red into the ongoi ng AF
restructuring etforrs
• Concentrate responsibili ty and
capabili ties under one management organization
• Create a single organization with
domesric and in ternational mandates
• Be support ed by a legitimate
NATO/EU supervisory ream

Our Proposal for Militarv Demininu
Team with a Humanitarian Mission
The design we are proposing concentrates responsibility and capabilities under
one management organization. This will allow
the unit to immediately address any priorities
designated by the BHMAC regardless of location or size. The design creates a single organization with domestic and international mandares. Once fielded and proven in BiH, rhis
design can be emulated in any of rhe 60 other
nations requiring humanitarian demining.
This will p rovide NATO and rhe world with
a capabili ty rhar has never before been seen in
military organizations, but that will soon be
mandated by rhe changing face of military stabil ization operations. T h rough the use of
NATO/EU supervision, the proposed unit
will reinforce rhe legitimacy of the BiH demining effort, which will in turn attract susrained IC funding for state-of-the-an equipme nt and training. This influx of equipment

alone will enable the unit to realize significant
performance improvements for AF BiH demining operations. Our proposed demining
unit improves the security and long term stabili ty of BiH by accelerati ng rhe removal of
the de facto BiH "Berlin Wall." It also
enhances the AF BiH restructuring plan,
enhances BiH prospects for PfP cooperation,
and provides a highly capable team for rhc
implementation of humanitarian dem ining in
NATO stabil ization operations. This demining initiative is an investmenr in a focused
solution to the BiH mine problem as well as
having implications ro meet global mine
rhrcars. T h is fact alone will make our proposal a key contributor to the U.S . Demining
2010 Initiative char aspires to clear the world
of mines by 2010. The key is rhe simpl icity of
rhe basic units and the flexibility that they
provide. So what will the demining units look
like?
Based on the key objectives above,
the demining initiative we arc p roposing is
fo rmed from nvo key structures. These base
structures are a Heavy Humanitarian Demining Compa ny and a Light Humanitarian
Demining Company.
The
H eavy
Humanitarian
Demining Company (HDC(H)) provides a
combination of manual deminers, EDDTs,
a nd mechanical clearing equipmenr to answer
the needs of complex terrain minefields. This
compa ny p rovides additio nal mech anical
assets rhar are currenrly nor parr of AF BiH
demining reams. The new combination of
mechanical assets will allow the HDC(H) to
clear more congested terrain at smaller levels.
Should heavier equipment be required, rhe
battalion headquarters is equipped ro handle
this need. The HDC(H) provides more readily available mechanical assets throughout BiH
without the current dependence on com mercial activities. T his will allow rhe HDC(H) ro
mechanically prepare minefields more quickly
and ease the work of rhe manual deminers
they support.
The Light H umanitarian Demining
Company (HDC(L)) is focused on manual
demining, which is the only method to dare
that can clear minefields ro humanitarian
standards. Although ir focuses on manual
demining operations, it may assist in preparing areas for mechanical clearing and EDDT.
The key here is to retain the skills and experience of the current manual deminers in rhis
company. T he light company may also be

used to perform surveying that is now perfo rmed by the regional mine action centers
and commercial activities.
Based on mission requirements,
these companies will be task-organized and
placed under the control of a Humanitarian
Demining Ba ttalion (H DBN) command
ream. The barralion headquarters is a key
component as it provides the additional heavy
demining assets required in support of demining operations in BiH. Our goal is to place
these more technologically advanced demining systems d irectly in rhe hands of rhe BiH
demining u nits, allowing them to com plete
the more diffi cult dem ining tasks. Th is is a
dynamic step for a demining unit that unril
now was incapable of hand ling most mechanical demi ning activities. Rather than depending on commercial companies for rhis equipment, the demining battalion headquarters
provides this equipment ar key locations
througho ut BiH when required. Based on
how rhe HDBN is organized, we calculate a
demining rare of I 2-24 sq km per year8 can
be achieved.
The HDBN will report directly to
rhe BiH Stand ing Commi rree on Military
Matters (SCMM), which is a state-level quasiequ ivalent to rhe U.S . Department of
Defense. The BHMAC will continue providing operational direction for the HDBN, but
it wi ll also be supported with direct
NATO/EU supervision. T he NATO/EU
supervision provides rhe required legitimacy
that will attract sustained IC fu nding for scareof-the-art equipment.

Commercia l activities have n or
eliminated
from
the
process.
been
Commercial activities are proficie nt in conducting technical surveys and will continue to
provide this service. However, we propose
reducing commercial demining operations to
focus fund ing o n rhe BiH team . This will
allow BHMAC ro leverage rhe already austere
ITF funds ava ilable by focusing commercial
activities on smaller and less costly demining
projects. This in turn will provide an increase
in rhe success rare of the commercial activities.
To support this change, we are suggesting that
once rhe BHMAC has contracted for rhe commercial activiry, the demining battalion will
coordinate the execution of the contract and
will have oversight of rhc activity. This will
require moving rhe current Field Operations

Manager from rhe BHMAC liaison office ro
rhe HDBN headquarters to ensure commercial acriviries arc coordinated with the AF BiH
activities. Making use of the latest computerized demining support systems, the HDBN
will ensure that commercial activities do nor
"rework" sires, which is seen as the most significant issue for com mercial activities.

As we stated earlier, rhe funds and
diplomatic support for a demining brigade
cannot be realized. But we arc confid ent that
if th e proposed demin ing units are successful,
rhe BiH demining teams will also be able to
focus on international mandates. W ith over
60 countries now in need of immediate demining support, th e need for a humanitarian
demining brigade in NATO or the EU is
inevitable. We view our initiative as rhe initial
step in creating a dem ining unit rhar is capable of dynamic growth ro meet international
demining mandates. This global ream has
added impl ications. One such implication is
assistance in driving the commercial development of demining technologies. As rhe demin ing uni t grows in size, it will generate longterm marker drivers for enhanced equipment
and research from the private sector. This in
turn will help make demining more eco nomically viable and accelerate an end to the global demining issue.

Bottom line
Based on rhe initial review of costs
for the unit, it will require $20-23 million to
implement this plan. Depending on the task
organization of the HDBN, the estimated
operational cost will be between $3 million
and $1 7 million per year and should be totally funded by the BiH government. This will
require char we hold BiH accountable for th is
cost through rhe restructured AF BiH budget
and other BiH government fundi ng. We are
also srill advocating a strong relationship with
the ITF to leverage their fu nds fo r commercial
activities. If rhese funds are properly managed
by BiH with assistance from rhe NATO oversight team, we are confident that past dependence on uncertain donor funds can be significantly reduced if nor eliminated. If som ething
is nor done ro significantly reduce BiH d ependence on rhe IC donors, rhe turure of BiH
demining is uncertain at best.
continued on p3.ge 53. Rethinking Humanitarian
Demining Efforts
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lisrs ro make sure chat we're nor leaving anything out anti we're
addressi ng all of che requirements char nor just the pa rtner nation military bur also rhe communiry needs. Fifteen years ago, it was nor as
well-programmed, and char's just a martcr of growrh and continuity of
personnel in key positions and experience in rhe program.

THE MILifARY

N K : You wn c jusr calking about adtlrc:~'ing the communil) ncc:d~
how tloc~ rhe commu nity rcacr or how receptive are rhc:y ro the m ilitary co m ing in and cond ucting the de mining ope ra tions?

An Interview With LTC Bob Crowley, U.S. SOUTHCOM

IN MINE ACIION
N icole Kreger (N K ) : \X'har has rhc military comributc:d ro m ine
action over the past 15 years?

LTC Crowley (LTC C): I can on ly calk about wh at we've done in
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Larin America, in the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command]
AOR [area of responsibiliry], for rhc pasr I 5 years. Even before 15
years ago, before rhere was a U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action [H MA]
Program , which ar the rime was called Demin ing Program, we had
Special Forces folks down in Honduras training the Hondurans how
ro demine. Fi rst of all, the way the program works is the Department
of Scare has rhc lead. They have the final determination on whether
we' re going co have an H MA program with another country or not. So
until that dete rminacion is made, we can' t do any demining training.
Bur when ir is made, what wear SOUTH COM bring ro rhe cable is
techn ical expertise, and we've had acrive demining programs in
Guatemala and El Salvador char are closed down now; c urrent program s are in Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, Peru and the new one in
Chile.
So what have we done? We
helped the Organization of
American Scates [OAS] establish
MARMIN C A
[Mission
of
Assistance for rhe Removal of
Mines in Central America], which
is an OAS program that relies on
office rs a nd non-commissio ned
officers from throughout Larin
America in the MARM INCA
Center, which is in Manag ua.
We've rrained deminers in all rhc
countries I just mentioned, and in
addition, we've built regional mine
action centers [MACs] in Ecuador
and Peru .
What we do from rhe
De partment of Defense [DoD] side is a Train-the-T rainer program
w irh three components to ic. We'll have a ream of experts that's assembled in rhe United Scares char is comprised of military Special Forces
personnel and sometimes conventional engineers as well. We always
have Civil Affairs personnel and informacion operations specialises char

LTC C: First of all, all of the countries in which we're currently conducting demining operations-Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador,
Peru-these are countries chat are used ro having a military presence
because our demining operations and HMA programs started after
their conflicts were over. They have gone from a period of either civil
war or imernational conflict where people are killing each other ro a
period where now the military is coming in and helping them get their
land back. The communities are wonderfully receptive. lr is absolutely unbelievable. We're received wirh open arms by community leaders
and rhe population. We' re rhere to help them solve their problem. The
community relations is a critical componenr of it, and char's whar our
civil affairs personnel work when they're down rhere. I can't chink of
an instance where we've had anything but wonderful reception from
rhe comm unity-from the national level all the way on down ro the
people chat are in a particular community of any size.

go down. The ream will go to the Humanita rian Dem ining Training
Center [HDTC] our at Fort Leonard Wood where they will be trained
co the inrernarional standard as deminers. They need ro have char certification before they're allowed to go anywhere, and once rhey ger
down there, there are rhree components ro rhe program. T he first
componenr is rhc technical advice and assistance in training: how ro
identifY a minefield, how to mark a minefield , how to clear it, how to
remove the mines, working with dogs-the soup co nurs of demining.
Bur manual or even mechanical d emining alone is nor a stand-alone
operation. The two other compo nents are mine risk education-for
example, I mentioned rhe Superman comic books [landminc awareness tools published by DC Comics in cooperation with rhe U.S.
Department of Defense a nd the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)].
Thar's d1e second aspecr-rhc third aspect is in o rgan izing and running regional mine action centers, which includes rhe database training char we reach as well as rhe comm unity outreach and development
char our civil affairs personnel work on rhc demining missions. And
we're very close co closing out programs in Nicaragua and Honduras.
Ecuador and Peru will rake a little while longer. Ch ile has 273 minefields on rheir northern border area, and chat will rake a few years. Bur
in Southern Command , we are postured ro be rhe firs r regional combatant command char is mine-safe. That's a huge success.

NK: How would you say rhe m ilir.uy approach ro mine acrion i~ diffc renr rro m the hu manitarian sector approach?

LTC C: Thar's a great question. Probably rhe biggest difference is
that we do nor acrually conduce demi ning operations. We rrain the
trainers on how ro conduct demining operations. And char's a policy
d ecision char the United States has made in which our forces are nor
authorized to actually pick up or remove mines. Our m ission is to
trai n rhc partner nation personnel in how ro do char. Now, if you look
at HALO Trust or MAG [the Mines Advisory Group]-a number of
rhc NGOs !non-governmental organizations] go out and rhey actually conduct the demining operations themselves. Our focus really is on
capacity building in the demining area and not the conduct of the
dcmining operations.

NK: H ow would you ~ay the role of rhc milir.1ry in h umanita rian
dem ining ha~ cha nged or develo ped over rhc years?

NK: \XIhcn yo u' re saying char you train rhe trainer\, are you
usually tra in ing the in-counrry milir.t ry?

LTC C: Initially, the program, l wouldn't call it ad hoc, bur it rook
Department of Defense and Southern Co mmand awhile to establish
the relationsh ips that we have with OAS, ro come up wirh rhe exacr
right template of forces that arc needed for a problem . R igh t now,
before any dem in ing mission, we do a comprehensive pre-deployment
sire survey ro identifY exactly whar the ream needs to do when they're
down rhere, and char's done about six months before the m ission.
During that period of ti me, the ream is gai ning the siruarional awareness of rhe mine problem on the ground, what the community needs,
rhe rypc of training rhe partner nation military needs, and is able to go
th rough a very programmatic process and p reparation phase, so that
when they go down, it's not a bunch of guys showing up saying, " Hey,
we know how ro dcm ine. What do you need?" lr's a thought-out, wellorganized, planned and executed procedure wirh a number of check-

LTC C: Yes, we are. And in rhe case of MARMINCA, for example,
MARM INCA again is an OAS organization, but thar's an international group of military personnel . Our focus for the procedures, the actual dcmining operations, yes, we are training the ocher militaries on
how ro demine in rheir own country.
NK: Wh at would yo u say are chc bcndlts or drawbacks o f using m ilita ry forces a~ opposed ro an NCO or a corporate organit<lti on carry ing o ur dcm ining?

rhere as a result of what had been a military problem, and I chink it's
mosr appropriate that the military take care of char problem. I respect
the Dickens out of NGOs char do ir. Ir's a wonderful humanitarian
piece. Bur I would rarher see somebody in uniform risking h is life to
do it because it's a military problem, rather chan seeing an NCO lose
rheir life or limb. And hopefully our train ing is such rhar we won't
have accidents where the dcminers wind up gerring hurt.
NK: Can you give me an example of a success story that yo u know of
of the milit.try in humanitarian demining?

LTC C: The biggest success story we're going to have in the
SOUTHCOM area is coming up. Ecuador and Peru were fighting a
border war in 1994. Following their ceasefire agreement, the United
Narions established rhe United Narions Mission ro Ecuador and Peru
(UNMEP) . Now, there are still tensions in thar area between Ecuador
and Peru . It's been a disputed border; the ccasefire agreemenr reestablished the border. Bur, later on chis year-and we' re looking at rhe
fourth quarter-we're going to be conducting a humanitarian mine
action mission char is nor bilateral in nature. Mosr of them arc-we go
ro country "X" and work wirh chose people. In chis case, we're going
to have deminers from Ecuador and Peru rrain at the Peruvian
Engineer School. We will train them in dcmining tactics, techniques
and procedures. Then we will go up ro the border area, the
Peru/Ecuador border, and those deminers will conduce demining
operations on borh sides of the border. Whar does that mean? That
means Peruvians are going co be dem ining Ecuador and Ecuadorians
are going to be demining Peru. And chen from there, we'll go to
Quito, Ecuador, where we'll conduct some follow-on training. Thar is
a multilateral as opposed ro a bilareral mission. Absolutely a huge success, and we're looking towards fourrh quarter of this year to execute
chat mission.
NK: Do you th ink it i~ important for mine actio n programs to have;
visiting mil itary T echnical Advisors?

LTC C: Ir depends on the capabilities of what they have .... Nor
always. You cake a look ar Honduras and Nicaragua, right now chose
programs are almost complete. There are Nicaraguan deminers right
now in Iraq char were trained by the United Stares military. Now chose
guys are as good as anybody. Do they need us now to cell rhem how
to demine? No. They don't need our assistance at this point. So ir
depends on rhe maturity of the program chat they have in their particular coun try. I expect when we gee down to Chile and starr the program in Chi le in 2005, they've got a very professional army, so our
technical assistance will hopefully be relatively limited and we won'r
have to srarr ar the ground floor with rhe Chileans. So ir depends on
rhe capabilities and rhe particular situation in any given country.
NK: How d o you feel rhe tra in-rhe-rrainers program has helped our
mil itary and host n.uions?

LTC C: One of rhe ancillary benefits we ger from any operation we
LTC C: First of all, l th ink it's right chat the military has rhe lead
responsibili ty for demining wirhin rheir own country. The mines are

do of chis nature is the individual contacts and bonding, for lack of a
better word, chat occurs between professionals. Whether they're mili-
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rary professionals o r whether they're doctors rhar are doing an
exchange or academics, ir doesn't marrer. There's a cultural understanding and growth that occurs through rhis program and our o ther
human itarian programs that, in rhe long term, is a huge, huge be nefit.
So rhe individual contacts and mutual understanding that develop are
as valuable as anyth ing else.

NK: \X' har role d o you th ink rhc rnilir.uy can pl.ty in \t.mdarJ , for
d cmin ing rcc.. hno logy?

We have DoD-funded programs rhar can help with that type of thing,
and that's rhe type of partnership that I think really goes a long way ro
rhe mutual benefit of everybody concerned-the United Stares, rhe
partner nation, the NGOs we partner with, rhe United States m il itary,
the partner nation military, and rhe ultimate beneficiary being rhe
mem bers of rhe community that live there. That's where I think we
can make rhe most money and get the most yardage our of rh is program.

N K : Do you think the mili tilfy i' hertl'J 'u itc:d for m ine acrion rha n

LTC C: l rhink rhe roles that we have right now wirh the HDTC
doing the training rhcy do, plus the OSD SO/ LI C [Office of the
Secrctaty of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity
Conflict] research and development folks do absolutely tremendous
work. I wouldn't say it needs to be adjusted. They wi ll go to a country, look ar a particular situation in terms of terrain, weather, where
rhe communities are located-any number of facrors-and they'll
look at ir and say, "You know what might help here is a piece of equipment or some sort of technology rhar could do this." Well whatever ir
is they chink would work best doesn't exist, so rhey will go manufacture that, and rhc:y'll rake it down to this country a nd they'll rest it.
And the Office of the Secretary of Defense fully funds rhar program.
We've gor equipment down in Ho nduras right now that rhey're doing
a final rest on. The benefits to rhe partner nation are absolutely
tremendous, and from a techno logy standpoint, it's those guys who
work om of OSD SO/LI C a t Fort Belvoir, Vi rginia, that bring a huge
amount to the table, whether it's experimenting with unma nned aerial vehicles, wirh ground penetrating radar ro idenrif)t m ines-rhose are
tremendous technological advances that we ca n capitalize o n .
NK: Wh.n d u you rhink is rhe role fil r the mili t.try in m ine ri>k
.:d uc...ll ion .rnd victim assisranc.:?
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LTC C: That's rwo separate questions, so I'd like ro answer each separately. In mine risk education, our role is ro work wirh rhe communities and through the community leaders ro help them develop a
good solid mine risk education program . You know, kids are kids, and
so ofte n, as you know, children are the victims of land mines; people
working in rhe agricultural community are rhe victims of land mines.
Our role is to help the communities in which they live develop srrong
programs char are coherem, rhar receive rhe necessary funding, thar are
we ll enough pur rogether so that they're sustai ned, thereby reducing
the number of landmine victims while rhe demincrs go ahead and ger
an area cleared of mines.
The other question ... that is a great question , and I was
talking to the guys from rhe Polus Ccnrer, because in rhe HMA
Program we really don't have a role in victim assistance. Bur we have
other programs within Southern Command rhat ca n assist wirh that.
We have a humanitarian assistance program. W e have humanitarian
and civic assistance programs. I would see an example of an organ ization like rhe Polus Center working in Leon, Nicaragua, where we've
also worked, primarily after Hurricane Mitch, when Southern
Com mand provided both immed iate and long-term disaster rel ief and
reconsrrucrion ro Central America. In Leon, they have a victim assistance center that need s renovation o r they're trying to build a new o ne.

the h uman itarian s.:cror?

LTC C: I wouldn't say that at all. I wou ld say there are professionals
in the humanitarian sector, and 1 would say there are professionals
in the military. We arc nor at all interested in competing. We're imercsrcd in working together to solve mumal problems rhar affecr the
world community.

The Role of

Military Technical Advisors

N K: T hat was something you ' pok.: about earlier- partnerships
and how im porr.rnr they .rre. I "'1.' wonde ring how you th ink
rhe mil itary can compkm.:nr other o rg,m it.ttiom worki ng in huma nit.lria n dcmining.

LTC C : W hen I was just mentioning the humanitarian assista nce
program, I rhink rhar's a great example. We've partnered wirh anumber of NGOs throughout the region al ready, both international
NGOs, the larger ones, as well as local, community-based civic acrion
groups. Our partnersh ip opportuni ties arc more lim ited by imagination than they are by fu nd ing. Now, we certai nly have some real-world
concerns; we can't, from a military standpoint, say, "O K, let's go do
rhis type of project in this a rea" just because somebod y's asked us ro,
bur there are many, many cases where there is a confluence of interest,
and those need ro be pursued vigorously ro make sure rhar we generate a sort of synergy through the confluence of interest and maximize
all of our capabilities ro achieve whatever particular objective ir may be
ar rhe time-whether it's education, whether it's health, whether it's,
as you mentioned, victim assisrance, rhar's another area rhar parmersh ips are certainly viable.

• Photo c/o MAlC.
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Introduction
In 1989 a multinational contingent of soldiers began to
arrive in Pakistan tO support a humanitarian mine action program for
Afghan refugees. They were, in effect, Technical Advisors (TAs) in rhe
fi eld of humani ta rian mine action, and in rhe years since, military TAs
have participated in m any other programs. This has nor been withom
irs controversial aspects.
For rhe purposes of chis discussion (and acknowledging char
some will not fir rh is description precisely) a military TA is a serving
soldier who is attached ro a humanitarian mine action program in a
training, advisory and memoring capacity. The military TA differs
from visiting military forces in three respects. He or she is nor-or
should nor be- a short-term visiror, bur rather is in theTA position
for a period of six months ro one year. The military TA is nor parr of
a fo rmed military unit, although national contingents within a program are usually under rhe command of their senior representative for
adm inistrative, personnel and disciplinary purposes. Finally, he or she
is nor armed and may nor necessarily wear a uniform.
l must confess a certain bias on my part. I have been a mi litary TA and I am immodest enough ro believe rhat my efforrs were
nor e ntirely in vain. I have also known and worked with many military TAs, from my own country and from others, and while they were
nor all well-suited ro rhe task, I believe rhar most of them did good
work. Somewhat inevitably, therefore, I am going to conclude rhar the
use of military T As is not a bad thing. I have structured rhis discussion
according to what I perceive ro be the three main concerns: ability,
money and philosophy. Or, more simply, can they do the job, how
m uch do they cost and should they be doing it an}'\vay?

by Rohan Maxwell, M ajor, Canadian Army
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Much of the d ebate revolves around rhe ability of military
T As to train, advise and mentor indigenous personnel in various positions within rhe organization . These positions can be grouped in to
three categories: rhe training and supervision required for specific mine
action tasks, such as finding and destroying mines; the training, logistics, planning, and command and control required fo r daily operations; and strategic planning, including integration with other development activities and resource management.
With respect to the first category, much has been made of
the difference berween military-style minefield breaching and rhe exigencies of humanitaria n demining. This difference undeniably existsin immediate combat. H owever, even in wartime, follow-on activities
are expected to achieve a high standard, and posr-confli cr clearance is
expected to reach what is effectively a huma nitarian standard. The
same is true of military demining activities in rhe context of modern
peace-support operations. It would be disingenuous to suggest that
milira1y personnel do not possess the techniques to reach rhis standard,
or the ability to understand and apply rhe International Mine Action
Standards (IMAS) .
Experienced mine action workers have stated that military
and humanitarian demining d o not differ at the point where the deminer and the ground come together, 1 and that military-style training is
applicable ro the training of humanitarian deminers. 2 It has also been
acknowledged that mili tary personnel can successfully form and train
teams of deminers,3 even though many of these trainers lack "live"
expe rience4 and even though some countries forbid their personnel
from conducting actual demining while working as trainers.5
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that military personnel can
effectively teach specific technical tasks such as d emining and explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) techniques, although they are not ad ept at
tasks such as mine risk education (MRE), where there is no clear military equivalent.6
Since there is an acknowledged need for qualified and experienced instructors,? it appears that there is a valid role for suitable military T As at this level so long as the tasks coincide with their skills. As
with any other job, rhe key word is "suirabiliry. " Technical skills and
knowledge are not sufficient: military T As, like civilian T As, must be

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol8/iss1/1

agencies.13 That bei ng said, senior officers in most armed forces have
ro possess strategic planning and resource management skills if they
are ro carry out their military duties wirh reasonable proficie ncy. This
is perhaps most notable in Western military establishments, where the
language used in many documents and meetings echoes that found in
civilian organizations, and where M.B.A. studies have assumed a status formerly reserved only for
advanced military training
courses.
A 1997 interview
with the (military) Chief
Technical Advisor (CTA) of
the Cam bodian Mine Action
Center (CMAC) appeared to
show a sound grasp of mine
action realities. He discussed
the need to build a sustainable demining program with
local buy-in, the desirabili ty
of a long-term approach by
donors and others, and the
importance of "weaving
together the various parts of
the program" by a pplying
business princi ples. He also
spoke of capacity building
and of the requirem ent for a
comprehensive national survey and an associated database in order to
support long-range planning.14 T he ability of military personnel ro
adapt to the exigencies of mine action does of course depend on the
individuals concerned , bur the option of using them should not be dismissed out of hand.

of a high caliber, able to transmit their ski lls and knowledge effectively in a given culrural, environmental and organizational context, and
remain in place long enough to be of real value.8 Ideally these requirements would be incorporated into the selection process used by rhe
providing country, but there is no guarantee rhar this wi ll be rhe case.9
Ir has been suggested that the receiving agency should play
a decisive role in the selection process, IO but this is unlikely to occur
under the most typical scena rio, where the receiving agency asks for
assistance and nations respond by sending the military TAs of their
choice. The militaiy personnel management system of the supplying
country dominates this process, and it will continue to do so while
military TAs are seconded to, rather than hi red by, the receiving agencies. T his means that the suitability of an arriving military TA will be,
to a limited extent, rhe luck of rhe draw. This is defini tely not the preferred staffi ng solution; however, my own limited experience working
with and within international organizations-and more relevantly the
judgement of those wirh more experience-suggests that rhis problem
is nor necessarily limited ro the group under discussion. 11
Military TAs have also achieved success in the second caregory, daily operations. One example is given by the Geneva
International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in The
Role of the Military in Mine Action: "... military T As provided an
invaluable injection of expertise at a time when Cambodia was struggling to rebuild its government and economy. Foreign military T As
appear to have been particularly effective at getting demining teams on
the ground."i2 T his makes sense, since deploying a nd sustaining large
numbers of persons to work on difficult tasks, under demanding conditions, is fundamental to milira1y operations. Given the personnel
and material resources (however scarce those might be) and specific
tasks within an assigned area of operations, military T As can perform
effectively at this level.
In contrast, most observers appear to believe that the military has little if any role in the third category: strategic planning,
resource ma nagement and integration wirh the wider developmental
effort. T his roo makes sense as sustai nable development is not a core
military skill, or is nor likely ro becom e one. As rhe United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) has noted, military personnel can
assist in this category, up to a point, but in the long rerm, rhe requisite training a nd assistance should be provided by more appropriate

Money

j

Although some believe that milita1y personnel represent a
net savings ro rhe receiving organization because their salaries are
already paid, l5 a more com mon assessment appears to be that milira1y
TAs, person for person , are rather m ore expensive than civilian staff.
The GICHD's comprehensive study states, " ... the incremental costs
associated with any foreign dury assignment of personnel from visiting
milira1y forces may be at least as high as the full cost of engaging equally well-qualified civilian personnel for the same assignment." 16 If this
were rrue, then it would clearly be a rational decision on the part of
the receiving organizations to eschew the use of military TAs. But is it
rrue?
The authors of the study cite rwo sources in arriving at this
conclusion. The first is a paper by rhe Organization for Economic
Cooperation and D evelopment (OECD), which correctly points our
that military operations are more expensive than civilian ones: a military airlift will cost more rhan a civilian one, a militaiy medical facility will cost more than a civilian one, and so on. This is undeniable,
even though the extra cost is not borne by the receiving agency (a
point that is acknowledged in the paper). 17 As others have nored, iris
true that "M ilitary unirs cost more for a given operation than the
equivalent carried out by a civil organization. " 18 However, we are discussing individuals, and it is a bit of a stretch to compare something

like rhc airlift of relief supplies into Somalia with the deployment of
individual military T As.
The second source is an American analysis rhar seeks to
quantify rhe incremental cost of deploying an individual soldier on
peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) or Kosovo.
The range given is $200,000 ro $250,000 (U.S.), a nd it is essentially
calculated by d ividing the
total annual cost of each
force by the number of soldiers involved. The incremental cost per so ldier,
therefore, includes his or her
share of the operating cosrs
of everything used by or in
support of American forces
stationed in BiH or Kosovo.
That is, everything from helicopters ro armoured vehicles ro camps to ammunition ro hospitals, for the
richest army in the world. 19
Obviously a military TA,
operating sans artille ry,
armored vehicles or a rrack
helicopters will be cheaper.
The GICHD study takes
this into account by lopping
off a third of the incremental cost, thus arriving at a range of $135,000
to $ 165,000 per year.20
This still seems like a he fry sum; as the study no res, ir is "as
much or more than appropriately qualified, experienced and morivared civilian personnel would cost (including recruitment and administrative support costs) if recruited directly." 21 It is true thar rhe receiving agency would bear the entire cost of a civilian TA, while most of
rhe cost of a military TA would be borne by the supplying nation. This
might appeal ro a pragmatic mine acrion manager, who might rake the
view that if there is ro be an incremental cost, ir would be better borne
by a la rge government rather than a relatively small mine action program. Still, the price seems inordinately high, irrespective of who is
actually paying. If it really were that high, governments would be better advised to conserve their military personnel for other purposes a nd
send the m oney rhus saved ro mine action programs for civilian staff.
The rrouble is that rhe marh does not work out. T he lower
end of the proposed range translates to about $12,000 per month in
incremental costs, a nd it is difficult to arrive ar that sum without
reaching levels of generosity not normally associated with the military.
Salary, medical and dental coverage, insurance, pension contributions
and so on arc nor incremental costs. Neither are living allowances or
local operating costs such as vehicles, drivers and interpreters, because
they would be rhe same for any TA, whether military or civilian. This
means that the entire incremental cost has to be de rived from military
allowances, administrative support and transpo rtation costs for
deployment, redeployment and home leave. Even if a T A fli es home
once a month and is an acure administrative challenge, $ 12,000
equates to an improbably high monthly allowance. Some militaries are
quire genero us, but even so it would be difficult to arrive at a monthly inc reme ntal cost in excess of $2,500 or thereabouts. Adding more
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rhan a bir for luck would give an annual increme ntal cosr of, say,
$48,000: hardly eno ugh ro recruit, pay and administer a civilian TA.
I have belabored rhis point because I believe ir is chimerical.
T he ofT-repeated assertion rhar military T As are mo re expensive is
demonstrably incorrect, no marrer who is paying. One simply can nor
exrrapolare from rhe per capita incremenral cosr of a fu ll-scale military
operation, or even per capita incremenral cosr of "borrowing" soldiers
from visiting military forces, ro rhe incremental cosr of deploying an
unarmed military TA wirh no logistics, communicatio ns o r infrastructure support beyond rhar which would also be provided to a civilian
TA. While debates over rhe relative quality of military and civilian TAs
cannot be conclusively settled because borh groups arc comprised of
individuals whose abilities vary widely, cost is a quantitative issue char
can be eliminated from the debate altogether.

Philosophy
If we accept rhar rhe question of abiliry is ar least sci II open
and char rhe question of money has been addressed, we are le fr wirh
philosophical argumenrs. This aspecr of che debare is a relarivcly fa inr
echo of rhe ongoing concroversy over rhe role of military forces in
humanitarian operations, and of rhe ofr-cxaggerared "culwral" differences between milirary and civilian personnel. A key elemenr of chis
w ider conrroversy-rhe abiliry of milicary personnel ro carry our
humanitarian rasks- has already been addressed in rhis arricle.
Anorher concern is related ro security. This argumenr suggests char humanitarian workers may be endangered because bell igerenrs won' t be able ro disti ngu ish between military and civilian pe rsonnel who are engaged in similar work, or because humani tarian workers
may become cargers by virrue of association with the mil itary.
However, attacks o n humanitarian workers (such as chose char have
taken place in Afghanistan) are nor carried o ur because of confusion
over rhe mili rary or civilian status of rhe victims, or because of a perceived rainr due ro civil-m ilirary cooperation; rhcy arc carried o ur
because rhe arrackers w ish ro drive away humanitarian workers.
The lasr philosophical argumcnr can be summarized as "lr
isn' t rheir busi ness," with a subrexr rhar rhe rnilirary is only interested
in humanitarian mine acrion because rhey are looking for gainful
employment in orde r ro jusrify rheir existence. In response ro rhe firsr
point I would suggest thar ir's the business of anyone who can make an
cfTecrivc conrriburion ro rhe efTorr, and rhar the only " turf' we should
be concerned about is rhar concealing rhe mines. As for the second
po inr, rhe armies char normally provide TAs seem robe busy e no ugh
these days. Furthermore, in rhe smaller armies, mi litary TAs are drawn
from a numerically small pool, and chose arm ies are ofren less rhan
anxious ro send scarce officers and non-commissio ned officers (NCOs)
ofT ro do work rhac they feel is nor che military's business!

Conclusion
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Altho ugh relarive qualiry is difficult co assess, the average
abil iry of m ili tary TAs is o n par wirh rhe resr of rhe humani tarian mine
action community and che fina ncial and p hilosophical argumenrs
against their use do nor srand up ro examination. Military TA~ are a
useful and usable resource, and since it would be srarding indeed co
hear a m ine acrion manager complain of a surfeit of resources, I must
conclude-as promised- char humanitarian m ine actio n benefirs fro m

the use of military TAs.
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Use of

BELGIAN MILITARY EXPERTS
For many years, a large debate over the use of military
experts in humanitarian demining has existed. Some individuals
are against military demining arguing the military performs different techniques and holds different priorities from humanitarian demining. Others are favourable toward military demining, as
they are the majority of demining centres. The Belgian military
has been active in demining since World War I (WWI). Still
today, explosive remnants from WWI and World War II (WWII)
remain a daily concern in the life of Belgians. The minefields
have been cleared for many years, yet everyday military experts
still dispose of UXO or abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). It
is important to understand this process does not take place during a military operation. Rather it is placed within the framework
of helping the population, a type of humanitarian demining.
Hi1tory
The explosive o rdnance disposal
(EOD) service was created immediately after
WWl. This service was acrive throughout
Belgium, initially as a decachmenr ro each
Provincial Recovery Service. In I 922, many
landmines we re disposed of, givi ng th e
impression ic would only take a few months ro
complere che project. Unfortunately, it
became clear rhe UXO problem was far from
over. In an effort to cackle this issue, rhe
O rdnance Disposal Service was created o n
Octo ber 3, I 923 .
After WWII , numerous Belgian
m ilitary unirs were directed ro dispose of the
obstacles and m ines la id in bo th world wars.
T hese unirs were sent rhroughour Belgi um.
On August 16, 1941 , rhe EOD service was
recreated, afrer rhe captive pe rsonnel were
freed , ro dispose of all explosive devices and

preserve any d evices of military importance.
Bomb d isposal reams quickly formed in rowns
char suffe red from bo mbing during the wars
and in places where old minefields, ammunition dumps or explosive charges were discovered. The EOD service activities conrinually
exceeded rhe casks emrusred ro ir by staying in
constant conracr with several resistance groups
and wirh allies. Through this constant interaction, EOD was able to inform London of p ossible manu facturing errors in fusing sysccms
and of likely causes of non-exploding bombs.
The bo mb disposal experts also recovered
explosives of defused devices and passed o n
rhe remaining explosive fille rs to resistance
groups for sabotage purposes.
On Ocrobe r 16, 1944, the
Explosive O rdnance and Obscacle Disposal
Service was creared as a n official addicio n ro
rhe EO D service and Belgian Armed Forces.
In the first year, 300 men worked under chis

in EOD
servtcc. The Explosive Ordnance D isposal
Service was created on December I , 1945, ro
unite a ll exisring bomb disposal un its under
one single command.
Between 1944 and 1948, rhe EOD
service srrucrure changed co nstantly as
Belgium search for an ideal organ ization and
due ro rhc Bomb Disposal Unir consran rly
decreasing inside. Likewise, afrer WWll, rhe
authorities believed an EOD service was no
longer necessary. The abolition of rhis service
was again imminenr. However, on July 4,
I947, a d ifferent decision was made-ro
reduce irs srrengrh ro 42 men. Fortunately chis
decision was never broughr ro execution , and
by rhe end of 1948, rhe EOD service consisted of 350 me n. T he Explosive Ordnance and
Obsracle Disposal Service held a temporary
unir sraws unril May I, 1948, whe n ic became
an organization of the basic Armed Forces.
Between I 949 and I 955, rhe EOD service saw
ma ny changes, essenrially as a resulc of che
reorgani7.-ation of rhe Armed Forces. Ar the
e nd of 1955, rhe EOD service had decreased
ro 11 5 personnel.
In O ctober 1971 , the army dete rmined rhe EOD service would no lo nger be an
independent unit. However, the early 1970s
consisted of inrernacional terrorism, which
meanr a need for Belgian specialists capable of
d isposing booby traps, letter bombs, car
bombs, etc. Furthermore, rhe number of leftover munirions from the two world wars
exceed ed the previous estimates. Each year,
ch e EOD service received 3,000-4,000
req uests ro dispose of devices of all kinds. Less
rha n three years after its dissolution rhe EOD
service was again creared on August I, 1974.
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The
I mer-service
Territorial
Command (lTC) was fou nded in 1995 d ue ro
a general reorgan isation of the armed forces.
lTC was established to bring together all
bomb disposal units in charge of territorial
bomb disposal operations under one command. This was the last major change for the
EOD unit.

CurrCIInt ActivHiC118
Today rhe Belgian bomb disposal
battalion comprises 23 officers, 151 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) , and 13 1 corpo rals
and civil ians, rhus a total of 305 personnel of
which 172 are bomb disposal experts ( 16 officers, I 00 NCOs and 56 corporals). The battalion is composed of three com panies decentral ised to cover the all-national territory.
T he first task of the unit is the
clearance of UXO and AXO left in Belgium
from the two world wars. Despite rhe proposal to d issolve the unit in 1971,
.u r' ~ 1
I .,lit t't un ~ 1 \ .u r;n gi ug
1 I 1 ''
1:1 ,, HI~' w 1 nr.h hnmb~ up w '\1 I kgn
rnon.:

Consequently, the battalion handles a11 average of 250 tons of ammunition
every year. Some 20 tons of "problem ammuni tion" (suspected chemical ammuni tion) are
recovered each year, especially in the areas of
fighting during WWI.
The Battalion's second mission is
rhe dismantling of roxie and chemical ammunitio n dari ng from WWI. The disma ntling

"'I

0
(")

c:
(/1

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol8/iss1/1

facil ity is located at the sire of conflict during
WWI. During 1998 and 1999, tests were carried o ut o n real ammunition ro control the
feasibility of rhe installation. The installation
has been opera tional since October 1999.
The third major task calls for the
support o f juridical autho ri ties in rhe field of
terrorism and organised crime. This responsibility averages around 150 interventions a year
fo r the EOD Battalion . Suspect devices ranging fro m letter bombs to car bombs arc investigated and rendered safe. The unit is also in
charge of post-explosion investigations. The
EOD Battalion is always ready ro intervene in
case of a military air crash to recover ammunition and pyrotechn ic elements. It can also rely
o n diver-bomb disposal expens for diving missions in the hinterland and the territorial
water su rfaces.
T he un it instructs its own bomb
d isposal experts and organises insrructional
courses fo r police forces, juridical authorities
and securi ty agents. The basic course to
become an EOD operator cakes one year.
After five years of experience, the no n-com missioned EOD officer operator follows an
advanced four- monrh course. Then the NCO
can act as an EOD ream leader. In 2003, the
Ministry of Defence requested char the bomb
disposal school develop an EOD ream leader
course for foreigners to parricipare in. T his
four-month course is available to experienced
EOD operators.
Belgian military experts continually
advise researchers involved in programs to
support humani tarian demining. Regularly,

rhe EOD operators su pport Belgian universities, the Royal Military Academy and many
civilia n universities in their studies with the
h umanitarian demining domain. The EOD
experts constandy rest new equipment and
p rovide help to the students, based on their
field experience.
The last support provided by the
Belgian military experrs encompasses the technical assistance to treaty and protocol d evelopment. Belgian Defence sends mil itary experrs
and both EOD and non-EOD operarors to
inrernariona l workshops and symposiums.
During these development processes, the military experts can provide counsel to developing treaties and protocol based on thei r field
experiences.
Beginning in 1990, Belgium began
requesting UN support fo r its humanitarian
activities and inform ing the world of irs 70
years of lessons learned.
Thus, the EO D Barralion began
participating in operations abroad. One mission called for the protection of thei r own
Belgian troops du ring deployments abroad.
Others were conducted within the framework
of humani tarian demining. Numerous un its
senr EOD experts to Rwanda (1986, 19931994), Iraq ( 199 1), Fo rmer Yugoslavia
( 1992- today), Somalia (1992-1993),
Cambod ia
(1994-today),
Democratic
Republic of the Congo (1997, 2004), Lao
People's Demo-cratic Republic (PDR)
( 1998-coday), Albania ( 1999) and Benin
(200 1).

The Battalion currendy has the following 13
EOD operators abroad:
• Three military EOD operators
are stationed in Kosovo to protect Belgian
troops, yet the Belgian EOD operators deal
daily with UXO in civiJian areas.
• Four military operators EOD
experts are stationed in Cambodia as technical advisers for the Cambodian Mine
Action Centre (CMAC). Between 1994 and
1996, the Belgian experts were involved in
the minefields. Their main task was to
inform and advise, in the field, the CMAC
deminers. Between 1996 and 2000, the
advisers assisted in the creation of an EOD
branch in CMAC with the cooperation of
Dutch colleagues. Since 2000, the Belgian
advisers have been alone in the support of
a n EOD branch. The statistics of C ambodia
show that 65 percent of the accidents are
due to UXO and 35 percent are due to AP
mines. The intention of CMAC is to build
an EOD branch able to work throughout
the country.
• Two military EOD experts are
deployed in the southern province of Lao,
C hampassak, in support of the activities of
the Lao National UXO Project (UXO
lAO). The BeJgian advisers support all the
domains, not only the technical and operational, but also human resources, material
resources, finance, etc. Since 1998, Belgium
has provided technical advisers to assist the
operations in the province. During the 15
years of war, bombs were dropped on Lao
PDR. Today it is a country covered with
tons of UXO. The experience gained in
Belgium since 1918 gives Belgium a good
opportunity to help Lao PDR to build a
long-term UXO disposal capacity to reduce
the risk due to unexploded bomb live units
(BLUs), bombs and other UXO.
• Four EOD operators have been

deployed in Bosnia since November 2003
to reinforce the Stabilization Force (SFOR)
mission. The mission of this team is to
assist Bosnia in the storage, transportation
and demolition of large stocks of ammunition.
Following the past experiences of
Belgium 's use of military experrs in human itarian demining has an advantage, even if the
humanitarian demin ing is normally nor a military mission. When a country uses mil itary
experts to build a national EOD capacity to
clear the country, the costs are substantially
lower. The majority of arm ies with an EOD
capacity developed them to support military
operations. During peaceful rimes, this capacity is available and the operators can be used to
clear the UXO on the national territory. The
country does not need to pay twice to develop
an EOD capacity for military operarions and
an EOD capacity for national territory. lr is
also evident that the experience gained on rhc
nationa l territory can also be used to support
programs abroad.
Military expcrrs usually have a mi lirary channel rhar gives them access to techn ical information. Thus, when the military
experts are involved in support of the humanitarian demining, it is easier ro ger access ro
rhe needed rechn ical informacion . Directly
after a conflict, milita•y units are regularly sent
to control the peace process. T he miliraty
EOD operators are able to starr wirh the
urgcnr clearance operations and disposal of
UXO. The co-operation with other actors will
only provide benefits to rhe humanitarian siruarion. A better coordination between military experts and non-military expertS is also an
advantage for research and development of
mine action technologies with a reduction of
the costs and an increase in the researchers
involved.

In conclusion, AP mines are a problem, bur they are unfortunately not d1e only
problem after a conflict. Many statistics
demonstrate today char UXO represent an
important problem rhar may be larger than
the AP mine problem. The experience of
Belgium shows that many decades after the
end of the hostilities, large quantities of UXO

still remain on the ground. The demin ing
acriviries of mincfields and rhe disposal of
UXO arc major tasks rhar will rake a long
rime. lr is in the interest of the inrernario nal
community to rake into accounr all available
resources, included military o perators. They
perform the same job as the no n-military
operators with, in some cases, other priorities
and other time schedules.
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Belgian Defence Staff Operations &
Training EOD
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O ne conrenrious ropic of debarc is
whether or nor militaries should even be
involved in mine acrion a nd if so, whar exactly their role should be. Because rhe level of
military involvement in mine action currently
varies widely from region to region , there are
many different views on the subject. There are
rhose rhar believe their role should be limited,
like Hugh Morris of MineTech International,
who says, "I don' r rhink rhc military have a
role in m ine action orher rhan in a conflict siruarion where rhey can nor bring in commercial
[organizations) or NCOs. I rhink rhe military
have a role to secure their own force protection aims, be able ro allow movement of their
forces and maybe movement of civilians and
movement of refugees. Bur when ir is a postconflict siruarion, rhe military should move on
to other tasks, because they're nor civil administrators and they're nor geared to do rasks of
a humanitarian mine clearing nature. Ir
requires a lot of men and a lor of rime, and I
d on 'r believe any military has the time to do
ir. So I don't rhink rhey have a role in a post-

conflict siruarion in any counrry in rhe world
ro clear land mines." 1 H e srresses rhat although
rhe milirary, being paid for by rhc governmen t, may be able to do such tasks for less
money, if rhey are nor p roperly trained and
knowledgeable on international standards,
then they will nor be as effective as commercial or non-governmenral organizations.
Morris says, "The milira1y have nothing bur a
military role in clearing mines, and rhen your
NCOs and commercial companies are rhe
ones who will ridy up in a post-conflict situation, unless there is money pur into rhe military, a nd they'd have ro adhere ro rhe
lnrernario nal Mine Actio n Standa rds
[IMAS)."t
Chuck Meadows of PeaceTrees
Vietnam believes th at rhe milirary should be
more involved in the actual clearance of
m ines: "In my view, a ny milirary in a ny country, rheir role should be in rhc removal of any
mines ... rhar rhey may have used or pur down
in any con flier rhar rhey have been engaged in.
Then, in their own countries, I think rhey
would be the appropriate ones to assist in the
removal of a ny land mines rhatany insurgenrs,

rebels or terrorists, or a nybody else have in facr
pur in rhe ground ."2 John Wilkinson of
RONCO also sees r:he role of rhe milirary as
one of involvement in clearance, bur in addition he e mphasizes rhar their involvement in
this aspect of mine acrion is more appropriate
rhan in orher aspecrs such as mine risk education (MRE): " ... I think thar the mine acrion
in terms of the removal of rhe mines as
opposed to MRE is probably more a role for
rhe military to play."3
Another view is thar the military
should mainly be involved in rhe "behind-thescenes" of mine action, such as providing
training, equipment, logistics and planning.
Paddy Blagden, an independent consultant of
lnrernarional Mine Acrion believes rhis ro be
besr rype of involvemenr in mine acrion for
the military: "There's so much that rhe military ca n do to help rhe NCOs even wirhour
getting near a minefield, and rhar I'd be far
more happy wirh , because 1 don 'r like seeing
soldiers bei ng pushed into doing mine clearance because ir's parr of their military dury."4

I think rhere's different areas of interest, different areas of access, different areas of understanding, bur all of rhem can be bridged and can
be made ro work in a comp lementary manner."3
Some non-m ilitary m ine action workers eire particular cases
in which rheir organizations are working wirh rhe military in a harmon ious way. As an example of how rhe rwo can work hand-in-hand
Paddy Blagden rells a srory of a Japanese NCO working in Thailand

1'

Facing the Challenges
alongside one of rhe Thailand Mine Acrion Cenrer's (TMAC's)
Humanira.rian M ine Acrion Unirs (HMAUs), which are com posed of
members of rhe Thai army. The HMAU was often unable to use irs
machines, so rhe NGO would borrow them, making sure that when
rhe machines were returned, rhe HMAU could carry on irs work wirh
a fully fueled and serviced machine. Thus, rhe NCO's deminers could
use a piece of equipment too expensive for them to own for only the
cost of fuel and servicing. "And rhis synergistic relationship workedwe gor enormous assistance fro m the army as a result,"4 Blagden says.
J ohn Wilkinson says char when RO NCO firsr began working with the U .S. military in Afghanistan, they weren'r sure how to
work rogerher, parrly because rhe military didn 't really understand rhe
process of demining a nd irs value. lr didn'r rake long, rhough, as he
explains: " ... IA]s soon as we starred working, rhey understood rhe
value of dcmining, when we started finding unexploded ordnance and
landmi nes that have been missed by rhe more cursory 'mine-clearing'
rechniques."3 Bur this progress was all bur lost when rhar unit's rorarion ended, and RONCO had ro start over with rhe incoming unir.
Soon, however, RON CO's value was recognized: " ... [Bjy the rime rhe
third unit came in, our presence had been established sufficien rly long,
and there was enough histoty of whar we'd been clearing and to what
effect rhar rhe arriving unir immediately said, 'We wanr you guys to
sray, we wanr you ro conrinue doing whar you're doing.' ... [T)hey
understood the role rhar we were playing for rhem even rhough we
were nor of rhem. "3

Collaborators or Competitors;»
W ith the military working in many
areas alongside non-military mine action practitioners, one might wonder if they see one
another as collaborators or competitors. The
overall feeling in the mine action communiry
seems to be rhar the military is nor in competition wirh NGOs and commercial organizations. One reason for this cired by a number
of non-miliraty mine acrion practitioners is
rhat NCOs and commercial companies often
hire ex-milirary personnel for rheir mine
acrion work. John Wilkinson sums ir up as
fo llows: " ... [L]et's face ir-many of the people
we hire and rhat everybody else hires are form er military, especially to run our field operations. So I've never rhought thar rhere was a
sort of hard and fasr division between rhe rwo;

which non-military originations could benefit. According to Chuck
Meadows, "The biggest tool rhey would have is jusr
experience and training, because in the militaries char I've been associated with, parr of rhar organ i1.arion are EO D folks and engineers that
are trained ro do rhar, whereas an NCO by ourselves might nor have
char personal experience." 2 On the orher hand, J ohn Wilkinson says,
"[ l] r's more of an organizational concept thar rhey have to bring rather
rhan experience ... . [Y]ou've gor a hierarchical sysrem in rhe m ilirary,
which, when iris given a mission or undertakes a mission, will turn ro
and pur a lor of resources aga inst and focus irs arrenrion on it. l think
that organizarional structure is something rhar we in the NCO com munity could benefit from in terms of how we approach things .... So
l think rha r more whar r:hey have to bring is the organizational
approach and rhe way rhey focus logistics and effort on a particular
rask."3

Though militaries can be a valuable resource if they use
rheir assets to mount collaborative efforts wirh non-military groups,
there a rc srill a number of challenges when involving rhe military in
mine action. Perhaps one of rhe mosr fundamental is rhe opinions and
prej udices rhar each group has towards rhe orher. Hugh Morris nores
thar " ...soldiers more often rhan nor consider civilians ro be a necessa•y evil and so are uncomfortable in rhei r presence." 1 Also, even
though non -mili rary organizations may have more experience in
humanitarian roles, soldiers may rcsisr learning from civilians. As a former military member himself, Paddy Blagden understands rhis attirude: " ... ! can rell you as an ex-military that no military man likes to
learn from [civilians] .... The lasr rhing you wanr is a rree-hugger coming alo ng and telling you how to do your business."4 However, he
thinks rhe military me n would do well to overcome rheir unwillingness ro learn from civilians, "because I rhink rhey would learn quite a
lor.. .. I rhink thar if rhey can overcome rhis unwill ingness by realizing
rhar rhey will save lives if rhey learn from people who are mine clearing the whole ri me as professionals, rhen I think ir'll help e normously.
If they won 't, then I'm afraid they've got to learn rhe ways rhar we d id
(i.e., by making a large number of mistakes), bur rhar is a very pain ful
process, and quire a lot of people can directly suffer as a result. "4 On
the orher hand, as Mr. Wilkinson arriculares, non-military organ izations can be jusr as guilty of such prejudice: " ... [I] r requires a change
of arrirude and a change of understanding on rhe parr of the military.
lr also in some ways requires a change in arrirude on the parr of rhe
NGOs-some NCOs prefer 'nor to deal wirh rhe military.' Well, rhe

What Does the Mllitarv Bring to the Table;»

J
,I

So whar advanrage, if any, is rhere to having rhe mil itary
involved in mine action' As in rhe example of Thailand mentioned
above, some mili taries may have rools at their disposal rhat are too
expensive fo r NCOs themselves to purchase. As John W ilkinson
points our, "rhey have much larger resources; rhey have the trained
EO D [explosive ordnance disposal] people. "3 If militaries and nonmilitary organizations can work our ways ro share these tools, as in the
T MAC example, such a partnership can be murually benefi cial to
borh .
Militaries also may have so me more figu rative "tools" from
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way rhings are going in terms of military presences, military interests,
people working basically on either side of the wire from each other,
rhar makes very little sense."3 Paddy Blagden agrees: "I agree fully ...
char NGOs sometimes dislike soldiers as much as the other way round,
bur ir depends very much on personalities wirhin both organizarions."5 The firsr step to successful cooperation is for both sides to
swallow rheir pride and be willing to admir that the other has a lot to
offer. T his step will probably be aided enormously by the fact rhar a
lor of NGOs and commercial organizations are comprised of some former military the mselves, wh ich should create opportunities to initially bridge the gaps between the two groups.
Another proble m when mili taries become e ngaged in mine
action is rhar rhey ofren have different priorities from the NCOs and
commercial groups. Hugh Morris describes his experience wirh priorities differing from rhe miliraty's: " ... [B]e we NGO or commercial, we
clear mines to the International Mine Acrion Standards, and that
imposes upon us a number of rules and a number of qualiry assurance
c hecks .... None of those rules apply ro rbc military, and rhe military
will clear mines as an expedient means of creating a camp, gerring ro a
target, or gerring through a minefield barricr."l Because of these standards, demining ofte n requires more rime and more paperwork rhan
rhe m ilitary is used to. If they don't understand the reasoning behind
such regulations, they can be turned off by rhe way professional mine
action organizations carry our demining. J ohn W ilkinson states, "In
many ways, a lot of dem in ing, when a military person looks at it, it's
kind of like, 'Geeze, it's a huge reporting structure; ir's relatively slower rhan mine clearance; we're nor going to be here that long'-rhose
kind of things. And rhcn on rhe ocher side of rhe wire, when an NGO
looks ar rhe military, ir's kind of like, 'You guys arc ignoring roo m uch
of the threat; you're just moving through and moving on,' ... and
again, we' re both doing the same rhing, ... ir's jusr a different approach
ro doing ir. .. ."3 This remark also rouches on anothe r issue when rhc
m ilir:uy gers involved in mine action: cimelines. As menrioncd before
with RONCO's work in Afghan istan, limited engagement times ofren
mean rhar mine acrion practitioners lose ground wirh militaries when
units change, having w re-establish their rapport with rhe incoming
soldiers and possibly re-explain their work. Paddy Blagden reaffirms
this problem : "The slight trouble with [militaries] is rhar although
they are initially pretry well-trained, as with mosr army units there's
q uite a large amount of rurnover. "4 T o overcome th is problem, John
Wilkinson says, " I rhink each has ro recognize rhe oth er's planning
rimcline and its areas of primary interest .... I think it's an issue of coming closer together and people starring to better understand what each
other does, how they do ir and why rhey do it rhe way rhey do."3
M il itaries arc also sometimes reluctant to share information
with non-military personnel, which can create difficulties when trying
ro work together in mine action. John W ilkinson describes this tendency: " ... [Y]ou've always got the issue of rhc m ilitary has a classification system and that, for operational security, they ofren don't share
information . 1 chink sometimes it's carried a little furthe r than ir needs
to be or should be."3 T his is probably one of the more difficult problems to overcome because militaries have an inherent level of secrecy
to carry on their work. As H ugh Morris explains, there is "a form of
fear by various m ili taries that the various weapons rhar [arc] dropped
[are] classified weapons, and if they [haven't] exploded, the n we as
non-military personnel should nor see these weapons." 1 Yet Morris

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol8/iss1/1

also chinks that the miliraty's tende ncy for elusiveness doesn't always
hinder information sharing: " ... [l]n some cases where it is not a contentious area, rhc military are pretty good at giving information to the
United Nations Mine Action C enters [UN MACs] to pass on ro people like us; but in other areas, they become quire rericenr because
they've dropped weapons that they don' t wanr us ro see how it worh.
So there the synergy is not always that simplc." 1 M orris cites Kosovo
as an example of a place where informatio n sharing with the military
is currently not bad, but he admits that his organization did meet with
some resistance when first trying to ob tain this information from the
milirary.

Improving Militarv/Non-Militarv Cooperation
Obviously, th ere is great potential for military and
non-military personnel to complement one anorher in mine
action. There are a number o f cases in countries worldwide that
demonstrate such partnership is nor only possible, but also quite beneficial. However, mosr would say thar rhere IS still room
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for improve mcnr. What suggestions do mem bers of rhe NCO
and commercial sectors of mi ne acrion have for improving
chis relationship?
Many mine action practitioners realize char there is a difference between the military and non-military approaches to mine
action. M ilitary minefield b reach ing or even what rhey sometimes call
"mi ne clearance" are not rhe same as demin ing, and mine action p ractitioners think rhe miliraty needs ro unde rstand rhe differences
betwee n rhem and why demining is so imporram. John Wilki nson
states, " ! think the military needs to better understand what demining
is ... and rhis requires a change of attitude frankly on rhe part of the
m ilitary. W e still run into situations where people say, 'Well, we don 't
do demining, we do mine clearance.' Well yeah, but, when you're sitring in a minefield, you'd better do demining, or when you' re sitting
in a field of UXO, you'd better do demining."3 Because military and
no n-miliraty organ izations often have different goals in mind when
doing their respective types of clearance, rhey may nor understand why
the other party rakes a cerrain approach ro ir; militaries may believe
that mine action is roo time-consum ing, wh ile mine action professionals think the military overlooks much of rhe problem. The bottom
line, accord ing to Mr. Wilkinson, is "we're both d oing the same
thing- we're both removing m ines and detecting and hopefully p icking up UXO, ir's just a d ifferent approach to doing it .... "3
The d isadvantage thar seems to be most agreed upon is that
many militaries getting involved in demining are not trained according to the internationally recognized standards. Chuck Meadows
expresses this as one of PeaceTrees Viernam's major obstacles: "For us,
the biggest challenge is training. lr's ensu ring the initial training for
rhe folks have been at the United Nations standards. "2 Pad dy Blagden
calls fo r rh e m il itary to " ... carry our clearance to International Mine
Action Standards .... I would say that until rhe m ilitary are capable of

doing th is, I wouldn' t like ro see them carry out all that much demining, except in emergency situations, and th e reason is because in any
one m ine-affected narion, rhere must be one national mine action program co ntrolled either centrally, or regionally b ur where each region
is integrated with rhe other regions. (I]f you want to get a complete
picture of rhe mine problem in any counrry, it is nor easy and you
have to have a central organ ization ... fill ing in the database and producing the rhrear maps and all rhe rest of ir. And if you get an army
working off on tl1e side, not provid ing information into this database,
bur having a little database of its own, which may not be compatible
with IMSMA [rhe Information Manageme nt System for Mine
Action], then you'll e nd up with inform ation that is nor getting into
the central, national mine plan. And if that quality assurance is not
done in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards,
you're really nor quire sure of what's going on."4
Mr. Blagde n cites the lack of following standards for major
prob lems with dcm in ing in Iran, " ... where although areas have been
cleared by rhe army, there have been so many accidenrs char rhe contractors working there require the work to be done again by a proper
mine clearance conrractor. What a waste of time and a waste of funds!
If rhe work was done properly beforehand chen ir would have been
alrighr."4 H e also expressed his concern for the lack of safety of militaty deminers who do nor follow these standards: "I am still though
vety saddened when I hear of accidents amo ng the military. I'm espec ially saddened when those accidents involve more rhan one person in
an explosion, unless ir was an anti-tank or ami-vehicle m ine, in which
case, ir's qu ire li kely to happen that way, provided rhe people were in
a vehicle. T he reason for this is that when six peop le are hurt because
rhey were all looking at an anti-personnel mine and somebody was
rrying to pur a pin in it or at least sore of make it safe, I realize then
rhat rhere was no dcmining d iscipline raking place at rhe site, rhar the
safety regulations were being rorally ignored, that all the safety disranees char are compulsory fo r humanitarian deminers we re being also
ignored, and that as a result, valuable human lives were, to be honest,
squandered, and I think char's a great piry...."4 H e does believe,
though , that militaries are starting to recognize the imporrance of following rhe example ser by non-mil itary mine action practitioners: " .. .I
think eventually they will come around to being much nearer ro rhe
NGOs' way of doing th ings and the commercial com panies' way of
doing thi ngs. They are already in many cases adopting rhings like the
l nrernarional M ine Action Standards ... [and] they are using the managemenr software, IMSMA ...."4 H opefully this trend will continue so
that the integration of m ilitary and civilian deminers can be streamlined for improved cooperation.
Although they may be reluctanr ro do so, m ilitaries should
be more will ing to learn from the mine action communiry. H ugh
Morris poinrs our thar because m ine action practitioners do demining
full-rime, rhe military would be wise to learn from them: " .. . [S]oldiers
that use mine detectors are trained in rhe usc of the m ine detector and
they mighr use it fo r at rhe most five or six percenr of their time on an
operation, whereas a commercial deminer ... uses a mine detector for
eight hours a d ay every single day of his life in-theatre... ." 1 Paddy
Blagden is also a proponent of rhis idea: " ... 1 don' t believe that armies
who try to do humanitarian dem ining look sideways enough ar rhe
h umanitarian mine clearing NGOs and commercial companies who
do the job full- ri me. Because I th ink they would learn quire a lot ....

(T]here have been conside rable developments in rhe procedures and
equipmenr available to NCOs, and I am constantly telling armies ...
that rhey would be very wise to look at the kinds of equipments that
are being used, and in fact, quire a lot of them are sensible enough to
have done so already."4
Another suggestion for improved cooperation is for the military to provide supporr to rhe mine action community in matte rs the
military may be better suited for rhan NGOs or commercial organizations and vice versa. Chuck Meadows, for example, believes " .. . the
improveme nt is really one of being supportive of each other's goals in
what we're doing. And in our case, that support is providing whatever the necessary assets. For us rhat means financial assets, ir means
equipm ent-it's worki ng rogerhe r in a partnership where there is
understand ing rhat the hosr nation is still in charge, but being supportive of what rheir needs are .... [I]t's nor a ma tter of manpower, ir's
a matter of training and rhen being able to provide the necessaty
equipment in cooperation with the other government officials that
oversee thar work and efforrs. "2 Paddy Blagden also suggests ways for
the military to assist mine action practitioners: " ... I bel ieve rhe military can help the NGO community immensely. T hey have equipment, they have transport; they have barracks; rhcy have training areas.
None of these things rhe NGOs have in nearly the same quantity. .. . I
believe char rhere arc lots of army barracks thar are available rhar could
make very good NGO headquarte rs -just let them have a corner of
the barracks-and there are a lot of army training areas, which NGOs
need for training the mselves. It's very hard find ing a training area .... "4
Such assets would be incredibly be neficia l for NCO or com mercial
groups and are a way for the military to help without having to commit irs own people where it may nor have the time, training o r logistics ro do so.
Along the lines of providing support but nor necessarily
"on-the-ground" manpower, some in the mine action community
propose that m ilitary cooperation be more on rhe administrative side.
Hugh Morris has had experiences wirh MincTech in which this type
of cooperation has worked wel l. " ... I do know of places where liaison
with the militaty at the UN MAC level is very good, and that is where
ir should rake place. And th is is where the military should be encouraged to open up to the people in the m ine action centers and mine
action center managers should be selected in their ability ro get on
with and operate alongside rhe milirary."l He continues, " I think that
we can work particularly well together, and rhar should be encouraged
ar rhe highest possible level, and I think this should be something that
should be pur together p rior to rhe nexr war, that civilian organizations,NGOs arc brought in straight away to work alongside the military, opera ring in support of rheir main aim, which again is force p rotection, and then we can get on with our hu manitarian roles of clearing up rhe problem fo r the local population." 1

Conclusion
I n many countries throughout rhe world, NGOs and commercial demining companies are finding themselves having to coexist
with militaries, wherher they be vis iring or indigenous. W h ile rherc are
ch allenges to this coexistence, there have been success stories and relations are im provi ng constantly as borh sides starr ro bener understand
continued on poge 5, NGOs
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we were unable to belp iu spite ofall our efforts.

Introduction
After th e impl ementation of the UN Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) at the end of the tlrst Gulf War in
1990, a medical team was set up in 1991 ro support the UN troops in
their difficult tasks in the demilitarised zone (DMZ), a remote desert
area between Kuwait and lraq. 1 The medical team was designed ro
take care of the medical treatment for the UNIKOM members and the
nomadic people living in the DMZ as pointed out in UN SecretaryGeneral rcporrs S/200 1/287 and S/200 1/913 on the official UN websitc.2
Despite the continui ng mine clearance and the UN Mine
Awareness Program on both sides of the DMZ, the management of
mine injuries remained a challenging rask for our medical teams.3 In
addition to these major problems, the usual day-to-day
outpatient department (O PD) visits fo r the militaty and local staff
personnel, dehydrations, scorpion bites, infectious diseases and road
traftlc accidents also had ro be managed.4 During rhe tlrst few years,
the medical duties and responsibilircs for rhc troops from 33 nations
were carried out by an Austrian and later a Norwegian Medical Team
(NORMED). In October 1995, this role was given to Germany, and
since then, 15 voluntary German Medical Teams (GERMED I w
15), equipped and managed by the Foreign Service of the Knights of
Malta hom Cologne, were responsible fo r providing the emergency
medical service (EMS) in the desert of the DMZ between Kuwait and
Iraq until the second Gulf War began in March 2003.5

Mine InJury-Related cxpenences
Missinnc: From 1996 to ?00?
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The rescue area included 3,800 sq km of rhe DMZ and the
remote desert surroundings. Five ambulances from three rescue stations with seven paramedics equipped with necessary supplies provided 24-hour service fo r the 1,200 UN personnel and the nearby
nomadic population. During 200 I , there were about 4,000 regular
OPD visits and about 50 calls for casualty evacuations (CASEVACS) .
Forry percent of the CASEVACs were mine-related and most of these
injuries happened on the Iraqi side of rhe DMZ. Therefore, this problem was greater than the road accident problem and had a political
component as well because the injuries happened in the Iraqi rerrito-

rics to the south of the DMZ where no domestic help was available for
the victims. In many cases, the victims had to be transported to the
southern paramedics rescue station to get access to the medical service
carried our from rhe United Nations within this area.
The mine clearing was always carried out by the

TABLE 1: CASEVACs for GERM ED 12

times, rwo helicopters from Banair, a company that specializes in testing equipment, or one of the rhree available ambulances had to be
coordinated in the most eftlcienr manner. Unfortunately, sometimes
rhe road conditions of the DMZ were nor easily manageable.
The UN level one hospital was located in rhe UNIKOM
headquarters. Therein basic life support could be provided and emergency operations could be done under emergency anesthesia-both
with limited resources. No X-ray, computerized tomography (CT) or
intensive care units (ICUs) from known EN were available. Due to
political reasons, the well-equipped Kuwaiti Health System was nor
available for the Iraqi patients. After rhe emergency treatment by the
United Nations, those patients had to be referred to their country.
Based on the reports of the former medical reams, the figures of the
missions were as shown in Table 2 .
It is interesting to note that the number of mine
incidents increased within the years of interest in sp ite of
the improving mine clearance conducted by the ARGENG
demining teams.

TABLE 2: UNIKOM: Mine Injuries
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Injury Pattern

GERMED12

Total from 1996 to 2002

Head

4

17

Thorax

2

4

Abdominal

2

37

Limbs

7

88

Upper Body

3

37

Lower Body

4

51

Both Sides

3

7
> 32

Amputation

For comparison, read Husum and Strata 5 2002 report on measuring
injury severity. 8
In spite of the large number of injuries in the lower extremities, some individual patients' injury patterns with injuries only in rhe
upper part of the body gave evidence that some of the patients had
been handling UXO or mines before the explosions of Hazards No.

YEAR

Mine Injury Incidence

1996

8

1997

7

TABLE 5: Fatalities Report

1998

5

(according to the UN documents 2)

1999

3

YEAR

Fatalities *

2000

Road Traffic Accidents

8

Mine Injuries

10

30

3

2003

N/A

Diseases

2001

24

2002

6

Others

3

2002

N/A

TOTAL CASEVACs

24

2003

N/A

2001
2000

7
>2

TOTAL

78

1999

N/A

1998

N/A

Argenrenian Engineering (ARGENG) demining specialists. During
each of the 75 mine blasting days, ARGENG had to be accompanied
by our paramedics.
To prepare the medical teams for their new tasks, mine
injury treatment guidelines and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) classit!cation of the mine-injured patients were discussed and compared with the regional mine injury epidemiology of
previous missions. These basic prepara tions for the medical teams were
usually accompanied by weekly concurrent medical education based
on the advice of R. Coupland from ICRC as well as M. King and P.
Bewes in their handbook Primary Surgery (on the web ar
www.meb.uni-bonn.de/dtc/primsurg).G T he basic preparations also
included training for special situations as well as some research abour
possible tclcmedicine support for medical treatment in these remote
areas.? The medical challenges in this remote area required the stric t
cooperation of the medical team members wirh representatives of different disciplines within the multinational ON-peacekeeping military
envtronme nt.
The chain of rescue from the two forward medical posts out
in the deserr to rhe UN level one hospital was equipped with rescue
equipment nearly approaching the European Standard (EN), and the
equipment had to be maintained within the extreme climatic circumstances, which included dust and temperatures up to 50 degrees
Celsius. Long rescue rimes had to be managed in certain instances in
rhe difficult environment of the desen. To achieve the minimal rescue

TABLE 3: Average Times for GERMED 12's
CASEVACs
Range

Times

Access Time

2-85 min

18 min

Response Time

5-80 min

44 min

Scene Time

10-75 min

28 min

Transport Time

2-125 min

44 min

1
[Calculatt'dfrom 23 C4SEVACS (I3 ground transport, I 0 air transport}
- 3 hours)
According to M. Helm, the chance of survival in these
severe injuries lowers by one percent for every three minutes of rescue
time. The Injury Severity Score (ISS) for the mine-injured patients
from GERMED \2 varied from 50 to 2. According to the Trauma
Injury Severity Score (TRISS), the survival probabilities resulting from
these and other necessary parameters had to be calculated berween 9 .5
percenr and 96 .8 percent mostly depending on the complexity of the
injuries described in Table 4.

.

1997

N/A

TOTAL

> 15

III.2.1.2.9
• The UN official reports only mention the ji~ttzlities.
For comparison, read janunlu, Husum and Wisborg's rl'port. 10
These figures extracted from the official UN documents arc
to be seen as minimal figures. Some dead on-the-scene patients from

accidents from outside the DMZ didn't get access to the help from the
UN medical reams in time. The follow-up for patients mostly referred
to care from the Basra hospitals with limited resources, which at that
time were not accessible to UNIKOM authorities.

t.,;onchJ<:Inn
From the end of the t!rsr GulfWar (1991) until the beginning of the second Gulf War in March 2003, UNIKOM attempted to
guarantee the stability of this post-conflict area between Kuwait and
lraq. Mine-related injuries remained the major problem fo r the EMS
services. Most victims were young Iraqi civilians who had been entering through the southern part of the former DMZ to get basic med-
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Appendix: Anaesthesia in the Field During the
GERMED-12 Mission
During the GERMED-12-Mission anaesthesia was started in the
field. According to the recommendations of the UN Peacekeeping Mission,
the paramedics did the basic-level medical support. An ambulance car was
available at this level of primary care. The treatment included cardiopulmonary resuscitation, haemorrhage control, fracture immobilisation,
wound dressing, casualty transport and evacuation. There was the possibility of communication and reporting by radio, so the paramedic had to
report the emergency situation to the doctor on duty at the operations centre. The medical treatment was coordinated on the advice of the emergency
physician.
For treatment and evacuation of casualties the tactical operation,
casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) was started. Especially under the conditions of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM),
a Forward Medical T earn (FMT) was sent to provide short-term medical
support in the field. The FMT was transported by helicopter or ambulance
car to the emergency scene. Both were equipped with modern emergency
appliances and medicine.
The task was to perform emergency resuscitation procedures:
maintenance of airway, breathing, and circulation and advanced life support, haemorrhage control, and life- and limb-saving emergency procedures.
Especially in GERMED-12 the physicians were trained to use
Ketamine in combination with intubation and ventilation. Ketamine could
be used in most wounded patients without problems. It proved to be very
safe and had only a few side effects:
• Hyper salivation: Atropine is necessary.
• Hallucinations: Diazepam or midazolam was given to prevent
these.
• Increased blood pressure: Preferred medicine for hypovolaemic
patients.
The transportation time was sometimes over one hour (see Table
3 on previous page) before arriving at the Level-One medical support facilities.
In our field hospital, it was possible to do surgery under general
anaesthesia in an operating room. We used an apparatus from the Drager
Company. We have administered general anaesthesia with nitrous oxide and
oxygen in combination with Ketamine. One physician was the anaesthetist
and two surgeons, one nurse, and one paramedic were on duty daily.
At this level, we could perform limb and life-saving surgery. It
includes laparotomy, thoracocentesis, wound exploration, and debridement,
fracture ftxation and amputation.
For post-operative monitoring at our ward, we have used emergency medical equipment like mobile ECG and transportable respirators. A
nurse or paramedic did the post-operative observation.
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ical support from the different UN medical reams provided in the UN level one hospital in the former
UNIKOM headquarters near Umm Quasr.
The lessons learned have been used to establish the World Association for Disaster and Emergency
Medicine (WADEM) Landmine Task Force to formulate an u pdate of WADEM's 1997 declaration on the
m ine hazard siruarion of rhe world at rhe beginning of
the new millennium (preliminary URL: www.dismedmaster.de) . Further work has to be done ro learn more
about rhe outcome and rhe rehabilitation of the surviving victims. For th is purpose, contacts have been established to the reaching IC RC's Superfluous Injury or
Unnecessary Suffering (S irUS) Project Team from
Geneva, the UN Portfolio of M ine Action Projects
Team in New Yorkl l as well as the journal of Mine
Action and surrounding institutions. We are hoping that
these contacts will help ro improve the living conditions
of the survivors of landm ines.

·~

Jordan is a country ri ch rn hi story and beauty.
Thro ugho ut the years, w ith the increase of tensions in
the Middl e East, Jordan has been fo rced to protect its
borders. As a resu It, Jord an has become a major actor
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in the mine action community and has taken a different
approach by promoting the use of its military for
demining and its non -governm enta l o rga ni zati o ns
(NGOs) for rehabilitati on and mine awareness.

History
The first mines were laid in Jordan in 1948 during
a war with Israel. Later, during the Six-Day Arab-Israeli
War in 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank
and developed a new cease-fire line, Jordan began planting
more mines along its western border. In the 1970s, Jorda n
experienced a Syrian threat, and numerous internal
problems led to more mine planting. Thus, Jordan quickly
moved from a mine-free country to a kingdom burdened
with minefields along its western and northern borders.
Over 15,000 acres of land, bountiful in natural
resources and sacred sites, quickly became consumed with
mines. The total number of landmines stretched beyond
300,000, of which over 225,000 were laid by the Jordanian
Armed Forces (JAF) and over 70,000 by Israel.!
Before his death, His Majesty King Hussein called
for the clearance of all minefields by the year 2000. In
March 1993, the Jordanian government implemented its
first phase in a three-phase demining plan. In 1998, Jordan
signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty. Today, the govern-

ment continues to support numerous mine action conventions and conferences, and submits updates on the status of
its stockpile destruction program.2
King Abdullah commissioned the National
Demining and Rehabilitation Committee (NDRC) in
MaKh of 2000. Th-is committee participates in vMious
demining aspects from mine risk education (MRE) to mine
clearance. New associations continue to emerge in Jordan,
such as the Hashemite Society for Soldiers with Special
Needs, Landmine Survivors Network, the I n ternational
C ommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Al Hussein
Foundation for the Habilitation and Rehabilitation of the
Disabled , and Queen Noor still plays an active role in demining. However , the Jordanian army's Royal E ngineers
Corps (REC) remains the key fo rce in demining.3
Through the REC's success in Jordan, the army
has begun to stretch its boundaries. Currently, the REC is
working in Afghanistan in an effort to demine the country
and return the land back to the Afghan people. Aiding
Afghanistan in its move to rebuild a country torn apart by
the Taliban is not only noble, but it will also provide the
REC with more experience in battling its problem at home.
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Interview With a Jordan Military Mine Specialists

Current REC Efforts

Q: What skills does the milttary bring to humanitarian demining that humamtarian organizations might

The new estimated completion dare

lack?
A: The sole deminer in Jordan is the military's Royal Engineer Corps (REC). The military deminers are
skillful, professional, highly motivated and adapting to tnrernational Jemining ~tandards. REC has led
in the removal of mines from inhabited and agricultural :treas, rhus lowering che number of casualties.
Through these operations REC's knowledge has increased in humanitarian aspects of demining, and
they have exchanged importam information wich concerned parries.

for rhe three-phase demining plan in Jordan is
the year 2009.2 To dace, t he REC asserrs ics
clearance actions are progressing well, as it has
cleared nea rly I 00,000 AP and ami-veh icle
(AV) mines2 Ge neral Fayez Al-Dwairi,
Commander of REC. told the Landmine
Monitor Rrport that Jordan's first goal is co
concenrrare on clearing land t hat w ill help
improve Jordan 's eco nomy through development, even though this land can be the most
difficult co reclaim2
Jo rdan is one of t he many landmine- in fested countries in the Middle East.
Thus, the REC's superior knowledge in dcmining and Jordan's efforts to promote a minesafe world were the main reasons the international community was delighted to have 13
Royal Jordanian Engineer Corps d eminers
d eploy ro Afghaniscan. December 2002
marked Jordan 's first effort co participate in an
international mine clearance operation.

Q: How do you feel the military approach co mine action is d ilferem from the humanitarian approach?
A: The military approach is different in that demining is only a small portion of their professional goal.
Their main goal is to serve thei r coumry without concern for extraordinary remuneration. They never
hesitate to do their duty, while trying to do their hesr in preserving their countrymen's lives and their
equipment.

Q : H.!.S the role of the Jordan military changed humanitarian demining: the methods used, the
strategy, ccc.... ?
A: Jordan's demining project has had its own challenges, which has led ro adopting special
methods and strategies. These can only be achieved by che military chrough proper training,
professionalism and discipline.

Q: What challenges has che Jordan milttary experienced tn humanttanan demining operations?
A: Many challenges were faced, which can be summarized in the following:
- High temperatures and severe weather
- Erosion and shifting minefields
- Heavy vegetation
-Sensitivity of mines due ro passage of rime
- Deeply buried mines
-Some mineficlds are in swampy areas

Afghanistan Efforts
Q: Can you tell me how the Jordan military became involved in Afghanistan?
A: The Jordanian milirary went ro Afghanistan because of irs good repuration and to enhance Jordan's
role in international humanirarian acciviries in respect to international agreements.

Q: Whac goals does Jordan hope for tn Afghan tstan?
A: That our operations in Afghanistan show Jordan's commitment to humanir.arian demining and che
role we play in the international arena.

Q: Have you experienced difficulties: Taliban, rebels, environment and dealing wtch other countries?
A: Every job comes with difficulties. The REC found that pieces of UXO brought che most
difficulty as they are very dangerous because there are many different rypes.

Q: h rhere any added benefit tn ustng the mtlitary m Atghantstan instead of NGOs?
A: We cannot answer that question, but we can say that in an uns.tfe environment iris becrer ro give the
job to che military, as they can protect themselves.
Q: I low do you coordinate efforts with NGOs?
A: Presently, che National Commicree for Demining and Rehabilitation handles the coordination; however, originally REC was responsible for coordinating visics co demining sires.
Q: What are some of the success scories in Afghanistan?
A: We helieve the best success stories are shown through our numbers:
-Area cleared: 225,000 sq m -UXO and mine removal: 473 -Total cost: $1.5 million (U.S.)
Beyond the numbers, we have cleared roads, purified water and provided medical assistance.

.,

Q: Is the Jordan milttary currendy or thmktng about performmg demining operations in ocher coumnes?
A: We are ready ro srudy any request through our chain of command .
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Q: What are the future plans or possibilines for the Jordan mihtary m hurnanitanan demining?
A: The REC will continue demining in Jordan umil we achieve our goal of a "Jordan free of mine;."
However, rhis will require no less than $150 million through coordination with the donors.
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The Jordanian m ili ta ry, along w ith
numerous coalition forces, is also raking part
in Operation Enduring Freedom by sending
soldiers to Afghanistan in an effort ro rebuild
che country. After numerous banles a nd especially the Russian occupation in the 1980s, it
is estimated rhar over I 0 million mines exist in
Afghanistan, which cominue to severely hinder the international reconstruction efforts.

Bagram Airbase
The first d eploym ent of REC deminers was stationed at the Bagram Airbase. By
using the Aardvark chain flail system that is
designed ro desrroy AP and AT mines while
cuning th rough vegetation, over 23,100 sq m
have been cleared by Jordanian REC deminers.7 The Aardvark has been h ighly successful, detonating 95 percent of the AP mines
and I 00 percent of the AT mines.
With the expertise and skills gained
in Jordan, t he REC demini ng ream provided
in-depth knowledge co the demining operatio ns in Bagram. This 13-member team consisted of mechan ics, drivers, guides and maintenance specialises. Although the Jordanians
have experien ced great difficulty in demining
their country, Afghanistan has proven to be
even more ch allenging to the ream. The

rugged terrai n and numerous batcles wich
their associated debris forced the ream to
replace rhc chains o n rhe flail once a week.
The camaraderie at Bagram Airbase
was valuable to the Jordanian ream. American
fo rces provided "shelter, food and security for
the engineers. "8 Other coalition forces provided maintenance and pans to rhe demin ing
ream, w h ile Afghans followed behind che
Aardvark clearing the land of detonated
mines.

team is led by the Task Force Devil mine
action center, which searches for cleared land,
new bui ldings and road s that can be constructed. Once rhe KAF is cleared and safe,
coalition forces will turn ir over ro the Afghan
governmenr. As Scaff Sgr. Oscar Rodriguez,
U .S. Army 27th Engineer Battalion our of
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, stared, "Every
inch they [the members of the Jordanian
ream) clear is o ne more inch we can usc. And
when we leave, it's ground the Afghan people
can usc ."6

• Photo c/o AP.
References
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Kandahar Air Field
Wich the completion ac Bagram
ai rbasc, the Jordanian ream was redeployed for
a three-month tour to Kandahar A ir Field
(KAF) to clear the surrounding area. Their
equipment did nor stand up as well as the
ream members. The REC soon discovered rhe
Aardvark's rotor was broken. Due to irs massive weight, five tons, the new rotor took four
mont hs co deliver from Britain. After promptly installing rhe new rotor, che 13-member
rea m began working.
Unfortunately, che REC team
fo und it once more d ifficult to dem ine the
debris-infested desert ground. The hammers
located at the end of each chain, wh ich "deliver one con of pressure and dig 12-20 inches
in co t he ground, for a coral of 72 tons of pressure on a space chree inches wide and I 0 feer
long,"6 were frequently desrroyed by rhe harsh
gro und conditions. In fact, I st Lt. Ashraf Odar
sta ted , "We scop every 15 minutes and check
the rotor. W e replace about 10 hammers a
day."6 The KAF demining proved to be a considerably slower process chan Bagram A irbase.
The Jordan REC demining team is
o ne of rwo unics stationed at KAF. Jordan's

clearance campaign has nor yet taken great
effect around the world. NGOs remain the
number one demining agents. Fortunately,
Jordan continues to assert irs campaign by
sending its experienced reams to m ine-infested regions such as Afghanistan and other pans
of the world.

Conclusion

Jamoary 15. 2004.
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2. jordan." Umdmint Monitor Report durp://www.

icbl.orgllml20031jordan.hrmb
Jo rdanian mine action efforts by the
military have cleared about I 00,000 mines
since 1993. The REC has notably changed
Jordan from a country constricted by mines to
a country thriving in new developmenr. The
Jordanian government felc the economic and
social pain from m ines, buc rook action ro
bring back t he freedom they once had as a
mine-free country. Now the government continues ics search for freedom and peace beyond
the Kingdom 's borders. Jordan rakes an active
role in che international arena and impacts
nations by irs example of pro moting mine
clearance through mil itary demining efforts.
On a WorldNec D ialogue among
numerous countries, one Jordanian general
urged fellow leaders ro pursue dem in ing
efforts by using their militaries and to leave
rehabilitation and mine awareness to NGOs.
His strong endorsement of this "more beneficial and effective" method of mine clearance
will hopefully encourage other nacions to follow sui r.7 Although Jordan has had great success in its military demining effort, irs m ilitary
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A Silent

Introduction
The objecrive of rhe Millen ni um Developmenr plan of rhe
Unired Narions is ro "eradicate extreme poverty and hunger [and} guartmtee the sttStttinabiliry oftbe environment. "Th rough rhe sel fl ess efforrs
of rhe humanitarian dcmining programs in Central and South
America by rhe U n ired Narions, rhe Orga nization of American Srares
(OAS) and the lnrer-American Defense Board (IADB), the precedi ng
objectives are being accom plished . Thus, I am overwhelmingly compelled ro share rh e successes and sing the praises of the personal sacrifices taken on hy demining pe rsonnel.
In rhis article, I seck ro manifest rhe experiences of rhe
Armed Forces' h uman itarian dcmining reams stationed in mine-affected countries. Tnformation expressing the imporrant roles of different
military componenrs, i.e., hosr o r visiting military, will be given
throughour rhis article.
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and Successful
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The mandares for humanitarian d emining programs by rhe
OAS were honored in rhe 32nd ord inary session of the General
Assembly, where rhe following resolurions were approved: GAIRES
1889 (XXXII-0/02) "The Wesrern Hemisphere as an anti-pe rson nellandmine-free zone;" GA/ RES 1878 (XXXll-0/02) " Supporr fo r the
program of ln regral Acrion against ami-person nel mines in Cenrral
America;" a nd GA/ RES 1875 "Support fo r action against anti-personnel mines in Peru a nd Ecuad or."
In 1998, the OAS's Unit for rhe Promotion of Democracy
(UP D) created the Com prehensive Action Against Ami-personnel
Mines (AlCMA) ro confront rhe complex, difficult and persiste nt
aspects related ro crises caused by ami-personnel (AP) mines. In 1991 ,
rhe Assista nce Program for Demin ing in Central America (PADCA)
was incorporated wirhin rhe framework of rhe AlCMA per rhe requesr
of numerous AP mine-affecred countries in Central America. A disrincrive facer of rhe AICMA program is irs eminenrly humanita rian
character. In conjunction with IADB, AICMA seeks ro rcsrore living
conditions, increase rhe confidence of the inhabitanrs, red uce
UXO/AP mine threars and dangers, and restore cleared land in mineaffected areas for use in agric ultu re a nd carrie-ranching acriviries.
This progra m also covers rhe following fields of acrion:
assistance in surveyi ng, mapping, locating and clearing of minefields;
mine risk education (MRE) fo r rhe civilian population; support for
mine vic rims, including physical and psychological rehabilitation;
socio-economic reintegration of mined areas; a nd supervision and supporr for rhe desn·ucrion of stockpiled mines. The p rincipal responsibilities of rhe U PD with in A!CMA are ro collect funds from the internarional communi ry, administer and manage resources, and coordinate
the program from a diplomatic a nd political perspective. The IADB is
rhe enrity respo nsible fo r organizing a ream of international supervisors for countries supported by rhe AICMA program . T hey are also
responsible for providing technica l assistance, training demining
rroops, and guaranreeing rhar rhe operations are a ppropriate and comply wirh international securi ry standards.
The achievemenrs of rhe AICMA are due, in grear measure,
to rhe invaluable and generous support of various Member Srares

(Argenrina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El
Salvador, Guate mala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Peru, Venezuela a nd the Unired Srates). These
Member Scares have provided technical advisers and supervisors through IADB. As well,
rhc achievements of AICMA would nor have
been accomplished wirhour the numerous
con tributions of key inrcrnarional donors such
as Germany, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South
Korea, Denmark, Spain , rhe Unired Srares,
Russia, the European Union, France, lraly,
Japan, Norway, rhe United Kingdom and
Sweden, a mong orhcrs.
Furd1ermore, wirhour rhc narional
co mm irmcnr and conrriburions from the beneficiary countries of rhc AICMA program,
whe re rh c.: Assistance Mission for Mine
Clearance in Central America (MARM INCA)
a nd the Assistance Mission for Mine
C learance in Sourh America (MARMINAS)
are operating, rhe key aspecr of rhe program's
~truc rure would have been missing. In Cenrral
America, rhe mission o f MARMINCA continues supporting rhe national efforts of
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, while
rhe program in Cosra Rica has concluded.

Likewise, within rhe mission of MARMINAS,
rhe demining acriviries in Ecuador and Peru
have gained momenrum.

V1s1ons From on External

)erspedive
The acriviries relared to rhe support
and rehabilirarion of people affected by mines
make up rhe wide range of rasks and efforts
from wh ich valuable experiences can be
drawn. Some of rhe diverse rasks carried our in
humanitarian demining require rhe participation and coordination of high-level OAS individuals. lr is imperative rhar rhese OAS officials provide incenrives for donors to conrribure and for rhese contributing countries ro
provide Armed Forces officers to compose
reams of supervisors and monitors. There also
needs ro be a commirmenr and coord ination
among rhe countries providing milirary forces
and wirhin rhe differenr levels of governmenr
of rhc beneficiary counrry. This enables large
geographic extensions of land where landmines are impeding rhe developmenr of rhe
region to be cleared.

Through rhe coordinated efforts of
civilian and milirary personnel, rhese objectives arc being achieved. A testament ro this is
Cosra Rica, which became rhe first country
free of AP land mines through the successes of
irs humanitarian demining program . Irs program included joinr efforts by civilians and
military organis ms unired by the call to
humanitarian service. Being conscious rhat
rhis is nor a particular task of rhe Armed
Forces, rhe perspective rhat is soughr wirhin
rhis article is ro highlight rhe praiseworthy and
self-sacrificing rask of milirary personnel.

Drive and Dedication
During one of rhe firsr field vis irs ro
Honduras, an opportunity was presenrcd ro
verifY rhe work and "drive" being carried our
by military personnel in Cholureca. lr became
cvidcnr rhar rhe responsibiliry of clearing
mines in areas where rhe remperarure is normally higher rhan 35 degrees Celsius is nor an
easy job. In addirion ro rhe remperarure,
Hurricane Mirch added more difficulry to rhe
job as mines were scarrercd in various places
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and depths, affecting their detection and
destruction. However, these adverse conditions did nor discourage the specialists nor
decrease their d rive.
T he successes of this work are the
d irect result of the fu nctions carried out by the
international supervisors and monitors. These
reams of professionals, army or marine officers, and non-commissioned officers, are represenrarives of diverse countries rhroughom
the Americas. Their principal mission is to
supervise dcmining tasks, ensure rhat operations follow international demining norms
and provide for the safety of rhe soldiers rhat
execute the tasks. In addi tion, they participate
in the planning of the tasks related ro impact
surveys and certifying that the work is being
carried our in compliance with strict securi ty
norms. In order to carry out rhcse tasks, they
must arrend an intense training program in
order ro be qualified. Wirh rime, camaraderie
and a sense of purpose begin ro develop within the demin ing teams; rhese aspects contribute significantly to strengthening the ries
between civilians and the military. Thus, the
confidence and affection of the civilia n populatio n toward their soldiers are reinforced.
On a daily basis, rhe ream coordinates with national military authorities rhat
are responsible fo r clearing their territories.
They have the responsibility of suspending
work if it is not being executed in accordance
with established norms. However, they musr
also observe the realities of the terrain and particular siwations and e nsure that they do not
become an impediment to the work, all while
staying within the perspective of security.
One of the most imporranr aspects
o f rhis type of work, where the daily
relationship of soldiers from diverse countries
is motivated by the sense of serving a country
and the international community, is rhe significant increase in confidence and security
rhe community gains. A situation that demonstrates rhis rook place last year between Peru
and Ecuador. These two governments commitred to clearing areas in Peru and formed a
sense of camaraderie as rhey worked toward a
humanitarian objective. These efforts were
significant in helping to overcome historical
differences between nations and in calming
the mine-related fears of Peruvians.
Alth ough confronted w ith hard
work and transferred to border areas where
memories of conflict can easily return, the
teams strive roward the objective of camaraderie and a humanitarian end. This is seen

in the displayed energy of sold iers as they
demonstrate motivation for what rhey are
doing. They can personally verif}r how recovered terrain is now being utilized for agricultural productio n in once-affected regions.
Additionally, rhey directly receive the expressions of fondness from rhe people when rhey
see rheir lands cleared and rerurned.
The unit commanders designated
by the host country to direct these missions
discover how their capacity ro manage can
exceed borders. The resul t of rhei r efforts nor
only is projected directly ro rhe communi ties
of their own countries, but also remains
inserted in the international community. This
is because they have taken parr in an effort
where various countries participate in humanitarian objectives and goals.
The d emining experiences carried
our by Armed Forces personnel have achieved
great results in respect to fulfi ll ing a job with a
high incidence of security. These tasks have
cleared terrai n contaminated by mines and
have offered tranquility and secu rity to rhe citizens rhar live in these sectors. Thus, rhe
efforts of international organizations aimed
toward peace and security in rhe hemisphere
can be visualized with positive and concrete
results.

ch1evements
IIIP

During 2003, important efforts
toward the elimination of AP mines sown in
Central America were accomplished. T he
number of mines and UXO that have been
destroyed as of August 31, 2003, reached a
total of 28,793. The area cleared reached
1,280,453 sq m among the coun tries of Cosra
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
In April 2002, MARMlNCA began
ro support the humanitarian demin ing activities both in Peru and Ecuador. MARM INCA
sent international supervisors on assignment,
suppl ied technical assistance to rhe armies,
and d ictated basic courses to the sappers and
Demining Operation Planni ng.

September 22, 1999, the Demining Center of
Ecuador (CENDESMI) was created through
Executive Decree Number 1297. In March
2001, rhe agreement between Ecuador and
the OAS was signed and pur into practice with
the AICMA program. Peru, in turn, developed the first phase of dem ining operations in
1999 with bilateral assistance from the United
Stares and Canada. In May 200 I, the OAS
a nd rhe Peruvian government signed the
agreement for the coordination of international support, through rhe AICMA. On May I,
2003, MARMINAS was created wi th headquarters in Zarumilla, Peru.

onciUSIOn
As an observer, I have seen the
importance of humanitarian demining in
Central and South America. The important
and unselfish work carried our by rhe Armed
Forces wi thi n the different roles that they execute is inspiring. Through this article, one can
only visualize the great successes of the OAS
and lA DB's coordinated efforts be tween civilian a nd military organizations. Although nor
well known, rhey have achieved a great degree
of success in liberating countries from rhe
threat o f AP mines, allowing for economic
and developmental activities to boom in cou ntries. It only re mains to congratulate rhe
efforts of all of the members of rhe demining
battalions for rheir unselfish work, which
make praiseworthy the activities of rhc militaries today and project their role for rhe
furure.

In November 2003, rhe Stares
Parries ro the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) met in
Geneva and agreed ro rhe creation of a fifth
protocol on explosive remnants of war
(ERW). 1 This new international humanitaria n law is designed ro minimise the risks and
effects of ERW in the post-conflict period.
While rhe Ottawa Convention has
focused attention on the issue of AP landmines, the mine action com munity has long
known rhar in rhe post-conflict environment,
rhere are many different explosive hazards that
can be found. In 2000, ir was rhe high number of injuries caused by cluster bomblcts in
Kosovo that led rhe lnrernarional Committee
of the Red C ross (I CRC) to call fo r new international law to address ERW2 Three years
later, the new "Protocol on Explosive
Remnants of War" was concluded.

The new protocol is a recognmon
by rhe states of the serious post-conflict
huma nitarian problems caused by ERW. The
protocol contains 11 articles and a separate
(non-binding) technical annex. These articles
specify post-con fli ct remedial measures of a
generic nature co minimise rhe humanitarian
risks and effects of ERW. The main articles in
this p rotocol are Article Two, which provides
definitions of explosive ordnance (EO), UXO,
abandoned EO and ERW, thereby becoming
a legal term in international law;3 Article
Three, wh ich covers clearance, removal or
destruction of ERW; and Article Four, on rhe
recording, retaining and transmission of information.
The future successful impact of the
protocol will d epend on how the states implement irs contents. There is scope for differen t
interpretations of whar is requi red fro m signatories. However, if we rake a positive view and

assume the states enact all measures of the protocol and the technical annex, the main difference for rhe members of mine action community will be to make their job easier and more
efficient in the post-conflict period.
First, the disciplines of mine clearance and mine risk education (MRE) should
benefit. 4 T he prorocol makes Stares Parries
responsible, to varying degrees, for the provision of resources (technical, financial, material
and personnel) to undertake work in these
areas. What is nor clear, however, is how many
and through which cha nnels resources will be
allocated. The protocol allows for the states ro
undertake work in such areas as clearance, survey and MRE, either directly or via a third
parry (which could be rhc U nited Nations or
other supra-national body) or other parries
involved in post-conflict clearance, suc h as
no n-governmental organisations (NGOs).5
T here may be a concern rhar m ilitary forces, with little understand ing of the
process of hu manitarian mine action, could

Contact Information:
First photo c/o JADE.

Second photo c/o AI'.
Colonel Mellado
Inter-American Defense Board
2600 NW 16th Street
Washington, DC 20441
USA
Tel: 202-646-1333
E-mail: pao@id,org
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l n I 998, Ecuador a nd Peru initiated the task of eliminating mines from their
respective territories. Both countries developed different methods for demining their territories, realizing that their situations were different. Ecuador rarified the Ottawa
Convention on April 20, 1999. Later, o n

::!!:
0

a:

"'C/1

w

1-

0
2

by Paul Ellis, Technology and Standards Expert,
GICHD
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2004

27

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1

z

0

....
m
(II

...:II
0

s:

....
::1:

m

...

m
r-

c

U1
N

come from the release
of information. The
List of the Articles in the Protocol on
protocol asks the states
Explosive Remnants of War11
and parties to an
armed conflict to provide information, as far
Preamble
as practicable, to assist
Article I: General provision and scope of
mine action. The speapplication
cific list of information
Article 2: Definitions
is provided in th e techand
nical
annex
Article 3: Clearance, removal or destruction
includes:
the
targets
ofERW
for EO, approximate
Article 4: Recording, retaining and transmission
amoums used, the type
of information
and nature of EO, and
Article 5: Other precautions for the protection of
general locations of
the civilian population, individual civilians and
known and probable
UXO. Further, provicivilian objects from the risks and effects of ERW
sion is specifically
Article 6: Provisions for the protection of
made to provide inforhumanitarian missions and organisations from
mation on abandoned
the effects of ERW
munitions, including
Article 7: Assistance with respect to existing ERW
rhe location, approximate numbers and
Article 8: Cooperation and assistance
types of munitions
Article 9: Generic preventive measures
abandoned. Of particArticle I 0: Consultations of high contracting
ular relevance to clearparties
ance and MRE is the
Article Il: Compliance
recommendation that
Technical Annex: Contains the suggested best
information on UXO
should include methpractice for achieving the objectives contained in
ods o f identification
Articles 4, 5 and 9 of this protocol. High
and methods for the
contracting parties will implement this technical
"safe disposal" of EO.?
annex on a voluntary basis.
Agai n, while the path
* Part 1: Recording, storage and
by which information
is passed is not precise,
release of information for UXO and
the text of the protocol
abandoned EO
is clear that NGOs are
* Part II: Warnings, MRE, marking, fencing
included as possible
and monitoring
recipients of informa* Part III: Generic preventive measures
tion.S
The key to rhe
military- mine action
rake a more acti ve role. Recem studies suggest
community relationship will be rhe implethat military units are not ideally suited to all
mentation of rhe Protocol V articles. In many
aspects of mine action, though they do h ave
countries,
contingency plann ing for post-consome relevam capabilities.6 U nder the protoflier
work
is
already done jointly by aid organcol, it could be argued that we will see the milisations and governments. This work now
itaty playing an increased role. However, it is
needs to be expanded to ensure that military
unlikely that we will see rhe military emering
forces
also rake into account the requirements
mine action in larger numbers than in previof the protocol on ERW. T hese issues are nor
ous rimes. T he world's militaries, with limi ted
resources and a large number of competing something that can be field-tested, but by
engaging with the political a nd military actors
tasks, will probably continue to welcome rhe
now, NGOs can at least provide evidence of
assistance of mine action organisations.
rheir experience in these matters, which states
Indeed, rhe protocol repeatedly states rhar
will hopefully recognise as useful for implestares can use a third parry to deal with ERW.
menting the protocol on ERW.
T he second positive impact will

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol8/iss1/1

The Fifth Protocol is not perfect.
Many believe thar the language is roo cond itional, and these caveats allow stares ro do litde and yet still legally fu lfil their obligations.
Many would have liked rhe technical annex to
be legally binding. Many of the cri ticisms are
right; from a humanitarian poi nt of view rhe
p rotocol could have been stronger. However,
diplomacy such as these negotiations over the
last three years is rhe art of rhe possible. The
coordinator of the discussions on ERW,
Ambassador
Chr is
Sanders
of
rhe
Netherland s, stated in the final session of
debate that in h is view, the text was the best
that could be achieved at the timc.9
Ambassador Sanders is the only person who is
fu lly aware of the haggling and compromises
required to ger to the final rext; his judgement
that the protocol was the best the process
could produce is probably accurate.
For proponents of a stronger protocol there was some risk to continuing the d iscussions. T he alternative to not agreeing in
November 2003 would have been to p rolong
the discussions for at least another year, if not
more. There were many States and NGOs who
were concerned tha t furthe r negotiatio ns
would result in a further weakening of the text.
The issues had, after all, been exhaustively debared a nd few could see what new grounds for
discussion existed. Significanrly, many of the
srates who agreed w the protocol are nor part
of the Ottawa Convention, including India,
Pakistan, Russia, Ch ina and the United States.
Overall, rhe protocol has the agreeme nt of 92
nations, although the states still have to individually sign the protocol.' 0
If the Fifth Protocol contributes
anything, it is a requirement rhar rhe states
now consider the humanitarian impact of
ERW and they have some guidance on the
measures rhar can be used to reduce the effects
in the post-conflict environment. Much will
depend on how the states will implement the
protocol. Som e of the states have already started to consider the implications of rhe protocol- the United Kingdom used the 2002
Gulf Conflict to rest some of its ideas for dealing with ERW, such as in forma tion provision
to clearance organisations.
The challenge ahead is to ensure
that the protocol is implemented in the
strongest possible manner. While the text of

rhe protocol carries many caveats, such as
"where feasible" and "where possible," it is for
states to d ecide how to incorporate the terms
of the protocol into their military doctrine.
The importance of bow the protocol is implemented is perhaps most clearly shown with
regard to the technical annex. The annex sets
out clear requirements on the provision of
information for ordnance used , the obligations concerning abandoned munitions and to
whom information is to be given; however, ir
is all voluntary. The provisions of the tech nical annex are nor onerous, and it might
becom e a m easure of a stare's commitme nt to
dealing with ERW as to whether or not they
adop t the technical annex along wirh the formal protocol.
The mine action community could
- and should-provide a pivotal role by
engaging with policy makers wherever possible ro ensure that states introduce the terms of
the protocol and the technical an nex into their
military doctrine. For example, the mine
action community can provide field experience to illustrate the importance of information provision in reducing the humani tarian
impact of ERW. For organisations involved in
mine action, now is the opportunity to try to
influence how the protocol is implemented.
Where cou ntries require national legislation to
e nact rhe protocol, political pressure can be
used to ensure that a state introduces all measures of the p rotocol and perhaps goes even
further, for example, by making the provisions
of the technical annex legally binding. Once
procedures and laws are written , ir will be
much more difficult to persuade governments
to rewrite rhem. H ow stares implement the
rreary is where the furure success of the protocol will be decid ed.

I. The full title of rhc convention is ''The Co nvem ion
on Prohi bitions or Restrictions on rhe Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons \XIhich May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects."
The framework convention has five prorocols, which ban or
restrict rhe use o f various types of weapons that are deemed
to cause unnecessary suffering or affect ei th er sold iers or
civilians indiscrim ina tely. The weapons covered include:
weapons thar leave undetectable fragments in the body
(Pro rocol I); mines, booby-traps and ot·her devices
(Prorocol II, amended in 1996); incendiary weapons
(Proroeol Ill); blindi ng laser weapons (Protoco l IV); a nd
ERW (Prorocol V). A5 of March 2004, rhere were 92 states

that were party to the convenrion.
2. For a history of how the ERW process began and
was developed, see: "Explosive Remna nts of War: The
Impact of Curren t N egotiations," Paul Ellis 1 journal of

Mine Action. Issue 7 .1 , April 2003; and "' Explosive
RemnarHS of\XIar: The Negotiations Contin ue," Paul Ellis,
Journal o[Mi1u Actio11, i>sue 7.2, August 2003.
3. The definition of EO excl udes mines, booby tra ps
and orhe r devices as defined in Prorocol II of rhe CCW.
While there is rarely a clear disrincrion between rhe location
of mines and UXO. booby traps and rdued devices could
nor be included in rhis protocol on ER\V for legal reasons,
as they already had th eir own Prmocol (II. amended 1996).
4. Vicrim assistance does nor have the same prominence in Protocol V as in [he Onawa Conventi on. The
issue of how much prominence to give tO vicrim assistance
was strongly debated. A number of countries, parricubrlr
South Africa, argued for much !ltronger provision for this
area. ln the end it was nor possible ro do m o re rhan include
ir as a paragraph in Article 8 on Cooperat ion and
Assistance.
5. Article 3 of the prowcol on "CIC"arance, Removal or
Destruction of ER\Xf.'' paragraph 5. states: "High
Contracting Parries shall cooperate, where appropriate,
both among themselves and with other states, relevant
regio na l and inrcrnarional organisations and non·govern~
memaJ organisations on the provision of inter alia tcchn i~
cal, financial, material and human resources assistance
including, in appropriate circum stances, the undertak ing of
joint operations necessary ro fulfil rhe provisions of this

Article...
6. See Tbe Role ofth' Military in M i11e Action, GICHD,
2003.
7. The rechnical annex has adopted many of the in for~
marion requirements thar the rnine action commu nity
asked for, see the report Explmivt' Rttnnmw of \f'nrJnfonnmion Requiremen/s, G ICHD , 2003.
8. In Tec hn ical Annex l.c.ii, it is stated that:
"Recipient: The information should be released ro rhe party
or parties in conrrol of rhe affecred territory and to those
persons or insti tutions that the releasing Stare is satisfied
are, or will be, involved in UXO or AXO !abandoned
explosive ord na nce] clearance in the affected area. in the
education of rhe civilian population on rhe risks of UXO
and AXO."
9 . Paul Ellis' personal norcs from the Meeting of the
Group of Government Experts to the CC\'7, Geneva, 24
November 2003.
I0. The protocol will come inro fOrce six months after
the 20th rJ.tification by a srare.
11. T he full tt:xt of rhe convenrion in rhe six l anguage.~
of rhe United Narions can be fo un d on rhe GICH D websire at: http://www.gichd.ch/CCW/index.htm or rhe UN
Departmen t of Disarmament Affai rs websir~: hrtp://
disarmamenr2.un.orglccw/index. html, accessed 29 March
2004 .

Rethinking Humanitarian Demining Efforts, continued
from page 27

Conclusion
So where do we go from here?
Although our focus is to eliminate donor
funding in rl1c fut ure, we are worki ng with the
IC and the BHMAC ro generate donor funding for rhe initial equipment costs. We are
confident that lC donors will support this initiative based on rhe much-improved rate of
return for their investment in this future EU
member. Over the next few months, the team
will be working with the SFOR AF BiH
Restructuring Working Group to integrate
rh is demining initiative into rhe future of
BiH. Based on guidance from the OHR, the
new military structure for BiH is to be implem ented in Januaty of 2004. The Defense
Review Co mmission is working diligently to
resolve any legislative or legal roadblocks fo r
restructuring success. lf we are successful, the
ream sees this as the beginning of a new era fo r
coalition military operations. BiH is at a crossroads in its history where it may be the best
suited and most capable country to help coalition countries m ake this paradigm shift.
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rhe rho rough knowledge and experience of the
capabilities of all components under a variery
of working conditions.

The Sdok I<ok Thorn

INTEGRATED DEMINING PROJECT
The Sdok Kok Thorn Project in Thailand was an ideal
proj ect in o rder for the Japan Alliance for Humanitarian
Demining QAHDS) to create a mine clearance capability. The
project site was compact, easily accessible and the vegetation varied from sparse to very dense, whi ch made it possible to create a progressive training scheme of increasing complexity. This allowed the
mine clearers to progress in steps towards the most difficult and challenging stages. One of the main points of the proj ect was to incorporate
a hi gh degree of integrated demining, i.e. , demining using rhe three major
tools in the mine clearer's toolbag: manual clearers, machines and mine
detection dogs. This was only possible due to th e generosity and cooperation
of rhe T hailand M ine Action Centre (TMAC) and specifically their Thai
M ilitary H uma nita rian Mi ne Actio n Un it 1 (HMAUJ), b ased no r fa r fro m Sdok Ko k
Thom in Ara n yaprarher, w hich allowed J A H DS

w use some o f thei r mechan ical equip-

m ent and also rheir dog ream s. T he p rojeer was co mpleted and rhe sire was h and ed back co
rhe Sa Keo province on January 23, 200 4.

What is Integrated Demining?
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Integrated mine clearance is not a
new concept, bur rather one rhar has developed
over rime with the combination of increasing
experience and advancing technologies aiming
to achieve the most cost-effect ive mine and
UXO clearance possible given the available
resources. Integrated mine clearance involves
the application of a range of tools, technology
and procedures in rhe mosr logical and costeffective combination to clear suspected mined
areas safely in rhe shortest possible time.
Integrated demining is increasingly being used
as more managers gain experience with rhe use
of machines and dogs. Some of rhe more experienced non-governmental organizat ions
(NGOs), including Norwegian People's Aid
(NPA) and Mensehen gegen M inen (MgM;
People Against Landmines), use all three component tools. The potential for high cost-effectiveness is great, bur the potential for waste and
low efficiency is also grear.

The advantages and d isadvantages
of rhe three compo nents of demining
ope rations are well-known. Manual mine
clearance is slow and potentially dangerous,
bur ir can be efficient. M ine detection dogs
can speed up mine clearance, bur are
expensive and can be unreliable. Machines can
also speed up the process of mine clearance,
bur can be a heavy initial investment a nd
require consid erable maintenance and logistic
support. On rhe other hand, when used
together as an integrated system, they can
make mine clearance faster, safer a nd more
cosr-effecrivc.

Methodology of Integration
The integration of rhe rhree di fferent components ar Sdok Kok Thorn was the
responsibility ofjohan Van Zyl, who h ad considerable demining experience from his work
in southern Africa a nd the Balka ns. Before
mine clearance could srarr, he had to assess rhe

most effective methods of clearance rhar could
be deployed for rhe rask. The fi rst factor was
the size of the project a rea with special atte ntion to rhe rype of soil, the gradient and rhe
vegetation. T his was established by a technical
su rvey, which also enabled rhe manager to
divide rhe area into ma nageable blocks according to natural fearures a nd boundaries, such as
roads, footpaths a nd walls. T he ground at
Sdok Kok Thorn was firm and relatively
stone-free with no major slopes a nd a rural
area of about 407,000 sq m. The area was initially d ivided into nine blocks. One block,
which was a silted-up lake, was liable to muddiness or even flood ing, so work on ir had to
be completed by the end of the d ty season .
The nexr factor was an assessment
of rhe m ine threat. There was a known Khmer
Rouge camp in rhe area, bur parrs of rhe worksire were already well-rrodden by rhe local
people. T he mines were mostly C hinese type
69 bounding fragmentation mines along with
some UXO. These were in the middle and east
of rhe sire and were laid for protection in rhe
directio n that the Khmer Rouge expected rhe
Vietnamese forces to arrack. In some cases, rhe
mi nes were still active- a tenth block was
added to the contracr following a mine incident involving a Thai border patrol soldier
close to rhe original project area. T hreat information cam e from rhe natio nal Level I Survey
reports, rhe TMAC database, rhe local miliraty commanders, soldie rs and ex-soldiers,
police, local au thorities and villagers, and was
in general accurate enough for planning and
training purposes. As the mines in the area
were predominantly rripwirc-acrivared mines,
any tripwires rhar had nor corroded had to be
removed by mechanical operation or during
rhe manual clearance process.
A further factor was rhe assessment
of resources. T he resources available were
manual deminers from General C harrichai
C hoonhaven Foundation (GCCF), starring
wirh 14 initially inexperienced staff recruited
from local villages, bur by rhe end of rhe proj-

Implications of the Sdok Kok
Thorn Project

ecr increasing to a sraff of 45 well-trained individ uals. All deminers were trained in a special
four-week civilian demining course o rganised
and carried our by TMAC, which concentrated o n the immediate clearance needs. All deminers were trained o n the CEIA Mil-D I mine
detecto r, wh ich gave excellent resulrs, even in
larerirc soils. For machines, JAHDS was forrunare in being able ro borrow U.S.-funded ,
T MAC-owned machin es from H MAU l; a
brush dem iner (BDM 48), and later a Tempest 3 and a Pearson Survivable Demining
Tractor and Tools (SDIT). JAHDS itself
owned a Hitachi BM307 brushcurrer. JAHDS
was also allowed to use between rwo and duee
HMAUI dog reams when they were nor
deployed elsewhere.
Although availabil ity of dogs and
machines fluctuated, overall rhe resources
available mad e for an effective " toolbox" fo r
rhe project. T he BDM 48 and Hitachi were
effective in clearing dense und ergrowth , as
well as preparing rhe ground with rhcir rotating milli ng heads. The Tempest mini-flail was
used for vegetation clearance in and around
trees, rh us minimizing rhe damage to the local
environment. The SDIT was effective in
prepari ng the ground before rhe manual operation starred, which sped up the clearance
process and made it safer for rhe manual operators. Ir nor o nly removed vegetatio n, bur rhe
ground-contact magnet of rhe
also

sorr

sped up the man ual process by removing rhe
majority of meral fragments from rhe area to
be searched by rhe manual reams. This fearu rc
eliminated borh a large percentage of false signals in the m anual reams' derecrors and a subsequent waste of detection rime. When used
in combination wirh a rake or plough , which
loosened rhe ground up ro 20 em, and by
repeati ng rhe process with multiple sweeps,
clearance using magnets proved ro be highly
effective and removed an estimated 80 percent
of metal debris from rhe soil. The dog reams
were used ro assist rhe manual deminers following vegetation clearance and for verification purposes. T hey identified a considerable
number of rhe mines found.
From these assessments, ir was possible ro scr up a clearance plan. Each individual block received individual attention and
was allorred rhe clearance methods rhat were
the most applicable. Teams were rasked, rhe
eq uipment was disrribured (depending on
ava ilability) a nd rhe projecred completion
dares were recorded. Th is allowed the generation of a flexible, safe and cosr-cffec rive operation. Because of the flexibility provided by
the coope ration wirh T MAC and HMAU I , ir
was possible to retain all the clearance components (i .e., manual reams, dog teams and
machines) in balance with each other, so no
resources were wasted by being present bur
inactive. This balance was only achieved by

In sum mary, the Sdok Kok Thorn
was a good project on which ro carry our integrated mine action. Every mine action sire is
different, bur rhe principles and methodology
used ar Sdok Kok Thom were general enough
to be used in a wide spectrum of scenarios and
will be used again in the next JAHDS project.
JAHDS was lucky to have rhc support of
T MAC and especially HMAU I, which
allowed rhc usc of a range of equipment nor
usually ava ilable to small NGOs. The civilian
mine clearers of rhe GCCF proved ro be very
effective despite rhe facr that rhis was the first
project in Thailand where civilians were used
as d eminers. Again , rh is project was fu lly supported by rhe all-miliraty TMAC. The success
of rhe Sdok Kok Thorn Project may pave rhe
way for more civilian mine clearance in
Thailand. JAHDS also enjoyed rhe sup port of
rhc governor of Sa Keo province and rhe
Ministry of C ul rure. T hrough good reamwork, rhis integrated project was successfully
concluded both quickly and safely-making ir
an cxcelknr starr fo r JAHDS' efforts in mine
clearance.
* Photo c/o the author.
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Background
MineTech International (MTI) has been stationed in southern Iraq since May 2003, working o n humanitarian mine and ammunition clearing projects, and as part of irs brief history, working to
deliver rapid response demi ni ng support for the United Nations
Office of Project Services (UNOPS).
MTI flm arrived in Basrah wirh a ream of around 90 explosive ordnance d isposal (EOD) and m ine clearance professionals
including m ine detecting dogs (MODs) and dog handling teams. Four
emergency survey reams were
also deployed to carry our
Level 2 technical surveys, initially to locate and identify
explosive renanrs of war within rhe southern Basral1 governare using rhc Information
Management System for
M ine Action (TMSMA) format. H owever, in June 2003,
MTI's survey teams were
retasked to conduct the
National Emergency Survey,
with rhe prime focus of gathering informacion to measure
the effect of Operation
Enduring Freedom in southern Iraq. As a result, eight
survey teams have been working to identify populated areas withi n each of rhe eight governates in
southern Iraq and ro identify rhe dangerous areas chat are within close
proximity to villages .
Southern Iraq comprises eight governatcs from Baghdad to
the Kuwait border in the south. The area is bounded by Saudi Arab ia
to rhe west, Kuwait in the south and a long land border with Iran to
the east. T he area has experienced rhree major conflicts: the Iran/Iraq
War ( 1980-1988), the Kuwait Campaign (Gulf War) from
1990- 1991, and most recenrly Operation Enduring Freedom. I n their
wake is an enormous accumulation of explosive remnants of war
(ERW) among which rhc local people have been living wirh fo r rhe lasr

•

20 years . Ammunition that sho uld have been destroyed has been
dumped in rural areas-much of which has deteriorated over rhe years
due to the high saline comem in rhe soil.
Added to this is the large amount of ammunition stockpiled
by the Iraqi milita1y chroughom rhe region. With the breakdown of
law and ord er, much of this ammunition has been removed from storage so chat the copper, b rass and alumin ium componenrs can be separated and sold in Iran. The result is char rhe conrenrs of mun itions
crates have been abandoned and spread over a wide area. There is also
rhc rhrcar of loose propellant having been widely scattered when looters trashed am mu nition
srorage facilities. This has
created safety issues nor
only for rhe local population bur also for the EOD
reams dealing with the
resulting mess.
In rhe first few
months of activity, the
mine clearance teams made
a concentrated effort ro
help farmers gain access co
their land in rime co prepare fields for cultivation,
removing cluster m u nitions
from agricultural land in
the Az Zubayr region, near
Kuwait.

Despite the dangers, local people appear
to be. largely unperturbed about the risks within
their communities. This cr'eated some problems
for the MTI survey teams who were frequently
told that there was nothing dangerous within the
community when, in fact, there were stockpiles
of ammunition. More often than not, the children, shepherds and nomads proved to b'e the
best source ofinformation on the whereabouts of
dangerous areas-not the village elders.
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Basrah
The survey reams, initially working in Basral1, encounrered
a large amount of ordnance rhar had been lcfr over from rhe Iran/Iraq
War, in particular a high concentration around the Sh an At Arab
waterway, which was subject to heavy fighting. There had been no
ancmpr by Iraqi governmenral organisations ro make the area safe for
the local population. One particular minefield along the Shan At Arab
water course is situated in a marshy area wirh up to 1.5 m of water in
some places. The locals usc dug our canoes to go about their business
for fear of detonating mines. T heir animals, on rhe orher hand, wade

in ro graze and regularly fall victim to rhe mines.
In rhe first week of July 2003, rhe Survey Teams deployed
to the oil facility in AI Fao township. The teams surveyed from the
lower At Fao peninsula northwards. H ighlights included the location
and survey of a major minefield to rhe north of At Fao that is hampering and blocking the rebuilding of homes, cultivation of agriculrural
land and fish ing activities. The minefield was laid during rhc I ran/Iraq
War and has a heavy metal contamination. The local people are clearing mines and UXO where they are identified.
South of Basrah, rhe teams found large quantities of
ordnan ce ranging from stored ammunition to abandoned
explosive ordnance (EO) from rhc last three conflicts. The EO was in
varying states of conditio n and stabi li ty, with most sites
containing large quantities of loose propellant scarrered among the
munitions. Additionally, another mined area was located 400-500 m
south of the greater c iry limits of Basrah, which the MTI
manual clearance teams cleared.
Of all rhe governates surveyed, Basrah posed the most challenges to the survey teams. It had a high number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) with in rhe province who were creating their
own commu nities with "villages" literally spri nging up overnight. In
the end it was decided that if rhe people considered themselves to be a
communiry, rhen rhey would be surveyed as one. In practice, this
meant reams were covering a far larger n umber of communities than
the original mapping information suggested. T he survey reams had to
travel the road systems and rely on local sou rces of information to be
able to guaranree they had picked up the required information and
covered all of the villages in rhe area. Additionally, there was ERW
strewn across rhc province from three previous conflicts. T he levels of
ERW contamination, particularly in the Basrah governate, led the survey reams having to complete m ul tiple dangerous areas for individual
villages.
To rhe north of the province, rhe teams ran into security
problems such as being warned off from entering certain areas,
encounrering potential h ijack situations or having to address fundamental issues such as lack of electricity, water, medicine, and law and
order.

The Threat From Border Minefields
Compared to rhe EOD problems, mine clearance issues in
Iraq are of much less consequence, largely because there are few, if any,
minefields in rhe country and these are mainly scattered defensive
minefields located around a few ex-Iraqi mil itary installations and are
considered to be strategic installations, such as oil and gas fields or
refi neries. The significant exception is the entire length of rhc eastern
border wirh Iran, which has been heavily mined, denying access to
thousands of hectares of land. Currently, rhe Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) does nor wish any clearance of the border mineflelds,
although MTJ personnel have completed a specific six-week mine
clearance task to create a safe area around a key border-crossing water
point. As movement restrictions have lifted, more people arc moving
to rhe Iran border, where the grazing is untouched. T hey are moving
into mineficlds that are extremely dangerous and cannot compare with
anything in MTI's experience. In the short rime worki ng in rhe border area, MTI personnel have evacuated six civilians who were injured
after returning to the minefields with their livestock. Although rhe
barrier minefields in the border regions arc known, ir has been reported that the area is prone to flooding during the wet season and consequenrly mines migrate into areas where people conduct agriculrural
activiry- in some cases preventi ng farmers from producing crops.
Mine awareness educarion will be viral to protect rhe families who are
now returning to rhe area if nothing is done to rackle rhe mineflelds
themselves.
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D u ring rhe first rhrcc weeks of October, the survey reams
worked in rhe Missan governare. There are limited Coalition Forces
EO within the province and rhe main source of ERW is Iraqi in origin from both the former Iraqi army and rhe Iraq/Iran conflict. The
Missan province had been home to an Iraqi Army Corps, rh us there is
a huge amount of amm un ition stockpiled in various degrees of security and condition, ranging from permanenr bunker facilities to open
field storage sites. T he main ongoing ERW threat remains in rhe bor-
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der minefields laid during rhe Iran/Iraq War.
The Missan governate in many ways is an easier environment in which to work. The local people removed the Baath Parry
from power, liberating their governate without rhe help o f Coalition
Forces, and there was no co nflict in the governate during Operation
Enduring Freedom. MTI was given assistance by all local community
leaders, which ensured a significant element of security, although
problems with armed gangs in the somhern portion of the governate
did limit activity.
Once the survey along rhe various axes of rhe Missan governate was completed, the survey group moved to the town of AI Kur in
the Wassit province, northwest ofMissan, at the end of October. MTI
was again welcomed by rhe local governor, who recognised the major
problem with ERWin the province, borh from field storage areas and
from rhe minefields running along rhe Iran border. Here, rhe problem
has been exacerbated by rhe number of Iranian pilgrims crossing the
border illegally on pilgrimages co Sh iite holy sites. As in Missan, mines
a re migrating from laid minefields into areas where local people carry
out their daily business.
The survey reams continued operations in the Wassir governare in early November with the intention of moving to rhe Thi Quar
governare, bur due ro the deteriorating security siruarion, the teams
had to srop the survey approximately 40 km south of the Wassir/Thi
Quar border. The main difficulties for the mine clearance teams were
caused by the conviction among the local people chat the survey teams
were involved with, or part of, the Coalition Forces. Survey reams penetrated into the Thi Quar and Babil governates from the east and
north; however, they did nor continue due ro rhe security situation.

proximity ro rhe villages. The impacr o n the population is continual
and devastating. While deployed in rhe Missan province, a key project
for the EOD teams from December through February of rhis year was
the clearance of a school at AI Musharrah, a town 40 km north of
Almarah. T his school, like many others in Iraq, had been used as an
ammunirion srorage depot in the belief that Coalition troops would
nor target it. Unfortunately, the chi ldren managed to set off a portion
of the stockpile, and the resulti ng explosion caused a wing of the complex to collapse, scattering ordnance throughout the school grounds.
The EOD clearance teams in general now face a wide range of challenges, from both the scale of the project and the stare of the explosive
materials, which can be rusty and corroded, buried up to a metre deep.
In Az Z ubayr, reams have been clearing EO rema ins from
under three sections of collapsed roofing. Searching through rhe rubble is slow and tedious because the tar roof covering has m elted into
the rubble and congealed a lot of it into a semi-solid mass. Despite
chis, in one week the teams recovered I ,609 items weighing 7,905 kg.
The teams are working in varied climatic conditions with,
on the one hand, extremes of heat that make it difficul t for the dog
teams and, on rhe other, strong winds and thick dust clouds.
Communications have been limited and there is still no network signal in southern Iraq. All e-mails have to be accessed and sent from rhe
CPA internet rerminal, which was out of order for prol onged periods
in Februa1y and March of2004. However, without doubt, the biggest
challenge f.1eing all teams, and inevitably all future reconstruction and
aid reams, is the issue of security.

The Legacy

Often the problem from the Iraqi community was rhe
misidentification of MTI staff as part of the Coalition Forces. Four
main issues/questions were continually asked when the reams arrived
in a village: When will the village have electricity, clean water, medication and security from banditry? In some cases, unless a n answer was
forthcom ing on those questions, the local people would refuse to discuss anything else.
As with all irs logistical requirements, MTl has successfully
managed irs own security, independently recruiting and training irs

What is apparent to everyone is the enormity of the problem still facing the Iraqi people. Latest estimates are char there are still
I ,000 ,000 tonnes of ammunition scattered over Iraq, equivalent to
more tha n half the srockpile of the entire U.S. military machine, and
that figure excludes the minefields.
The final count of community villages surveyed was recorded as I ,029, with data collected on 527 dangerous a reas within close
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The Security Challenge

Four main issues/questions were
continually asked when the teams arrived in a village: When will the village have electricity, clean
water, medication and security from banditry? In
some cases, unless an answer was forthcoming on
those questions, the local people would refuse to
discuss anything else.
own armed protection and security services, enabling our teams to work securely and safely across southern Iraq.
To mitigate the security
threat, all survey reams were accompanied by a policeman where available and
had their own security guard , hired by
MTI. However, even this had its uncertai nti es . These police escorts we re
adamant they would do nothing if
required to respond for fear of retribution on rheir families. Also, there was
ini tial confusion with regards to the policy on rules of engagement. Although
permitted to carry weapo ns, many
policemen were not issued any ammunition due to a ruling by the Coalition
Forces.
Because the Missan province
ejected the Baath Parry prior ro the end
of the war, there does nor seem to be the
intensity of anti-Western sentiment that
the Coalition reports elsewhere. All security threats to date seem to be from lawlessness and poverty, rather than concerted resistance activities. Having said
that, it is still commonplace ro hear gunfire, though mostly from local weddings
and other celebrations. The local people
have been friendly and supportive and
MineTech has been accepted into the
community.
Differing attitudes and threats
in the north and south arc the result of
both religious feeling and the interaction
between the military a nd the local population. The threat in the south is mainly
fro m banditry and criminal behaviour,
with most of the political unrest targeted
at the north. However, several of the
MTI survey teams were caught up in
rioting and stone throwing in Basrah,
a nd a whole team was trapped in the AI

MAIC ••

Qurnah Civil Military Cooperation
(CIMIC) building during another angry
protest. Yet, the main problem for MTI
has been the hassle with thieves, which is
handled by its own security processes.
The security situation that
prevailed in Iraq hampered the com pletion of the Emergency Survey; however,
what was achieved under the circumstances made the contract worthwhile
and successful. MTI would like to thank
all the UN Area Mine Action Coordination Team (AMA-CT) staff for its
cooperation and assistance throughout
the contract, despite rhe sometimes difficult security climate that prevailed.
As of the end of February
2004, the reams had destroyed approximately 1,162 ronnes of ammunition,
492,033 irems of EO and 33,024 landmines-clearing a total of 4,422,574 sq
m ofland.

* Photos c/o the authors.
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Bombs
Dispensers, dusters and launchers
Projectiles
Fuzes/firing devices
Grenades
Rockets
Guided missiles
Landmines
Pyrotechnics
Miscellaneous explosive devices
Naval mines
Depth charges/underwater UXO
Scatterables
Weapon system
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De finitio ns and A p proac h

ITEP/JMU Database of Intemational
Experiences: Supporting the Test and

Eval ation Community
Intro duc tio n

in the humanitarian demining industry. The
JMU Mine Action Informacion Centre
(MAIC) maimains the database, whereas rhe
ITEP Secretariat is responsible for irs conrenr.
The ITEP/)MU Database of
Inrernational Experiences in Support of the
Test and Evaluation Community (DIETEC)
was created in order to summarise test and
evaluation (T&E) experiences that are referenced to the original test reports. The most

A new database has been added to
the James Madison University UMU) Lessons
Learned database, with more specific content
a nd aim. The specific content reflects the
main tasks that the Imernational Test and
Evaluation Program (ITEP) for humanitarian
demining has agreed on in irs M emorandum
of Understanding, namely to evaluate and
standardise rhe process of equipment resting
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Figure 1: Structure of the DIETEC database.
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demanding part was ro work out the database
structure and to discuss the concrete co nrriburions currenrly included. The re are fine dividing lines, when at all, between lessons learned ,
experiences and test results. A remaining question is whether ir is opportune to also include
technical questions related to the use of rested
equipment (test results) or to strictly focus on
rhe resting process. In rhis regard, we would
like to invite the reader to share his/her opinion with the ITEP Secrerariat.
Currently, rhe database only contains experiences relared to rhe T &E process.
I r was found that the rest reports coma in an
imporranr amounr of informacion, either general or specific, which could be useful for rhe
T&E community as a whole. In order to make
these hidden experiences more widely and easily available ro rhe test community, ITEP
decided to join up with the MAIC. Funding
was provided by the U.S. Department of
Defense.

------ ------------
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The main aim ofDIETEC is to colleer and publish information derived from
experiences in T&E of humanitarian demining equipment. The collected "experiences"
are intended ro highlight key areas of consideration in the T &E process, as well as specific
observations related to the evaluation of
humanitarian dem ining equipment in operational use. Moreover, it attempts to provide a
common structural approach for T&E of
equipment used in humanitarian demining.
The database should provide useful information for a variety of T&E stakeholders, ranging from test engineers and entities involved
in large-scale T&E campaigns to the individual user ar the field level interested in evaluating his/her specific piece of equipment.

The database, in irs current version,
provides a Iisr of experiences. The experience
may be positive or negative bur should meet
the following criteria:
• It should be significant in rhar ir
has real or assumed impact on the T&E operation.
• It should be valid in that iris factually and technically correct.
• I r should be a pplicable in that it
identifies a specific process or decision char
reduces or limits rhe potential for failures and
mishaps, or reinforces a positive result.
• It should be u nderstandable for a
skilled person nor necessarily intimately familiar with the subject matter (adapted from rhe
U .S. National Aero nautics and Space
Administration's d efinition of lessons learned).
The experience may be generic or
equipment-specific and can be submitted by
any individual or organisation. However, a
core set of experiences is extracted from publicly available resources (T&E reports on
humanitarian demining equipment) and from
T&E activities undertaken under the umbrella of the Inrernacional Test and Evaluation
Program for Humani tarian Demining

Equipment.
T he intention is that all experiences
entered in the database will be periodically
reviewed by an international panel of experts
from the ITEP network and ocher organisations performing activities relared ro T&E,
e.g., the United Nations or rhe Geneva
Jnternational Centre for H umanirarian
Demining (G!CHD). During this process, the
relevance of the experiences to T&E standards, technical nares and/or methodologies
will be assessed.
An entry could become one of rhe
following four things:
I. An ite m added to an ITEP
T & E m ethodology: The experience is seen as
an important or/and a new way of carrying
out tests. A spin-off of this could be a request
fo r further research to be carried o ur to back
u p a new test methodology. This further
research could ultimately be executed in the
form of a collaborative project under the !TEP
umbrella.
2. An item added to the Lesso ns
L earned/ Ex periences d a tabase: The experience is judged to have a significant impact on
rhe resting method and is preferably backed
up by ar least rwo other expe riences. An existing test methodology may be changed or

I

Table 1: Two examples of testing and evaluation experiences
extracted from DIETEC.
Category
Subject
Experience/
Advice

LGeneric Considerations to T&E > Planning > Supporting information

_

1 Test site layout and facilities

Detailed prior knowledge of the test site layout and facilities will allow for more efficient data collection and archiving schemes to be designed. For
instance, if a large amount of data are planned to be collected in order to
evaluate the performance of detection equipment under development,
knowledge of the test site layout could allow for automating part of the
data collection process and/or use of purpose built data collection
platforms. Also, knowledge of internet connection characteristics might
influen ce the data archiving provis ions.
Reference
I.M. Dibsdall, S.M. Bowen, D.J. Allsopp, Portable Humanitarian Mine
Detector 2003 US Trials, 2003
Reference Link http://www. itep.ws/pdf/PH MD_ 2003_ US_ trialsreport.pdf
Posted by
ITEP Secretariat (ITEP) on 2t14i2004
Category
Equipment Specific Considerations to T&E > Detection > Metal
Subject
Test design, environmental data records
--The following environmental characteristics of the test area should be
Experience/
recorded, in order to more efficiently compare test results: magnetic ground
Advice
properties, scrap metal content density and distribution, soil composition
and texture, distribution of stones/rocks, soil moisture content, vegetation
type, density and development, meteorological conditions. Furthermore,
details on how the environmental characteristics were measured also need
~be registered .
D. Guelle, A. Smith, A. Lewis, T. Bloodworth, Metal Detector Handbook for
Reference
Humanitarian Demining, EC, 2003
Reference Link http://www.itep.ws/pdf/metal_detector_~ andbook.pdf
Posted by
ITEP Secretariat (ITEP) on 2/14/2004

t
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updated ro rake into account rhis experience.
An entry can also fall into this category if the
experience reports on an unexpected evenr
during resting and outlines a strategy for dealing wirh it.
3. An item circ ulated to the User
C ommunity: The experience has an impact
on the operational usc of demining equipment/systems. It should be passed on to the
User Community, for instance through a
Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA)
issued by rhe G!CHD.
4. Dismisse d: The experience does
nor f.,ll into one of the above categories. I r
may be dismissed wirh reasons scared.
In its initial srage, the database will
mainly include "experiences." After review,
the database will be expanded with "lessons
learned," referenced to a ser of experiences.
These lessons learned can then further be
incorporated inro standards and similar documents whenever rdcvanr.

Struc ture
Figure
gives an overview of the
database structure. The category and sub-category fields have been selected in order ro provide rhe user with a structured overview of rhe
main stages and factors that should be considered during T &E of humanitarian demining
equipment. The structure may be used as a
guide when drawing up a rest plan. Thecategories distinguished expand on rhe structure
given in rhe !MAS 03.40 on Test and
Evaluation of Mine Action Equipment (first
edition, 0 I .0 1.2003) and include rhe main
technical categories used by ITEP and the
GICHD Mechanical Demining Equipment

Catalogue.

Implem en tation
The database consists of two main
categories: Generic Considerations and
Equipmcnr-Specific Considerations. Each
main category has subcategories to explore the
experiences in d erail and to guide rhe user ro
add relevant experiences. Each subcategory
can be browsed by clicking on the corresponding individual cell or by executing a detailed
search. The user can add an experience to a
subcategory by clicking on the corresponding
individual cell or on "Add Experience." Table
I includes two examples cxrracted from the
database in order ro illustrate rhe type of information provided by DIETEC.
continued on page 69, ITEP
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International Conference \ssembles
Military Considerations within
Mine Actio11 Technology Trends
During the "International Conference on Requirements and
Technologies for the Detection, Removal and Neutralization of
Landmines and UXO" held in Brussels September 15-18, 2003, many
global viewpoints and models emerged from the discussions. Some of the
ideas triggered strong emotional reactions during the conference. Several
of the new ideas might have a short lifetime; others have the potential of
forcing breakthroughs; and all of them are subject to further debate.
The EUDEM2-SCOT 2003 conference was an open forum for
discussing state-of-the art humanitarian demining technology research
and development (R&D) and practice. New technology developments and
demining systems and scenarios were confronted with viewpoints from
daily practice in demining on the field.
I"

2
0
....

P Busquin, a member of the
European Commission, has acknowledged the
advances made in information management
rools, integration of geographic information
systems (G IS), and incremental improve ment
of sensors, area reduction a nd international
standards, but mentioned also that "delivery
of new tools and equipment to improve the
search for individual mines has nor mer early
expectations."! He pointed to the complexiry
of the probl em, rhe mismatch between
research ideas and application requirements in
the field and the significant non-technological
problems in finding the resources to turn prototypes into fully rested commercial products
read y to use in the field.
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Although different goals a re pursued
a nd differe nt practices are used in military and
humanitarian demining, there is a large potential for technology sharing (Petersberg Tasks).2
P. Busquin emphasized rhar even financial
support will gradually be opened by rhe
European Union for joint technology developments in the context of (civil) security. This
may certainly help bridge rhe chasm between
research results and deploymen t.

James L. Jones, General and
Supreme Allied Commander Europe for the
North Atlantic Treaty Orga nization (NATO) ,
has pur the mine problem in a broad historical perspective. T he notion of mili tary necessity makes the case rhar inadvertent harm to
civilians a nd civilian objects, though regrettable, is acceptable if a significa nt military gain
results and there is no other way to proceed.
The Ottawa Convention3 (which bans the
use, rhe stockpiling, the production and transport of AP mines) and rhc diminishing threat
of warfare with massed armies (hence the
decreasing "milita1y necessiry") are the two
main reaso ns fo r optimism in the futu re evolution of the worldwide min e problem.
However, "non-state actors see the land mine
and its horrifying, indiscri minate nature as
being a very useful weapon if the objective is
ro psychologically terrorize and influence populations and government."4

{untc rpr< lmg ( ontrolkcl I -,tms
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The evidence rhat lirrle is understood abour why current successful demining
works (dogs, prodding, metal detectors and

machines) rriggers rhe following questions:
What is the baseline to which new
tech nology has to be compared?
In the presence of urgency, is it
nor appropriate to be less rei ucrant towards
fast uptake of new technology ar an earlier
srage in current practice?
• User requirements have nor been
updated in 10 yea rs a nd technology has
evolved substantially. Isn't it the right time to
bridge rhis newly developing gap, so that we
can move forward a nd introduce some of rhe
new technologies by associating them in rhe
operations even if they a re nor I 00-percenr
effective?
Amazingly low probabil ities of
derecrion were presented for rwo standard
demining tools, namely prodders and meral
detectors, in three conference prescntations,5
even in controlled rest conditions. C. Mueller
et al. repon ed success rates with metal detectors beginning ar about 50 percent and rarely
reaching above 80 percent;5 R. Fjellanger er al.
reported detection pe rform ance down to
approximately 70 perce nr based on the
vapour-sensing capabilities of dogs; and J.
Trevelyan described success rates with prodders down to 50 percent. lr is certainly true
that, in p ractice, locally adapted operational
procedures, based on the contextual a priori
knowledge, reduces the risks and increases rhe
probability of detection. Nevertheless, the
rhree papers on re trospective scienrific analysis
of well-adopted sensors remain extremely
valuable- if their results are b ei ng confi rmed-because they describe the objective
intrinsic behaviour and limitations of sensors
when operated independently of an operational procedure based on human expertise in
controlled conditions for a variety of soils and
foreign objects.
Producing these kinds of figures for
an experimental new sensor probe resulting
from an R&D project would probably be and
has often been inrerprered as unsuccessful.

Nevertheless, the end-user community has
adopted prodders and metal detectors as
workable instruments a long rime ago. This
leads to rhe concl usion that deployment of
new technologies in the field should occur at
an earlier stage, and rime should be explicitly
provided for developing appropriate procedures and contextual scenarios to complement
the toolbox of instrumentation so rhar more
and more specific situations can be covered.
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The major impediment to ad option
of new technology in rhe field is the absence of
support for bridging rhe gap between R&D
results and fieldable systems. For a small government and a financially unattractive marker
(with no explosive marker increase), such support is a prerequisite for ach ieving a breakthrough. Dual use developments within civil
applications, common military/civilian technology development and incorporation in the
broader field of security are encouraged to
solve that problem but rake away som e of rhe
needed focus on specific technology to solve
the m ine problem . A debate concerning rhe
European Commission (EC)-co-funded research and technical developmen t (RTD)
projects leads to rhe conclusion that no structure for support exists at this rime in Europe
fo r carrying the results of EC-funded R&D
proj ects towards fi eldable systems. The crude
question is raised : Why fund research, since it
is well-known that "research only generates
new research," if the results are nor exploited'
The reluctance of donors and their
li mited interest to participate in technology
transfer can be explained by the high budget
require men ts in this area. Grossly, J .
Trevelyan stared rhat for every Euro spent in
supporting research, 10 Euros are req uired for
development, wh ile an investment of I 00
Euros is needed for turning these developments into successfully marketed products.
Moreover, as stated earl ier, in humanitarian
demini ng technology, we are confronted with
modest market perspectives and markets created by government decisio ns.?
Borrlenecks hampering the structural fu nding of the transiti on activities
berween R&D results and fieldable systems in
Europe include the partitioning of Directorate
General (DG) responsibilities, rhe strict inter-

prerarion of laws on falsification of competition and the limited interest of donors in this
area due to high budget requirements. To get
rid of th is situation, urgent political action on
rhe decision level is required .

The overview of rhe Canadian landmine detection R&D program,5 presented by
J. McFee, and rhe overview of the currenr U.S.
Army basic research on landmine and UXO
detection, presented by R.S. Harmon, illustrate rhe North American structural approach
for the continuous cross-ferrilisarion of laboratory research towards applications in practice:
the U.S. Army research office has as a mission
to invest in fundamental research at uni versities, and a parallel structure within rhe Army
for applied research is picking up the results of
rhe fundamenta l research. An equ ivalent
approach does nor exisr in rhe European
Union (EU) at th is moment.
David Dan iels raised the point of
Eu rope lagging far behind commercially. If
Europe does nor srart u p a voluntary acrion in
p icking up rhe R&D results and turning rhem
into commercial produc ts, U.S. governmentfunded technology will monopolise the marker. lr is in the interest of everybody rhar second and rhird source suppliers exist.

Progress has been made in many
domains and this was covered by rhe conference contriburions.5 Nevertheless, P. Blagden
mad e the statement that, except for ground
penetrating radar (G PR), none of the technologies appeared near being ready to be taken
into rhe field for close-in derecrion. The general opinion at rhe conference is rhar close-in
detection of individual mines and a rea reduction are rhe priority domains for demonstrating progress.

In rhe area of mulrisensor platforms
and data fusion, the following three ideas are
essential:
Sharing: Info rmation exchange
certainly occurs now wirhin the humanitarian
demining communiry.
(Demonstrated) p romise: We are
on the way, bur have not yet arrived, e.g.,
good results on learning sets are nor sufficiently convincing.
• Real rime: Appropriate processing
architectures are being conceived to go from

simulation towards practice.

From rhe work presented, a coherent framework emerges wirh opportunities fo r
improvement, both on sensors (e.g., chemical
derecrion) and on software (e.g., integrated
G IS environments, image interpretation
methods). Ir involves the roral usage and integration of all available information over the
area from small-scale to large-scale, past and
presenr- aerial and satellite mulrimodal clara,
ground surveys, interviews and local knowledge about culture and land usage. T he means
to obtain all of this information are generally
known ; rhe integration and structuri ng
schemes arc emerging and being validated.
"Everything would have been easier
if we had the JMU Uames Madison U niversiry] clearinghouse at the start. "5 This statement heard from D. Radmore, a professional
deminer, illustrates how initially hostile attitudes towards a technology com ing from
another scientific community outside rhe
humanitarian demining field can gradually
gain acceptance when developed in collaboration wi rh end users.

Information systems are now being
equ ipped wirh extra communication means
and decision support sysrems. The primary
question raised is how to harmonise rhem
around the Information Management System
for M ine Action (IMSMA). It is generally
acknowledged rhar IMSMA has brought standardisation in the field and enforces correct
documentation and reporting of mine actions.
Therefore, there is a tendency to encourage
add-on developments rhar are compatible
with IMSMA, which has gained wide acceptance within rhe d emining communiry.6
It was suggested that a structured
knowledge base on "lessons learned from field
experience" would be useful, particularly for
bringing back the results and experience
gained with new technologies on the field
towards researchers and developers.
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continuous power and runn ing water.

Profile of •

The Continuing Problem of Landmines

an1s an
The Topography of a Broken Land
Afghanistan is a dry, landlocked
nation made up mosrly of rugged mountains
that run norrheasr ro southwest and d ivide the
northern provinces from rhe rest of rhe country. Bordered by Pakistan , Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, it also shares
a riny strip of land with China. Because of its
cold winters and hot summers, nearly all of
Afghanistan 's supply of natural fres h water
begins as snow. This limited supply, however,
has been severely d epleted because of a four
year d rought from 1998-2002. D rought and
rhe added rhirsr of rwo million returning
refugees has left nearly 80 percent of
Afghanistan's population witho ut access ro
safe drinking warer. 1 The drought has also
affected Afghanistan 's struggling fa rm and
livestock (mosrly sheep and goats) production.
T he country is highly d ependent upon fo reign
aid ro meet irs most basic needs such as food
and medical care.

Bin Ladin and Taliban and Warlords,

OhMy.'
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Following Soviet military withdrawal in 1989 , local leaders fo ught in b loody
civil battles over con trol of the nation. C ivil
unrest ended with the rise of rhe Ta liban, a
group of ethnic Pashtuns backed by Pakistan.
In 1994, the Tali ban took Kandahar, and they
entered Kabul unopposed in September 1996.
The Taliban, whose rule was oppress ive and
often brmal, eventually seized power over 95
percent of the nation. T he September I I rh
terrorist attacks in 200 I prompted rhe Uni ted
Stares and Allied forces ro action in support of
rhe opposition. Near rhe end of that yea r,
major leaders fro m these Afghan opposition
groups mer in Bonn, Germany, and agreed on
a plan for the formu lation of a new government structure rhat resulted in the inaugu ration of Hamid Kan_ai as Chairman of rhe
Afghan Interim Authority (AlA). The AlA

held a natio nwide Loya Jirga (Grand
Assembly) in June 2002, and Karzai was elected Presidenr.
Despite these developments, most
of the people in Afghanistan continue ro live
in fear of oppress ion and violence. W ith only
about 2 0,000 peacekeepers and Karzai's
inability ro control any parr of rhe country
o utside of Kabul, Afghanistan has come under
the power of warlords who siphon fede ral
funds and participate in illegal opium trading
to finan ce their own personal m ilitias. Only a
fraction of the duties and taxes collected by
provincial leaders find their way ro rhe central
government. UN experrs expect this year's
crop to yield 3,600 tons of opium; char makes
up three-fourths of rhe world's heroin. Also,
some of rhe warlords are as brutal as rheir

https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol8/iss1/1

predecessors. The Kabul-based Afghan Independent Human Righrs Commission has
observed Afghan commanders eliciting forced
marriages, making illegal land grabs in Kabul
and performing several execurions.
In add irion to these problems, the
Taliban continues to maintai n a presence in
areas of rhc sourh. Taliban leader Mullah
Mohammed Omar, in hiding, is said ro be
controll ing nearly a third of rhe country's rerritory. New offensives and more troops were
d eployed by rhe United Stares in the spri ng of
2004 in efforts to capture terrorist leader
Osama Bin Lad en and end T aliban control of
rhe sourh. Years of conflict have left Karzai
with the rask of rebuilding demolished roadways and bridges and helping a large segment
of the population gai n basic resources such as

......

Afghan istan's greatest man-made
environmental problem is, of course, landmines. Planted by Soviet troops, rhe Mujahedin and the Taliban, some estimate rhe
number of la ndmi nes in Afghanistan to be
around 40 mill ion. The types of landmines
found rhere make up a smorgasbord of varieties. Deminers have encountered over 50
types of AP (blast and fragmentati on) mines
and the AT mines of eigh r different countries.
More than half of these varieties were of
Russian/CIS origin. The most common AP
mines fo und arc PMN, PMN-2, POMZ,
POM Z-2, Type 72 and OZM 3/72. The AT
mines fou nd are mostly Russian TM (46/57),
TC-6 and Pakistani P2.
Most of these landmines arc concentrated in the western, eastern and southern
regions of rhc country. They are scattered
indiscriminately through both urban and rural
areas restricting commercial and agricultural
growth. They also line ma ny of the transport
roads hindering safe and timely transportation
th roughout rhe country. Despite conrinuing
efforts to clear land in Afghanistan, unstable
security and limited resources have kept it o n
the top of the list of rhe world 's most mineinfested countries. According to rhe
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICB L), "Landm ines contaminate all but rwo
of Afghanistan's provinces and are scattered
over an area of more rhan 780 sq km, including rowns and villages, grazing land and
roads."2 These land mines were responsible for
I ,286 d eaths in rhe year 2002 alone.
Recent and prior conflicr has also
lcfr large amou nts of UXO, which have killed
another 154 people and lefr I, 132 injured in
2002.3 H ighly explosive bombs, cluster munitions and m issiles were used in great numbers
during military operations of coalition forces
since October 200 1. The additional UXO
compounds the problem of landmi nes and
furthe r debilitates rhe population. Efforrs to
clear the land of both landmines and UXO
have been frustrated by irs rugged terrain and
political instability.
Deminers an d demining agencies in
Afghanistan have faced some d ifficulty in
clearing certain areas that lack adequate security. UN demining staff was forced to hair
demining activities along parts of the road
between Kabul and Kandahar after a series of

attacks in the beginning of May 2003. Afrer
anorher arrack, deminers in six southern
provinces began traveling with local armed
escorts to ensure safety. Finally, on May 22,
the United Nations suspended all demining
activity in I 0 provinces of sourhern and
southwestern Afghanistan , as wel l as along a
road from Kabul ro Jalalabad. Demincrs were
then redeployed to other regions. Attacks continued into June when a rocker was launched
into a demining camp, fail ing to damage or
hurt anyone. Nine deminers were injured in
yet another attack, which prompted the
United Nations to conduct a review of the
security siruation. In July 2003, UN operations were resumed in all provinces with
added security measures in place.2 In February
2004, violence against deminers struck once
again when suspecred Taliban gunmen killed
four deminers working for rhe Organization
Mine
Clearance
and
Afghan
for
Rehabilitation (OMAR) in the western parr of
rhe country.
In response to rhis recent tragedy,
Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA)
spokesperson Takuto Kubo writes: "We never
send deminers to areas where factional fighting or military operations are going on, and
also areas that !the United Nations] thinks
high risks of security instability and possible
security incidents. However, these artacks
happen where deminers have been safely operating for a long rime, so ir is hard ro predicr
and prevent (as was rhe case in most of terrorist attacks in anywhere in rhe world). It also
means char local people in urgent need of
mine and UXO clearance may nor be able to
receive our clearance and mine risk education
due to our suspension of operations."3

Avoiding the Fate of Sisyphus
The United Nation's oldest mtne
action program is the Mine Acrion Program
for Afghanistan (MAPA) (in operation since
1989). Ir, along with scores of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN affiliates, has been working diligently through war
and peace ro reduce the massive numbers of
landmines in Afghanistan. Despire nearly 15
years of effort, however, Afghanisran continues to be one of the most mined nations in the
world. Although rhe Taliban have been ousted from national power, lingering Taliban elements in the south and ease continue to use
landmines as booby traps against occupying
forces. L1sr June, two U.S. soldiers were killed

when their veh icle drove over a manually detonated mine in the city of Asadabar. Renewed
conflict and bombing continue to increase the
number of UXO. Like the mythic figure of
Sisyphus, who was doomed ro ceaselessly roll
a rock to rhe rop of a mountain and watch it
roll back down again, so have mine acrion
workers in Afghanistan watched rhe size of
their rask grow with each new offensive.
Mine action in Afghanistan is not a
Sisyphusian rask, however, because perceptible progress has been made. In the past three
years especially, with rhe relatively greater
freedom of posr-Taliban rule, mine action
workers have accomplished m uch in terms of
policy, clearance, awareness and victim assistance. According ro rhe Landmine Monitor,
funding for mine action has quadrupled since
200 I, rotaling approximately $64 m illion
(U.S.). About $51 .4 million of this was provided through UN MACA and about $12.9
mill ion was provided through bilateral donations and in-kind contributions. Japan continues ro be the leading donor of funds, giving a
total of $21.2 million in 2002. T he European
Commission (EC) and rhe United Stares were
second and third respectively in donations.

Stockpile Destruction
M inis ter of Foreign Affa irs
Abdullah signed the Mine Ban Treaty on July
29, 2002, which officially went into force last
March. Afrer the government acceded to rhe
T reary in September 2002, a few of rhe
provincial authorities were willing ro hand
over stockpiled m ines and explosive ordnance
(EO) . At that rime, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) ream from the Afghan Technical
Consultants (ATC) went to these provinces
and destroyed 400 AP mines, 500 mortars,
1,000 projectiles and 200 fuses. Currently,
ATC has 12 EOD reams, each consisting of
14 men, working throughout rhe country. In
their 14 years of operation, ATC has located
and destroyed a total of 3,437 AT mines,
143,392 AP mines and 1,6 11 ,676 items of
UXO. The ministry of defense plans ro conduct a countrywide assessment to prepare an
inventory list of the number, location and
type of mine caches before creating a comprehensive plan for stockpile destruction.

Survey and Assessment
Survey and Assessment has been
problematic in recenr years due ro an explosion of economic regrowth in urban sectors.
This has caused an increase in the need for
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clearance ac tivities in reconstructio n p rojects.
According to T akuto Kubo, Surveyors must
now try to balance humanitaria n needs w ith
the needs of d evelopme nt. Prioritizatio ns o f
m ine acrio n activities have made a perceptible
shift towa rds reconstruction and d evelopment
due ro posr-conAict securiry issues in 2002
and 2003 . T he Mine Clearance Planning
Agency (M C PA) , with ove rsight and mo nitoring by the Survey Action C enter (SAC), started a new 14- month survey in June 2003. The
fo ll owing are some tentative survey and
destroyed devices figures for 2003.

CLearance
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According to the Landmine Moni tor, about 263 sq km of mined land has
been cleared in addi tio n to 422 sq km of ba rrlefield areas fro m 1989-2002. In that rime,
over 268,000 AP mines, nea rly 13,000 AT
m ines a nd over 2,488,000 ite ms of UXO were
detected and destroyed. Below are tentative
fig ures fo r the year 2003.
Through February 2004, ATC had
cleared 82 .4 sq km of high-priority mined
areas a nd 192 .7 sq km of former battlefields.
It is c urrently working to clear battle and
minefield areas in and around the Kabul
International Airport, the Kabul-Jalalabad
Highway a nd nearby secondary roads that
could serve as alte rnate ro utes to the highway.
ATC is also working on a few clearance side
projects o n provincial roads (funded by the
U.S. Agency for Inte rnational D evclo pmcnr)
a nd at the Sardeh D am in Ghazni province.
T he organizatio n currently has 25 ma nual
minefield a nd barrie area clearance reams of
40 men each (incl uding o peratio ns and support staff), and I 0 m echanical clearance un its
using excavators, backhoe loaders o r rotary
Cll[tcrs. As the first organization to impleme nt
a D emo bilization, D isarmame nr and Reinteg ration of Ex-combatants (DDR) Program in
the northern Kundoz province, ATC has succeed ed in facilitating the absorption of II 0 excombatants into a clearance, mine risk educatio n (MRE) and permanent marking prog ra m. Last February, ATC starred a new D DR
program in Parwan province (north of Kabul)
with 49 enrollments.
T he main age ncies working on
clearance, in addition ro ATC, are rhe Agency
fo r Rehabili tatio n & Energy Conservatio n
(A REA), rhe Danish Demining Gro up
(DOG),
the
D emining Agency for
Afgha nistan (D A FA), the HALO T rust, rhc
M ine Detection and Dog Center (MDC),
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O MAR, MCPA, the Monitoring, Evaluario n
and Training Agency (M ETA) and RONCO
Consulting Corporation under contract to
U.S . D epartme nt of Srare. AREA is an Afghan
NGO established in 1993 d evoted to comm uni ty mine clearance. DOG is an inte rnational
N G O wo rking in vario us regions. DAFA
clears battlefields and mined areas mainly in
southern and western regions of rhe country.
The H A LO Trust began demin ing in
Afghanistan in 1988 and clears multiple types
of areas, mainly in the central and norrhcrn
regio ns. The MDC has been training mine
detectio n d ogs (MODs) and ha ndlers since
1989. O MAR co nducts both mine awareness
and clearance activities. The MCPA prima rily
conduc ts surveys of mine- a nd battlefields.
M ETA is respo nsible for training a nd rhe
mo n itori ng and evaluatio n of m ine action
ope ratio ns. RONC O Consulring Corporation is a U.S. comme rcial mine clearance contracror wo rking with 13 Jo rda nian e ng ineers
to demine areas in Bagram and Ka ndahar.
Pakistan recently anno unced rhe
pla nned srart of the Torkhum-Jalalabad highway consrrucrion project in May 2004 . With
an estimated cosr of $20 million , rhe road is
due robe comple rcd by June 2005. W ith surveying already done, deminers are curre ntly
wo rking ro clear the area for construc tio n.

Mine Risk Education (MRE) and
Victirn Assistance
MRE in Afghanistan has three focus
grou ps: returning refugees, children, and aid
worke rs and journalists. T he programs utilizes
such approaches as M RE briefings at schools,
informa l educatio n fo r wo men and girls, sessio ns held in mosques, community centers o r
cl inics, and mass m edia campaigns. The
Landmine Monitor states that at least 12
N G O s have been providing MRE to civilians
and refugees in high-risk areas. These o rganizations are OMAR, AREA, HALO Trust, the
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan (AAR),
Ansar Reli ef Institute (ARI) , Save the
C hildren- USA, rhe Afghan Red Crescent
Society (ARCS), Handicap lnre rnario nal
Belgium (H!B), MCPA, the BBC Afghan
Educatio n Project, DAFA, META, and the
Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) .

Conclusion
Afghanistan has a long history as o ne
of the world's great centers of culture and arr. It
produced such cultural icons as famed Ce ntral

Asian poet Rahman Baba and the ancient rel igion of Zoroastrian ism. Once th e seat of the
great Mogul empire, it boasted some of rhe
richest archeological arrifacts in the world
(most of w hich are now either looted or
destroyed). Afghanistan's indomitably rich trad itional culture, however, rema ins intact
despi te decades of warfare that have destroyed
most of irs rangiblc artifacts and relics.
T he beauty and d epth of Afghan is
and the ir land persist despite rhe ravages of
war, fami nc a nd eco no mic instability. T hei r
ab ility ro e ndure is a trait that seems to have
passed o n to the m ine ac tio n workers from
around the world who have been vigila ntly
work ing for over a decade ro clear the la nd of
mines. As rhe poet D urrani elicits, it is nor rhe
barrenness of Afghanistan's deserts that draw
h im, bur the o neness he claims w ith rhem.
The sense of home chat D urrani describes in
his poem remains in the hearts of Afghans
today, fuel ing their tenacious affection fo r
what we perceive to be mere d esert. For this
reason, mill ions of Afgh an refugees have
returned and cominue to return to their stillda ngero us home land. T hei r determ ination to
reclaim th is bro ken land motivates rhe w orld
to strive w ith rhem.
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problem is related co the previously raised
question: How does one ensure adequate and
exchangeable reporting from mine actions?
Solving this question is an essential prerequisite for further development of economic
models, ICT decision support systems, informacion systems and socio-economic impact
studies that can identifY priority and less usefu l areas for demining operations.
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Standardization (CEN) Workshop? activities
on sta ndardisation are deemed useful and necessary, certainly fo r manufacturers, but the
timeliness of the activities is questioned in the
presence of a shrinking marker.8 Standards
sho uld gai n acceptance also by the end-users
and manufacturers befo re geHing maximal
utility. Practical questio ns of end users should
be taken into accounr, e.g., the appropriate
footprint size at a specifi ed depth {Vernon
Jo int) in rela tio n to full area coverage.
Standardisatio n in general could be useful as
one of the elements in procuremcm decisions
of existing tools.

In itial step s towards a scientific
approach to econom ic modelling of costeffectiveness of d emini ng technologies were
pro posed by R. Keeley as an al ternative or
compleme nt to the ad hoc analyses of today.5
The main challenge will be the acceptance of
the models and their abiliry to be tuned to
local c ircumstances. One of rhe main identified bottlenecks is the availability and the certainty of rhe inpll[ information. The laHcr

The chinking behind the following
three observed evolutions converges towards a
similar way ro move forward, and it calls for
the investigation of a pa radigm shift in
research, development, deployment and
donor atrirude from humanitarian demining
cowards restoring local communities and evidence-based risk management.
1. At the organizarionallevcl in ECFP6, R&D on human itarian d emining is parr
of "Improvement of Risk Management. " The
rexr of the "Call for Proposals" is tech nically
o rienred towards (open) system development
and should be interpreted as a transcription of
the global objective to achieve high-level society benefirs.9
2. At the level of field actions, in
practice, mine action centres (1\ifACs) are
adapting their priorities ro rhose of the locals.
Avoiding famine by food supply, medical
assistance and agricultural activities o r restOration of water sources might come first before
the removal of mines. S. Grainger presented a
case study in Lebanon in which urban rescoration of the infrastructure started before rhe
contracted demining organisation had rhe
opportunity of ful ly removing rhe mine
threat.5 In certain situations, the risk of
fam ine or socio-economic fail u re might either
subjectively be perceived o r objectively be
higher rhan the mine rhreat, influencing rhc
priority of action . Ranking of risks is impl icitly made.
3. At the level of designing models
and R&D, J. Trevelyan presented a possible
model of agricultural exploitation in the presence of AP mine risk.5 The model is an initial
proposal and includes m ine-resistant agricultural machinery development and new agriculrural practice. The idea is certainly not mature
yet bur deserves to be taken up further.

The fundamental question was
raised of whether or not this viewpoint is
compatible w ith the Ottawa Convention} In
our opinion, it is: "the fencing of minefields
rhat have little impact on the socio-economic
life rarher than their removal" and "prioritising a solution to the threat of famine by cultivating the land rather than ro clear ir" can be
seen as interim solutions co solve urgent local
problems causing immediate and high risk,
taken up before the actual mine clearance.
The emerging new paradigm also
triggered a lot of organisational questions.
New views are required on the quality of
results and liabil ity defined in rerms of achieving acceptable risks, which should be adopted
by the donors in their conrracts. Probably due
ro the presence of representatives from several
demining companies, the difficulry of the
statement of work in the contracts was raised
at several occasions: e.g., the specification of
quality assurance and the definition of failure.
The UN requirement for humanitarian mine
clearance efficiency of 99.6 percent is in contradiction to the term "acceptable risk,"" wh ich
primarily depends on the end use of the
cleared land. IO
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The EUDEM2-SCOT 2003 conference has brought together subsets of all
players in the field of humanitarian demining.
The presentations and discussions were characterised by an increasing maturity, transparency and honesry abour rhe achievements.
Views were exchanged frankly berween different pam of the community, including analyses of where we have gone wrong.
The authors wish to thank all rhe
EUDEM2-SCOT conference participants, and
mainly the ones that have conrribmed to
extracting the general trends, conclusions and
open questions described in this paper. Some
were obvious to pick up; others were slightly
hidden and needed collaborative digging ro be
extracted. Special thanks go to Karin De
Bruyn , Claudio Brusch ini, Russell Gasser,
Stewart Grainger, Vernon Joynt, Paddy
Blagden, David D aniels, James Trevelyan,
Chris Weickerr, Noel M u lliner, Helmut
Kraenzle, Russell H armon and Francois
Littmann.
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JAIPUR
Foot Camp

Brings Renewed Hope to Landmine Victims 1n Kabul

resident of Kabul,
Afghanistan, lost both ofher legs in a landmine explosion. After
the accident, she felt like a burden to her family. Through an
advertisement on television, Faribo heard about the ]aipur Foot
Camp and decided to see what it had to offer her. At the camp, she

on many cabs and buses in Kabul as well as distributed through young
people who normally sell newspapers at traffic junctions in Kabul.
• Announcements were made on the local radio and relevision.
• Journalists from three local newspapers-Anees, Hewad
and Kabul Times-were invited to and carried them the activities of
rhe camp prominently in their newspapers.
• An FM channel-Radio Sadai Azadi-also covered rhe
event.
• Kabul television featured the activity in rheir weekly
" Health" program.
• HHI staff went ro some health centers around Kabul and
requested they send their handicapped patients fo r free fitting of the
prostheses.
This multi-media coverage helped ro mobilize beneficiaries
and over 400 limbs were fitted at the camp within a one-month rime
period.
The camp was a unique experience both for HHI as well as
the amputees. Indo-Afghan relations have always been warm, so the
HHI ream was well-received, and they built a rapport with the local
officials, beneficiaries and the technicians.
Con c lu s io n

received a light and comfortable prosthesis. Faribo testifies that it has
given a new meaning to her life.

It is experiences like this that incite Help Handicapped
lnrernarional (HHI) ro organize camps in various parts of the
world for the free firmenr of Jaipur, an Indian prosthesis. These prostheses have proved ro be durable, versatile and cost-efficienr.
B ackground
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HHI has focused irs work in rhe srrife-rorn areas of Kenya,
Burundi, Sudan and recently, Mghanisran. The number of landmine
amputees in these areas is ove1whelming, and concerted relief efforts
are limited due ro shortages of funding, impassable geographical terrain and inadequate security considerations.
In light of the nearly 300,000 amputees-mostly landmine
and war victims-an advance HHI team went to Kabul in August
2003 ro explore the possibility of conducting a Jaipur Foot Camp
there. Discussions were held and officials promised whatever assistance
was possible for the war-ravaged city. Ir was decided that a one-month
camp would be conducted at the orthopedic center inside Wazir Akbar
Khan Hospital in Kabul. Although the technicians at rhis center were
inexperienced in Jaipur foot technology, they could provide valuable
assistance to the ream from India, as well as act as interpreters.
The ream working at the camp in Kabul was comprised of
a project coordinator, a co unselor and experienced technicians.
Machinery and raw materials were flown into Kabul from India in
October 2003.
In order to notifY survivors in rhe area about the camp, the
following steps were taken:
• Banners were hung at strategic places in Kabul, especially
at the entrances into Kabul from the provinces.
• Pamphlets were placed at various locations within the city,

~ Photo

c/o the author.

Contact Information:
Mahendra G.Mehta, Trustee
Help Handicapped International
5th Floor Vasant Vilas
31 Dr DD Sathye Marg
Mumhai 400 004 India
Tel: 91 22 238 98930
Fax: 91 22 238 21969
E-mail: promain@vsnl.net or mgmehta@rediffmail.com
Website: www.hhiindia.org

ITEP, continued from page GI

As memioned in the inrroducrion, during rhe analysis of the
reports, valuable information was also encountered char is related to
technical and operational deployment of the equipment. For instance,
the report The Severe Duty Vegetation Shredder Technical Test-ing of
Capability by rhe U.S. Night Vision and Electronic Sensors
Directorate (NVESD, onl ine ar h rrp://www. humanitarian-demining.org/demining/pubs/clearance/svc_test_ reporr.asp) mentions the
fact that fence wire tangled up in rhe rotating machinery and inflicted
considerable damage/disturbances during the resting. This findi ng
could also have implications for rhe operational use of this type of
equipment, not only in fenced minefields bur also in dense vegetation
where liana-like plants can have the same effect. Hours may be needed for the machinery to become operational again. Important feedback
from the reader could be an indication that similar information would
be worthy of being included in DIETEC.

Final Rernarks
Care should be taken when using the rerm "lessons learned. "
In general, the process followed for compiling a "lesson learned" is
quite complex and consists of a n information-gathering and-processing
chain spread over a considerable rime period. For instance, the Swedish
EOD and Demining Centre (SWEDEC) lessons learned project
includes several phases such as the collection of an "experience report"
using a standard form, which is then analysed and commented on in an
"extended experience report." This stage is fo llowed by validation of the
information (i.e., Did it happen several rimes? Is it useful for another
organisation? ere.), which leads to the implementation phase and the
compilation of the "lessons learned report." A similar process is being
applied by the Department of Energy (DOE) Corporate Lessons
Learned Collection database, for example. However, this is nor the
approach followed at present by the JMU MAIC lessons learned database and is, in our opinion, at rhis momem in rime nor necessary,
mainly due ro the given structure of the database.
Both the JMU MAIC database and DIETEC are currendy
being evaluated by an international ream of "experts." No final results
are available yet, bur preliminary results of the assessment indicate that
an imporram percentage of the DIETEC experiences have been classified as relevanr to rhe T&E process.
The /TEP would like to get your ftedback and opinions when
you are visiting the dlltabase via http://maic.jmu.edu!iteplessons/ or
http://www. itep. wsl.

Contact Information
ITEP Secretariat
JRC/EC T.P. 723

IT-21020 lspra (VA)
Italy
Franciska Borry
Tel: +39 0332 789138
E-mail: Franciska.horry@jrc.it
Dieter Guelle
Tel: +39 0332 785576
E-mail: Dieter.Guelle@jrc.it
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ENDURING FREEDOM:
The Role of Polish Engineers in Afghanistan
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The Polish Military Contingent, located at Bagram Base, 65
km from Kabul, has been contributing to peacekeeping missions within Operation Enduring Freedom since March 2002. In addition to the
platoon 's main responsibilities of engineering reconnaissance and mine
clearance, the platoon is also responsible fo r building fortifi cation structures, developing base infrastructure, loading and transporting constructing materials, and conducting differenr kinds of ground works,
mainly in the surrounding area of the base.
The area surrounding Bagram Base is a vety difficult area for
engineering tasks. The surface of the area is flat; however, there are
many hollows from the remains of firing positions, the elements of
engineering barrier systems, anti-armoured vehicle ditches, craters, and
wire and mine barriers. The diversity of the region, considering the

building techniques and various constructing materials that were used
in the past, creates many problems for the Polish e ngineers.
Furthermore, the structure of the ground itself creates problems.
Several centimetres of ash cover the ground during the summer, while
the spring and the autumn bring mud that fo rms into a solid shell with
the extremely low winter temperatures.
The e ntire civilian infrastructure in the region was adj usted
to support combat action . Firing positions, minefields, engineering
barriers and dams are everywhere. Minefield plans and documentation
are imprecise or even deliberately misleading. It is very common for
actual minefields to lay several metres from the marked minefields,
which often lay barren. This is a characteristic of the mine battles that
were conducted several years ago in this region. Often, booby traps

were built on the approaches to the firing positions during these battles.
The battles also left behind the wreckage of vehicles and planes, abandoned combat equipment and thousands of landmines. Jn these conditions, it is necessary for Polish engineers to be well-prepared, properly
equipped, well-regulated and highly qualified in order ro succeed.
At the moment, the priorities for the Polish Engineering
Platoon include mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),
minefield and road marking, reconstruction of civilian infrastructure,
and water purification and distribution. U nfortunately, due to the relief
of the ground, location or degree of complication, most of these tasks
must be executed manually from the beginning through the end.
Clearing minefields around gas stations a nd ammunition depots or even
removing mines from under the wheels of aircraft that had to make an
emergency landing in a minefield are examples of those tasks.
Checking the ground is usually done with help of tentacles
and detectors. Soldiers working on minefields have anti-mine shoes that
at least partially protect them from the detonation of AP mines. When
the terrain allows, a mine flail is used for clearing minefields, which can
clear abour 250 sq m of the ground in one hour. However, there is often
the necessity to prepare the terrain before and check it after sweeping.
For clearing rerrain of AP mines, heavy chain sweeping gear is used
(Hydrena). In favourable conditions, rhe Hydrena can clean 700 sq m of
the ground in one hour. When there is a risk of damaging the sweeping
gea r or it cannot be used due to the relief of the ground, bunch charges
of explosives are substiruted.
The occurrence of extremely large amoums of arrillery, aerial
and ami-aircraft ammunition, from manual grenades to scarrcrablc
mines, gas-fuel bombs, and a variery of AP and AT mines, poses an enormous threat for the Polish engineers. According to statistics, Polish engineering platoons in this region can recognize and clear areas an average
of abour 15 ha of mines, defuse about 300 AP mines, 20 AT mines, 60
scatterable mines of different types, 20 aerial bombs, 30 missiles and
arrillery shells, 30 mortar bombs and manual grenades, 80 bomb fuses of
different types, 50 different ammunitions, and about 80 other dangerous ttems.
Despite enormous work and effort, the Bagram Base is continuously in danger. Missile or bomb artacks, ambushes and mine traps are
no rarity. However, there is an atmosphere of mutual respect and eagerness for accomplishing tasks in the Polish contingent. The support of the
contingent commander, the chaplain and the soldiers themselves keep
spirits high during this difficult period of their lives.
*Photos c/o the authors.

Contact Information:
Capt. Wojciech Chyla
Engineering Department
HQ Polish Land Forces
ul. Dyminska I
01-783 Warszawa
Poland
Tel: +48 22 6878 024
E-mail: wojciechchyla@interia.pl
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communities. A significam end-product of the
process is rhe ability ro identify rhe high-,
medium- and low-impact communities.
These scores can then be used as markers
against progress. The Afghan survey includes a
reuofir component so that the data collected
over the past 14 years can be incorporated into
the LIS's impact grading system.

ec
Reconstruction funding is provided
for the coordination and execution of mine
and UXO clearance activities that are a precursor to major infrastructure projects such as
road construction, power line repairs and irrigation system rehabilitation. This rype of
funding, whether provided through a grant or
a service contract, rends ro come from the same
donor rhar is funding rhe infrastructure project. T his allows rhe donors and their collaborators amongst Ministries and implememing
partners to rrear the demining reams as parr of
their overall available assets. T his provides for
maximum fl exibility as the same d onor controls the fund allocations for both rhe demining conrracror and other construction contractors, and can thus line manage all of the
contractors whose work is necessaty for the
completion of rhe reconstruction project.
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Peace-building funding is provided
fo r the coordination and execution of the
Mine Action for Peace (MAFP) initiative and
rhe destruction of anti-personnel mine stockpiles.
MAFP is a reintegration project
designed to assist former fighters demobilized
through an Mghanisran-wide demobilization,
disarmament and reintegration process to fir
into civil life again. Former fighters are trained
in manual clearance, permanent marking, and
mine risk education techniques and are given
employment for 13 monrhs. While parr of
each day is spent in mine action operations,
rhe orher parr is spent in literacy and vocational training. The aim of the project is to develop a viable reintegration strategy for each former fighter.
This project is a full spectrum
demobilisation option. lr addresses rhe economic needs of demobilized fighters bur also
deals wirh problems of psychological adjustment and community acceptance. Ir also has
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the potential of expanding MAPA's mine and
UXO clearance rates. The current project plan
is to open places for 8,000 soldiers over a
three-year period. In addition ro providing a
first-class reintegration option for the former
fighters involved, this project will add a total
of 8,000 man-years of demining ro rhe
Programme.
Given rhar Afghanistan became a
Srare Parry to the Ottawa Convention on 1
March 2003, the country must destroy all
stockpiles of ami-personnel mines on irs territory within four years. Despite rhe destruction
of over 5,000 stockpiled anti-personnel mines
since the tteaty cmered into force, there is still
a srrong need ro identify and destroy rhe large
quantities of ami-personnel mines stockpiled
around the counuy. As a result, the Ministry of
Defence, with support from the North
Arlamic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led
ISAF and rhe MAPA, has developed a Strategic
Plan for rhe National Destruction of AmiPersonnel Mines, which is based on lessons
learned from a successful srockpile destruction
pilot project carried out in Kabul in 2003 and
early 2004. The stockpile destruction project
aims to survey, assess, collect and destroy amipersonnel srockpiles around rhe counrry,
develop national regulations on the transportation, storage and desrrucrion of ami-personnel mines, and to conduct a public information campaign on the significance and
scope of rhe stockpile destruction initiative.
The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
(NAMSA), which is NATO's principal logistic
support management agency, will also be proving project management staff ro assist the
Ministry of Defence.

In order to mobilize resources
through the humanitarian, reconstruction and
peace-building channels, rhe United Nations
and the MAPA NGOs have had to accept a
myriad of different funding modalities alongside the traditional grants-based approach of
the VTF. This has taxed rhe NGOs' ability ro
administer rhe grants and contracts management side of rheir operations. The United
Nations has also been forced to increase and
diversify its skills base. The United Nations
Mine Action Center for Afghanistan
(UNMACA), working out of eight major cities
in Mghanisran, now employs over 150 people,
including 17 expatriates, to coordinate the

increasingly complex MAPA and to manage
host government and donor relations. Five of
these expatriates, (including lawyers, fund-raisers and finance sraff) work full rime and another three senior managers dedicate parr of their
rime ro raise money or help rhe NGOs administer and report on the money rhar has been
raised, with the rest of rhe expatriate rime spent
coordinating rhe NGOs' field operations or in
support fu nctions. To lessen the reliance on
expatriates and ro smooth rhe way for the
evenrual transition to national administration,
rhe UNMACA has also beefed up rhe training
capacity within the Programme and has inrroduced dedicated training courses for rhe
NGOs 111 financial adminisrrarion and
accounting.
Despite the challenges, the emergence of a post-Taliban Mghan governmenr
has had a positive impact on mine action in rhe
country, both in terms of being able ro plan
with a recognized government that is a State
Parry to rhe Ottawa Convention and also in
being able to work with that government ro
raise rhe resources necessaty ro pay for rhe plan.
The next challenge is to create the opportunity
to transition a programme rhar has been
administered by the United Nations for rhe
past 14 years to a national authority rhar has the
capacity to continue ro manage this complex
Programme in rhe years ahead. A thorough and
derailed transition plan that sets out the criteria
and milestones for a successful transition
should be released in the coming months.

Contact Information:
Patrick F rucher
UNMACA External Relations Officer
P.O. Box No. 520
Kabul, Afghanistan
Tel: +870 762 918 170
Fax: +870 762 918 171
E-mail: parriek@unmaca.org

The

OTTHWH COUUEUTIOU
in Perspective

Seldom has a name caused such
polarity among like-m inded people, in this
case those concerned with mine action. The
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) of 1997, commonly called the "Mine Ban
Treaty," or more often the "Orrawa Treary, " is
loved by some- loathed by ochers. To some ir
is rhe lynchpin of mine action activities, ro
others ir is a disrracter from pragmatic mine
action challenges. Some will nor take action
against mines without "it" being invoked, others will nor rake action if "ir" is invoked.
As an American involved in rhe
mine action community, being a citizen of a
major non-signatory to the convention, I
often fed rhe scorn of Orrawa boosters.
Usually this comes in rhe form of icy silence (I
am often given the role of rhe Invisible Man at
APMBC-relared gatherings), and sometimes
via obstructionism. Bur as rhc director of a
global outreach cemer, I also observe the disdain of "Ottawa" doubters who seem to have
little time for reflection on rhe benefits of rhe
convention.
As we approach rhe review of rhe
APMBC, I think iris rime to rake a forthright
look ar it and have the courage and good sense
ro accept ir for what it is and does-and what
it is not and does nor do.

The Stlqma of Landmine Use
The "Mine Ban Treaty" has certainly chilled the production, use and transfer
of landmines. The public's knowledge about
rhe latent landmine threat has, ro some
degree, been engaged by Princess Diana and
the APMBC. Bur even among policy makers
and rhe international community, there is no
d oubt that rhe issue of anti-personnel landmines has come ro rhe fore largely because of
rhe dialog, meetings, discussions, and provisions of the convention and that the doctrinal

Communication, Coordination and
Consensus

and conventional use of landmines has been
dramatically reduced because of the stigma
attached to them. This is no small fear and
provides a global mindser within which mine
action can now effectively rake place.

tockplle Destruction
Another clear benefit of rhc
APMBC is rhar it has provided a finite,
acceptable and measurable way to destroy
stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines. We
need nor assume rhat all landmines rhar have
been rhus destroyed were viable or that all
landmine stocks have been accurately
accounted for. T he salient fact is rhat massive
numbers oflandmines have been systematically destroyed and thar national programs
brought into being for this purpose have been
not only successful, bur have facilitated the
coordination of complementary humanitarian
efforts within some countries. Indeed the use
of some military organizations to carry our rhe
destruction of landmine stockpiles has
enhanced their role in humanitarian efforts.

A third effect of rhe APMBC is that
ir has focused much arrention and facilitated
much action on the activities and functions of
what we have come to call "mine action."
Without the meetings of rhe lnrersessional
Workgroups, steering committees, the submission of reports and presentations, many
governments, non governmental organizations (NGOs) , donors, and the United
Nations would not have been able to define
and propose action plans ro address rhe wide
scope of mine action challenges. The pure acr
of having real-rime discussions among groups
rhar might ordinarily never see one another,
much less engage in dialog, has lead to new
partnerships, new approaches to mine action
activities, and if nor always a clear consensus,
rhen ar least a greater understanding of rhe
p roblem and an awareness of others engaged
in the effort. The fact rhar national governmental agencies of countries at risk are routinely coordinating wirh NGOs, visiting militaries, rhe United Nations, regional organizations and donor countries is truly amazing.
The meetings of rhe various venues of the
APMBC provide a good sounding board in
which ideas compere for arrention and general approval.

estrlction of HPLs by the
.onuention on Conventional
JJeapons
Ill

On the other hand, rhe APMBC is
nor rhe only international instrument to
restrict rhe use of anti-personnel landmines,
but for some reason, many "Mine Ban Treaty"
advocates often fail to add rhe aurhoriry of
Protocol II of rhe Convention on Conven-
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